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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1998 this author published the first comprehensive law
review article examining legal issues surrounding the “off-label
use”1 of Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved
prescription drugs and medical devices.2 That article was cited
twice by the United States Supreme Court,3 then by many other
courts,4 and served as a catalyst for a great deal of subsequent legal
* James M. Beck is an attorney and Senior Life Sciences Policy Analyst at
Reed Smith LLP. The author would like to thank Stephen S. Phillips, Esq.,
recently retired Special Counsel for Medtronic, Inc., for his persistent
encouragement, without which this Article would probably not have been
undertaken.
1. At the time, the same practice was variously denominated “unapproved
use” (the term favored by FDA), “non-approved use,” “non-label use,” and “extralabel use.” E.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 28 n.1 (D.D.C.
1995) (discussing FDA terminology). “Off-label use” was chosen as the more
accurate phrase because “unapproved use” incorrectly suggested that FDA
“approves” how physicians therapeutically prescribe drugs and medical devices.
See Part II infra. Perhaps due to the initial article, “off-label use” is now the
predominate descriptive term.
2. See James Beck & Elizabeth Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, & Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths & Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71 (1998).
Co-author Elizabeth Azari is now Senior Vice President of Operations of the
National Board of Medical Examiners. There is “no difference between the ‘off
label’ use of drugs and devices,” so this article does not distinguish between
them, except where appropriate in addressing federal reimbursement and statelaw duties to warn. Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270,
1283 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011); see Christopher
Wittich, Christopher Burkle, & William Lanier, Ten Common Questions (&
Their Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 986
(2012) (“In developing legal precedents for off-label therapies, courts have
typically treated drugs and devices as coequals.”).
3. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350, 351 n.5 (2001).
4. Cordray v. Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region, 911 N.E.2d 871, 881
(Ohio 2009); Southard v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101, 104 (Pa. 2001);
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012); Wash. Legal
Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000); In re Orthopedic Bone
Screw Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 830 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom.
Buckman, 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 919 (N.J. App.
Div. 2002); Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. App. 2000); Alvarez v.
Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 654 n.1 (Fla. App. 1998); United States ex rel. The Dan
Abrams Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. LACV1501212JAKASX, 2017 WL 4023092,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2017), aff’d in pertinent part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, ___ F. App’x ___, No. 19-56377, slip op. at 3-6 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2021);
Shoemaker v. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. CV 16-568 (DWF/KMM), 2017 WL
1180444, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2017); United States ex rel. D’Agostino v.
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and medical scholarship on the topic of off-label use.5
EV3, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 519, 535 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2016); United States ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Global, Inc. (Modglin II), 114 F.
Supp.3d 993, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 678 F. App’x. 594 (9th Cir. 2017) (on
district court opinion); United States ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Glob., Inc. (Modglin
I), 48 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1370 (C.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 678 F. App’x. 594 (9th Cir.
2017) (on district court opinion); Patteson v. Maloney, 968 F. Supp. 2d 169, 171
(D.D.C. 2013); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1137 (D. Idaho
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015); Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp.
2d 769, 778 (D. Minn. 2009); Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA,
226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 217 n.20 (D.D.C. 2002); Bober v. Glaxo Wellcome, No. 99
C 3243, 1999 WL 759364, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999), aff’d, 246 F.3d 934 (7th
Cir. 2001); Stirling v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. CV01-18-4880, 2019 WL
6456186, at *2 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2019); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 317 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013); Bay v.
Abel, No. CJ200206805, 2004 WL 5453008 (Okla. Dist. Apr. 21, 2004); Baron v.
Pfizer, Inc., 12 Misc. 3d 1169(A), 1169(a), 820 N.Y.S.2d 841, 841, 2006 WL
1623052, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), aff’d, 840 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007).
5. E.g., George Horvath, Off-Label Drug Risks: Toward a New FDA
Regulatory Approach, 29 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCI. 101 (2020); Wendy
Teo, FDA & the Practice of Medicine: Looking at Off-Label Drugs, 41 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 305 (2017); Colleen Conners, Illuminating the Off-label Fable:
How Off-Label Promotion May Actually Help Patients, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
91 (2017); William Comanor & Jack Needleman, The Law, Economics, &
Medicine of Off-Label Prescribing, 91 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2016); Rodney Smolla,
Off-Label Drug Advertising & the First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
81 (2015); Marcia Boumil & Kaitlyn Dunn, Off-Label Marketing of
Pharmaceutical Products in the Wake of United States v. Caronia & United
States v. Harkonen, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 385 (2014); Phillip Palmer,
Jr., Medical Device Immunity: Should Promotion of Off-Label Uses Leave
Medical Device Manufacturers Vulnerable to Unlimited Liability?, 35 J. LEGAL
MED. 553 (2014); Gregory Conko & Bartley Madden, Free to Choose Medicine,
14 ENGAGE 4 (2013); Narcyz Ghinea, Wendy Lipworth, Ian Kerridge & Richard
Day, No Evidence or No Alternative? Taking Responsibility for Off-Label
Prescribing, 42 INTERNAL MED. J. 247 (2012); Kristin Eichel, Focusing on
Fraud: The Federal Government Expands Its Use of the False Claims Act to
Police Off-Label Pharmaceutical Promotion, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 399 (2011);
Philip Rosoff & Doriane Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of Physicians’
Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2011); Briana Barron,
Silent Warning: The FDA’s Ban On Off-Label Speech: Is It Protecting Our
Safety?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 983 (2011); Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils
& Protection of Off-Label Drug & Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX
149 (2011); John Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective
on Regulating Off-Label Scientific & Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH
& POL. L. & ETHICS 299 (2010); Allison Burroughs, Mark Levy, Gregory Schwab,
& Young Paik, Off-Label Promotion: Government Theories of Prosecution &
Facts That Drive Them, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555 (2010); Rebecca Dresser &
Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional &
Government Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476 (2009); Joshua Cohen,
Andrew Wilson, & Laura Faden, Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 391 (2009); Emily Largent, Franklin Miller, & Steven Pearson, Going
Off-Label Without Venturing Off-Course: Evidence & Ethical Off-Label
Prescribing, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1745 (2009); Randall Stafford,
Regulating Off-Label Drug Use Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1427 (2008); Richard Ausness, “There’s Danger Here, Cherie!”: Liability
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This Article presents a comprehensive update of legal issues
concerning off-label use as they have evolved in the 25 years since
the initial article was published. First, it addresses the context in
which off-label use should be evaluated and its now well-established
medical and legal status. Second, it updates decisions concerning
the “widespread,” “accepted,” and “necessary” points for which the
original article was cited by the Supreme Court. Third, this Article
addresses two off-label topics that have evolved largely since the
original 1998 article was written: First Amendment free-speech
protection and federal preemption. Fourth, this Article revisits the
core of the 1998 article – informed consent. Fifth, and finally, this
Article discusses often fraught relationship between off-label use
and promotion and the legal standards applicable to product
liability litigation.

II. OFF-LABEL USE – THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
Except for certain controlled substances,6 the practice of
medicine by licensed physicians and other health care providers is
not regulated by the federal government, but rather is governed by
state statutory and common law.7 “[W]hen Congress wants to
for the Promotion & Marketing of Drugs & Medical Devices for Off-Label Uses,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 1253 (2008); Daniel Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do OffLabel Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? A Critical
Analysis of Physicians’ Argumentation for Initial Efficacy Requirements, 67 AM.
J. ECON. & SOC. 743 (2008); Ralph Hall & Robert Berlin, When You Have a
Hammer Everything Looks Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act
to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653 (2006); Christian
Tomaszewski, Off-Label: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 2 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY
87 (2006); David Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient?: Why
the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech from Drug
Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 315
(2005); Donald Arbitblit & Wendy Fleishman, The Risky Business of Off-Label
Use, 41-MAR TRIAL 46 (2005); Glenn Smith, Avoiding Awkward Alchemy in the
Off Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Research
Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L.R. 963 (1999); James O’Reilly
& Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber & Marketer Liability for
Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295 (2003);
Steven Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription & Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs:
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1999);
Veronica. Henry, Off-Label Prescribing: Legal Implications, 20 J. LEGAL MED.
365 (1999).
6. See 42 U.S.C. §290bb-2a (2021) (providing that the federal government
“shall determine the appropriate methods of professional practice in the medical
treatment” of drug addiction).
7. “It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce
standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there.
It is a vital part of a state’s police power. The state’s discretion in that field
extends naturally to the regulation of all professions concerned with health.”
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954); see Planned Parenthood
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regulate medical practice in the given scheme, it does so by explicit
language in the statute.”8
The modern Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)9 came into
being in 1938, with the FDA being authorized to regulate, inter alia,
the labeling of prescription drugs.10 “Labeling” has been construed
broadly to include promotional and informational material such as
product inserts and brochures distributed to doctors, whether or not
physically accompanying the product.11 In 1962, the FDA obtained
power to regulate advertising and promotion of drugs, as distinct
from “labeling.”12 In 1976, the FDA’s authority was expanded to
include regulation of medical devices, including their labeling and
promotion.13
Under the federal FDCA, before a prescription medical product
may be marketed in the United States, it must have FDA approval
or clearance to be labeled for at least one intended use.14 FDA
review “shall be based upon the proposed labeling submitted” by the
applicant,15 and is thus limited to the submitted intended use(s).16
Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “the
practice of medicine . . . is the exclusive realm of individual states”); Betancur
v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 296 F. App’x. 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that
“[s]tates retain the police power to regulate professions, such as the practice of
medicine” (citation omitted)); Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA, No.
20-1784, 2020 WL 5745974, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 2020) (finding that “state
medical boards − not [the FDA] − control how physicians can prescribe or use
drugs”); Goico v. FDA, No. 20-1248-JAR-KGG, 2020 WL 7078731, at *8 (D. Kan.
Dec. 3, 2020) (concluding that regulation of off-label use “is generally within the
states’ exclusive authority”) (footnote omitted).
8. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 272 (2006).
9. 21 U.S.C. §§301-399h (2021).
10. 21 U.S.C. §321(p)(1) (2021) (defining “new drug” as any substance
covered by the FDCA not “generally recognized, among experts . . . as safe and
effective for use under the conditions prescribed . . . in the labeling”); see United
States v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles of Drug . . . Equidantin
Nitrofurantoin Suspension . . ., 675 F.2d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D.N.J. 1981))
(describing evolution of FDCA and its regulation of drug labeling).
11. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1948) (“[Labeling] . . .
includes what is contained within the package whether or not it is ‘upon’ the
article or its wrapper or container.”).
12. Kefauver Harris Amendments to the FDCA, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §131(a),
76 Stat. 780, 791-92 (1962); see Merck & Co. v. United States Dep’t of HHS, 385
F. Supp. 3d 81, 95 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 962 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (observing
that, “as part of the Drug Amendments of 1962, Congress amended . . . the
FDCA to impose content requirements for prescription drug advertisements”).
“Behind the 1962 amendments were concerns that doctors could not adequately
evaluate frequently misleading claims by drug manufacturers without a body
of objective, reliable information.” Caronia, 703 F.3d at 178.
13. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat 539.
14. 21 C.F.R. §§201.57(c)(2) (2021), 807.92(a)(5) (2021).
15. 21 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(E)(i) (2021) (devices); see 21 U.S.C. §355(d) (2021)
(providing for FDA drug approvals based on review of “the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling”).
16. “FDA’s review of a [product’s] safety and effectiveness was not universal;
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“[D]uring the approval process, the agency can look solely to [the
applicant’s] labeling claims to determine the intended use of its
drug.”17 However, because the FDA does not have authority to
regulate the practice of medicine, physicians may use legally
marketed drugs or devices in any way that they believe, in their
professional judgment, will best serve their patients.18
Prior to the enactment of the FDCA, there were no drug
“labels,” and thus no “off-label use.” Therapeutic use of drugs and
medical devices in the practice of medicine was predicated on the
“standard of care” – that accumulation of clinical experience
suggesting that the benefits outweighed the risks of any given
medical treatment, and the relative safety of the drug or device
being prescribed compared to the seriousness of the medical
condition being treated.19 “[M]edical practice guidelines, and thus
the standard of care, revolve around medical decisions that are
‘medically necessary’ and ‘evidence-based,’ whereas the distinction
between on-label and off-label is made solely through the FDA
approval process.”20 As discussed herein, that standard of care is
not set by the FDA-approved labeling for prescription medical
products.21 Indeed, the FDCA “expressly contemplates the
possibility that physicians may use [approved products] for
unapproved purposes.”22
[but] focused only on the intended use specified by a manufacturer.” De La Paz
v. Bayer Healthcare LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Weinreb v. Xerox Bus. Servs.,
LLC, 323 F. Supp. 3d 501, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that FDA drug approval
is “for one type of use and/or for one condition”); Nightingale Home Healthcare,
Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, No. 1:06-cv-1435-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 4367554,
at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2008) (concluding that “FDA premarket clearance . . .
is limited in scope to the indications and uses declared by the applicant in its
application”), aff’d, 589 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2009). “[P]harmaceuticals are studied
for certain indications for which they are determined to be safe and effective.
No other indication is approved because the drug is not known to be either safe
or effective for any other purpose.” Mary J. Davis, Time for a Fresh Look at
Strict Liability for Pharmaceuticals, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 435
(2019) (footnote omitted).
17. Spectrum Pharms., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
18. See Part III(A) infra.
19. E.g., State v. Nucklos, 904 N.E.2d 512, 515 (Ohio 2009) (finding that
compliance with medical standard of care in prescribing opioids not an
affirmative defense); State v. Sturman, 56 N.E.3d 1187, 1207 (Ind. App. 2016)
(holding that “practitioners define the appropriate standards of care based on
their experience in practicing medicine over time”); Hawkins v. Greenberg, 304
S.E.2d 922, 925 (Ga. App. 1983) (determining that the standard of care “places
upon a physician the duty to determine the proper medication for each patient,
weighing its benefits against its potential dangers”).
20. Katherine A. Blair, In Search of the Right RX: Use of the Federal False
Claims Act in Off-Label Drug Promotion Litigation, 23 HEALTH L. 44, 45 (2011)
(footnote omitted).
21. See Part VI(C) infra.
22. Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 766-67 (3d Cir. 2018)
(applying Pennsylvania law); see United States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharms.,
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While it is a common misconception that the FDA regulates
how drugs are prescribed or how medical devices are used, that is
not the case. The FDA does not “approve” uses at all, and only
approves products in the context of labeling for their intended
uses.23 The FDA determines whether to approve or clear products
only for marketing and labeling of the “intended use” submitted by
to it.24 To be marketed, a product need only have a single intended
use.25 All treatments beyond such intended uses are a matter of
discretionary medical practice, outside the realm of FDA regulation
– that is “off-label” use.
“Use [of a drug or medical device] for any purpose other than
what is approved by the FDCA is ‘off-label.’”26 Off-label use occurs
in a variety of contexts: it “is the therapeutic27 use of a prescription
Inc., 871 F.3d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that the “FDA does not restrict
physicians from prescribing an otherwise FDA-approved drug for an off-label
use” (citation omitted)); Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 (stating that “FDA’s . . .
approval process generally contemplates that approved [products] will be used
in off-label ways”); White v. Medtronic, Inc. (White II), 808 F. App’x 290, 296
(6th Cir. 2020) (deciding that “the FDCA expressly contemplated the off-label
use of medical devices”) (applying Michigan law); In re Smith & Nephew
Birmingham Hip Resurfacing (BHR) Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (BHR II),
401 F. Supp. 3d 538, 553 (D. Md. 2019) (finding that 21 U.S.C. §396 “implicitly
endorses off-label use of devices”); Aaron v. Medtronic, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 994,
1008 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (asserting that FDA “knew that medical devices often are
− and that [this product] in particular likely would be − used in an off-label
manner” (citations omitted)); S. Ill. Laborers’ & Emp’rs Health & Welfare Fund
v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 08 CV 5175KMW, 2009 WL 3151807, at *2 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2009) (concluding that “the Supreme Court and the FDA have recognized
and approved of the off-label use of drugs and medical devices” (citation
omitted)).
23. See, e.g., Is It Really ‘FDA Approved?’, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/it-really-fda-approved
[perma.cc/MBP9-T8HE] (last updated Jan. 17, 2017) (stating that for drugs, “[i]f
FDA grants an approval, it means the agency has determined that the benefits
of the product outweigh the known risks for the intended use.” For medical
devices, the standard is “reasonable assurance that the devices are safe and
effective for their intended uses.”); New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-applicationnda [perma.cc/2XCK-NVFH] (last updated June 10, 2019) (“The law is intended
to assure consumers . . . that drugs and devices are safe and effective for their
intended uses[.]”). Thus, this article speaks of FDA approval or clearance of
regulated products in terms of “for marketing and labeling” for particular uses.
24. See 21 C.F.R. §§201.128 (2021) (identifying prescription drugs), 801.4
(2021) (labeling medical devices). An abortive effort to revise the “intended use”
regulations led to indefinite suspension of the current language in 2018. See
infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
25. See Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments, Manufacturer
Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical
Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 60299, 60300 (Sept. 1, 2016) (FDA regulated medical
products “may be legally introduced into interstate commerce for at least one
other intended use.”).
26. Stiens v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 2018-CA-1762-MR,
2020 WL 7266398, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2020).
27. See Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2013)
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drug or medical device for: (1) a condition; (2) in a population; (3) for
a period of time; or (4) in a dose or other means of administration
other than what the FDA has either approved or cleared (in the case
of most medical devices) for marketing and labeling.”28 “Any use by
a physician which differs from the use described in the label or from
the patient conditions described in the label is called ‘off-label.’”29
The FDA distinguishes between on- and off-label uses in terms of
an article’s “intended use:”
The words intended uses or words of similar import . . . refer to the
objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of
[the article]. The intent is determined by such persons’ expressions or
may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of
the article. . . . It may be shown by the circumstances that the article
is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives,
offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor
advertised. The intended uses of an article may change after it has
been introduced into interstate commerce by its manufacturer. . . .
But if a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of facts that would
give him notice that [an article] introduced into interstate commerce
by him is to be used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the
ones for which he offers it, he is required to provide adequate labeling
for such a device which accords with such other uses to which the
article is to be put.30

This definition has existed since the 1950s31 − before
(distinguishing between “therapeutic off-label use” and “medical experiments”)
(applying California law).
28. “Off-label use is defined . . . as the prescription of drugs for indications,
in dosages, and following treatment protocols different from those expressly
approved by the FDA.” Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 878 (citation omitted). Off-label
use includes “prescriptions of the drug for a condition not indicated on the label,
treating an indicated condition at a different dose or frequency than specified
on the label, or treating a different patient population than approved by the
FDA.” Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP, 634 F.3d 1352,
1356 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011). “A doctor’s off-label prescription also may involve
using a drug for an approved condition but at an unapproved dosage or directed
to an unapproved patient population.” Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States
FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “The term ‘off-label’ refers to
the use of a prescription drug for any purposes − any indication, dosage form,
dosage regimen, or population − not specifically approved by the FDA.” In re
Schering-Plough
Corp.
Intron/Temodar
Consumer
Class
Action
(Intron/Temodar I), No. 2:06-CV-5774(SRC), 2009 WL 2043604, at *2 (D.N.J.
July 10, 2009) (citation omitted).
29. Carson v. Depuy Spine, Inc., 365 F. App’x 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2010)
(applying California law).
30. 21 C.F.R. §§201.128 (prescription drugs), 801.4 (medical devices) (both
pre-2017).
31. See 21 C.F.R. §1.106(o) (1952) (setting forth original language); 17 Fed.
Reg. 6818, 6820 (July 25, 1952) (codified in 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(a)(1) (1952 Cum.
Supp.)) (providing basis for original language); see also Gregory Gentry,
Criminalizing Knowledge: The Perverse Implications of the Intended Use
Regulations for Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 441,
447-48 (2009) (describing 1952 origin of this language).
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commercial speech was afforded any First Amendment protection.32
The definition of “intended use” is currently in limbo. In early 2017,
the FDA issued a final rule that would have replaced that archaic
definition with a “totality of the evidence” test.33 However, this
revised definition has been withdrawn,34 and as of the date of this
Article the FDA appears to be starting over.35
By the terms of the unmodified “intended use” definition, mere
knowledge of an impending off-label use, without more, would
create a change in intended use.36 Historically, however, the FDA
has avoided an interpretation. “FDA would not regard a firm as
intending an unapproved new use for an approved or cleared drug
or device based solely on that firm’s knowledge that its product was
being prescribed or used by healthcare providers for such use.”37
Courts have also reached the same conclusion. Section “801.4 must
be read in conjunction with other statutes and regulations
governing both a manufacturer’s right to disseminate information
about off-label uses and a manufacturer’s ability to alter a label that
has been approved by the FDA.”38 “[A] manufacturer is not liable
32. See Part IV(A) infra.
33. See 21 C.F.R. §§201.128, 801.4 (2021 suspended) (establishing that “if
the totality of the evidence establishes that a manufacturer objectively intends
that [an article] introduced into interstate commerce by him is to be used for
conditions, purposes, or uses other than ones for which it is approved (if any),
he is required . . . to provide for such [article] adequate labeling that accords
with such other intended uses”).
34. Regulations Regarding “Intended Uses”, 85 Fed. Reg. 59718 (Sept. 23,
2020) (“This action will . . . repeal and replace the portions of a final rule issued
on January 9, 2017, that never became effective.”).
35. The FDA stated:
The Agency is proposing to delete the last sentence of §§201.128 and
801.4 and to insert a new clause in the body of the regulations (“provided,
however, that a firm would not be regarded as intending an unapproved
new use for an [approved or cleared medical product] based solely on that
firm’s knowledge that such [product] was being prescribed or used by
health care providers for such use”) to clarify that a firm’s knowledge
that health care providers are prescribing or using its approved or
cleared medical product for an unapproved use would not, by itself,
automatically trigger obligations for the firm to provide labeling for that
unapproved use.
Id. at 59720.
36. Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1995) (“FDA
regulations require manufacturers to provide appropriate labeling if the
manufacturer has reason to believe that its medical device might be used for
purposes different from the purposes for which the device is approved.” (citing
§801.4) (footnote omitted)) (applying Louisiana law).
37. Notice of Further Delayed Effective Date and Request for Comments,
Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated
as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations
Regarding “Intended Uses”, 82 Fed. Reg. 14319, 14320 (Mar. 20, 2017); see 85
Fed. Reg. at 59722 (reiterating this position in the context of currently ongoing
rulemaking).
38. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 781; see United States v. Prigmore, 243 F.3d 1,
20 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that court “not persuaded” that FDA prosecution
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merely because it sells a device with knowledge that the prescribing
doctor intends an off-label use.”39 Mere “calculated silence” even
where a manufacturer knows that off-label use of a defendant’s
product will occur − does not rise to illegal promotion.40 The FDA
has also prosecuted off-label use as “adulteration” where a deviation
from a product’s labeled intended use actually introduces serious
new product risks.41
In general, however, off-label medical practice is not regulated
at the federal level.42 “States have a compelling interest in the
practice of professions within their boundaries.”43 Courts recognize
“professional licensing and regulation [a]s a traditional area of state
power.”44 “The right to practice medicine . . . is subject to the
paramount police power of the state.”45
So, although “states have traditionally been recognized to have
broad authority to regulate the practice of medicine,”46 aside from
occasional attempts to restrict use of abortifacients,47 state-law
“can be premised upon . . . a sincerely unintended and warned-against, albeit
known, condition of use” (footnote omitted)); Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson
(Cornett I), 998 A.2d 543, 564 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (holding that
“federal law does not treat an off-label use as ‘intended’ when the manufacturer
simply has knowledge of it”), aff’d, 48 A.3d 1041 (N.J. 2012); Ass’n of Am.
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d at 218 (rejecting FDA “regulation
of all off-label uses, based solely on the manufacturer’s knowledge that those
uses are common-place”).
39. Carson, 365 F. App’x at 815; see Dan Abrams Co., 2017 WL 4023092, at
*3 (holding that “sale of a device for off-label use does not constitute a per se
violation of the FDCA”); Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (concluding that “it was
not unlawful, under the FDCA, for [a manufacturer] to become aware of offlabel uses of [its product] and not seek to change its label to warn of those uses”).
40. Seavey v. Globus Med., Inc., Civ. No. 11-2240 (RBK/JS), 2014 WL
1876957, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014).
41. In one instance, re-use of a medical device limited to “single use” – while
an off-label use – was prosecuted as adulteration where it created new risks of
contamination and infection. See United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1211
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “off-label use does not immunize a physician who
uses adulterated products” because “off-label use of adulterated products is
beyond the scope of the privilege”).
42. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §396 (2021) (expressly precluding FDA from
regulating off-label use of medical devices); 21 C.F.R. §312.2(d) (2021) (same for
prescription drugs).
43. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)
44. Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 567,
577 n.9 (3d Cir. 2017).
45. Comm’n on Med. Discipline v. Stillman, 435 A.2d 747, 755 (Md. 1981)
(citation omitted); see People v. Rogers, 641 N.W.2d 595, 605 (Mich. Ct. App.
2001) (observing that “[i]t is well established that a state can legitimately
impose broad regulations on the practice of medicine through its police
powers”).
46. Teo, supra note 5, at 324.
47. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865
N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2015) (declaring statute prohibiting off-label medication
abortions unconstitutional); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 855 N.W.2d 31 (N.D.
2014) (same); Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253 (Okla. 2013)
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interventions restricting the off-label uses of prescription medical
products have been infrequent.48 On the other hand, well over half
the states have enacted legislation, supportive of off-label use, that
restricts insurance companies’ ability to deny coverage.49 A couple
(same); Cordray, 911 N.E.2d 871 (interpreting statute as prohibiting off-label
medication abortions); Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905
(9th Cir. 2014) (requiring preliminary injunction against statute prohibiting offlabel medication abortions); Planned Parenthood of Cincinnati Region v.
Strickland, 531 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2008) (certifying issue decided in Cordray);
Planned Parenthood v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming in part
preliminary injunction against enforcement of similar statute); McCormack,
900 F. Supp. 2d (declaring statute prohibiting off-label medication abortions
unconstitutional); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §20-16-1502 (2021) (prohibiting offlabel medication abortions).
48. See 3 COLO. CODE REGS. §713-30:2(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2021) (regulating
off-label use for cosmetic purposes); D.C. CODE §48-841.03 (2021) (requiring
informed consent); 30-026 MISS. CODE R. §2640.1.5 (LexisNexis 2021)
(restricting off-label use of obesity drugs); id. §2635.4.1 (same for off-label use
of EDTA for chelation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3719.06(B) (LexisNexis 2020)
(same for off-label use of steroids); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4731-11-04 (2020) (same
for off-label use of obesity drugs); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §246-851-590(9) (2021)
(prohibiting off-label use of opioids).
49. See ALA. CODE §27-1-10.1 (2021) (prohibiting coverage denial of most offlabel uses treating “life threatening” illnesses); ALASKA STAT. §21.42.415(c)(5)
(2020) (same for cancer); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§20-826(R), 20-1057(V); 20-1342(F),
20-1402(F), 20-2326 (LexisNexis 2021) (same for cancer); ARK. CODE ANN. §2379-147 (2021) (same for cancer); CAL. INS. CODE §10123.195 (2021) (same for
life threatening illnesses); COLO. REV. STAT. §10-16-104.6 (2020) (same for
cancer); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§38a-492b to -518b (2020) (same for cancer and
other “disabling or life-threatening chronic diseases”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§3350(b) (2020) (same for “chronic, disabling or life-threatening illness”); FLA.
STAT. §627.4239(2) (2020) (same for cancer); GA. CODE ANN. §33-24-59.11 (2020)
(same for “life threatening” illnesses); id. §33-53-2 (2020) (same for cancer); 5
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/370r, 375/6.4 (2020) (same for cancer); IND. CODE §§27-8-201 to -9 (2021) (same for cancer); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§40-2,167 to -170 (2021)
(same for cancer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:999(B) (2020) (same for cancer); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 24, §§2320-F-G (2020) (same for cancer and AIDS); MD. CODE
ANN., INS. §15-804 (West 2021) (same for all off-label use); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 175, §§47K-P (2020) (same for cancer, diabetes, and AIDS); id. ch. 176A, §8Q
(same for AIDS); MICH. COMP. LAWS §500.3406q (2020) (same for any “lifethreatening condition”); id. §550.1416c(1) (2020) (same for “life threatening” or
“chronic and seriously debilitating” conditions); MINN. STAT. §62Q.525 (2021)
(same for cancer); MISS. CODE ANN. §83-9-8 (2021) (same for cancer); MO. REV.
STAT. §376.429(3) (2020) (same for cancer, but only in context of clinical trial);
NEB. REV. STAT. §44-788(1-2) (2020) (same for cancer and AIDS); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§689A.0404(1), 689B.0365(1), 695B.1908(1) (2020) (same for cancer);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §415:6-g (2020) (same for off-label use generally); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§17:48-6h, 17:48A-7g, 17:48E-35.5, 17B:26-2.1g, 17B:27-46.1g,
26:1A-36.9 (West 2020) (same for off-label use generally); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§3216(i)(12), 4303(q) (McKinney 2021) (same for cancer); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§58-51-59(a), 58-65-94(a), 58-67-78(a) (2021) (same for cancer); N.D. CENT.
CODE §26.1-36-06.1 (2019) (same for off-label use generally); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§1751.66(A), 3923.60(A) (LexisNexis 2020) (same for off-label use
generally); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§1-2604-05 (2020) (same for cancer); OR. REV.
STAT. §743A.062 (2020) (same for off-label use generally); 28 PA. CODE §9.673(c)
(2021) (same for off-label use when alternative treatments are “ineffective”);

12

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

of states have outright legalized truthful off-label promotion.50
Off-label use – like any other treatment − can amount to
medical malpractice when it violates the recognized standard of
care.51 However, the mere fact of off-label use, in and of itself, does
not establish professional negligence:
New uses for drugs are often discovered after FDA approves the
package inserts that explain a drug’s approved uses. Congress would
have created havoc in the practice of medicine had it required
physicians to follow the expensive and time-consuming procedure of
obtaining FDA approval before putting drugs to new uses.52

Courts thus have disagreed with “suggestion[s] that an off-label
prescription alone may violate [the prescriber’s] duty of care.”53
Off-label use is legal and generally accepted. The federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act expressly disclaims any intent to regulate the
practice of medicine. . . . Plaintiffs have cited no case, and the Court
is aware of none, suggesting off-label prescriptions breach any
physician’s duty of care in [this state]. These claims are utterly
without basis in fact or law.54

P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§9981-84 (2020) (same for off-label use generally); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§27-55-1 to -3 (2020) (same for cancer); S.C. CODE ANN. §38-71-275
(2020) (same for cancer); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§58-17-101 to -06 (2021) (same
for cancer and other “life threatening” illnesses); TENN. CODE ANN. §56-7-2352
(2021) (same for off-label use generally); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§1369.004 to
1369.005 (2019), 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§21.3010-11 (2021) (same for “chronic,
disabling, or life-threatening illness”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§4100e (2021)
(same for cancer); VA. CODE ANN. §§38.2-3407.5 (same for off-label use
generally), 38.2-3407.6:1 (same for cancer) (2021); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §28430-450 (2021) (same for off-label use generally). See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF
INS. COMM’RS, OFF-LABEL DRUG USE MODEL ACT (1995) (prohibiting coverage
denial of most off-label uses treating “life threatening” illnesses).
50. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32-1997 (LexisNexis 2021) (providing that “a
pharmaceutical manufacturer or its representative may engage in truthful
promotion of an off-label use of a drug, biological product or device”); TENN.
CODE ANN. §53-10-113(b)(1) (2021) (providing that “[a] pharmaceutical
manufacturer or its representatives may engage in truthful promotion of offlabel uses”).
51. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 775 n.15.
52. United States v. Algon Chem., Inc., 879 F.2d 1154, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Palmer, Jr., supra
note 5, at 577 (affirming that “a physician’s creativity or an alternate use of a
medical device may save a life or cure an ailment”); id. (Thus, “a physician is
allowed to use a medical device for any purpose that he or she feels will improve
the patient’s condition[.]”).
53. Wilhoit v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., Nos. 07-MDL-1836
(JMR), 08-CV-5755 (JMR/FLN), 2009 WL 702007, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 13,
2009) (citations omitted) (applying Oklahoma law).
54. Id. at *3-4 (citations omitted); see Patteson, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 171
(holding that “such off-label prescription does not necessarily constitute
negligence”) (citations omitted); Castillo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 309886/10,
2015 WL 1291839, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 2015) (asserting that “the fact
that a drug or medication was not FDA approved for a particular condition does
not establish that it was not the standard of care for a physician to administer
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“In clinical practice, new uses or dosing regimens often become
widespread and well accepted long before they are reflected in the
labeling.”55 Indeed, on occasion, courts have ordered off-label
medical treatment.56
A fortiori from these professional negligence cases, courts have
held in §1983 cases57 that “allegations that the FDA did not approve
the alleged off-label use . . . [are] not enough to give rise to a
constitutional violation absent allegations of deliberate indifference
to [Plaintiff]’s medical needs.”58 Nor is §1983 necessarily implicated
by a decision to halt off-label medical treatment.59

it to a patient in an ‘off-label’ manner” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 33 N.Y.S.3d 269
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Bay, 2004 WL 5453008, at *1 (finding that “non-approval
by the FDA with regard to the [device] and technique utilized by Defendant does
not, per se, demonstrate or prove professional malpractice”).
55. Am. Acad. Pediatrics, Comm. on Drugs, Uses of Drugs Not Described in
the Package Insert (Off-Label Uses), 110 PEDIATRICS 181, 182 (2002); see Anna
B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 913, 939 (2015) (observing that “[i]n some cases, off-label use constitutes
the standard of care”); Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2, at 983-87 (“A
physician’s duty of care is defined as the same degree of care provided by other
physicians practicing under similar circumstances. Use of off-label medication
alone does not result in liability under negligence standards.” (footnote
omitted)).
56. In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434, 443 (Iowa 2016) (affirming
order to continue off-label treatment of child in custody dispute); United States
v. Garnos, No. 3:15-CR-30021-RAL, 2017 WL 548215, at *5 (D.S.D. Feb. 10,
2017) (ordering “involuntary administration” of off-label drugs to restore
competency to stand trial); Cruz v. Zucker, 218 F. Supp. 3d 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (ordering coverage of off-label “hormone therapies to treat individuals
with gender dysphoria” in §1983 case) (citation and quotation marks omitted);
State v. Richard Z., 49 N.Y.S.3d 278, 287 (N.Y. Sup. 2017) (ordering that sex
offender receive off-label chemical castration); cf. Herricks v. Pickaway Corr.
Inst., No. 2:08-CV-580, 2013 WL 4804983, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2013)
(holding that failure to provide off-label treatment could state §1983 claim for
“deliberate indifference”), aff’d, 782 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2015).
57. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2021).
58. Morgan v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice McConnell Unit, 537 F. App’x
502, 507 (5th Cir. 2013); accord, e.g., Schutt v. Wexford Health Servs., No.
119CV03590TWPMPB, 2019 WL 5692762, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 2019); Pride
v. Straga, No. 14-CV-414 JLS (DHB), 2018 WL 1726523, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
10, 2018); Torres v. UConn Health, No. 3:17-CV-00325 (SRU), 2017 WL
2369370, at *3 (D. Conn. May 31, 2017), amended as to other defendant, 2017
WL 3737945 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2017); Sanders v. Ocean Cnty. Bd. of
Freeholders, No. CV165380MASLHG, 2016 WL 6542834, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 3,
2016); Cox v. Levenhagen, No. 12-0320, 2013 WL 3322034, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July
1, 2013).
59. Turner v. Nolan, No. 17-CV-01486-CRB (PR), 2018 WL 1885454, at *910 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (not “medically unacceptable” as a matter of law to
“taper and discontinue” an off-label prescription), aff’d, 776 F. App’x 440 (9th
Cir. 2019). But see Herricks, 782 F.3d 744, at *7 (finding issue of fact).
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III. OFF-LABEL USE IS A RECOGNIZED AND ACCEPTED
ASPECT OF MEDICAL PRACTICE.
A. The General Status of Off-Label Use
The legality and propriety of off-label use was recognized by
the Supreme Court in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee.60
“[O]ff-label use is generally accepted” under the law as a “necessary
corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without
directly interfering with the practice of medicine.”61 The Supreme
Court’s reasoning has been widely followed, not only in the medical
device product liability/preemption context in which Buckman
arose,62 but also in product liability matters involving prescription
drugs,63 claims brought by third-party payors,64 False Claims Act
60. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
61. Id. at 350 (footnote omitted) (citing Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 7677).
62. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 766; Perez, 711 F.3d at 1115; White II, 808 F. App’x
at 295-96; Norabuena v. Medtronic, Inc., 86 N.E.3d 1198, 1208 (Ill. App. Ct.
2018); McCormick v. Medtronic, Inc., 101 A.3d 467, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2014); Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 304 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014); BHR II, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 553; In re Smith & Nephew Birmingham Hip
Resurfacing Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation (BHR I), No. 1:17-MD2775, 2019 WL 3557451, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2019); Fertik v. Stevenson, 186
F. Supp. 3d 98, 104 (D. Mass. 2016); Hafer v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d
844, 858 (W.D. Tenn. 2015); Thorn v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 81
F. Supp. 3d 619, 623, 627 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Wright v. Medtronic, Inc., 81 F.
Supp. 3d 600, 607, 611 (W.D. Mich. 2015); Scanlon v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek
USA, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 403, 411 (D. Del. 2014); Schouest v. Medtronic, Inc.,
13 F. Supp. 3d 692, 703 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Bertini v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 8 F.
Supp. 3d 246, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Smith v. Medtronic, Inc., C.A. No. 13-451,
2014 WL 2547813, at *4 n.3 (W.D. La. June 4, 2014); Houston v. Medtronic, Inc.
(Houston II), No. 2:13-CV-01679-SVW, 2014 WL 1364455, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
2, 2014); Ramirez v. Medtronic, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 988 (D. Ariz. 2013);
Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc. (Caplinger I), 921 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1218 n.3 (W.D.
Okla. 2013), aff’d, 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015); Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., C.A.
No. 12-0851, 2013 WL 3791612, at *11 (E.D. La. July 19, 2013); Healey v. IFlow, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 868, 880 (D. Minn. 2012); Wheeler v. DePuy Spine,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at
778; Davenport v. Medtronic, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 419, 439-40 (E.D. Pa. 2004);
McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-00005-LJM-WG, 2004 WL 2538642,
at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 16, 2004), aff’d, 421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005).
63. Markland v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 758 F. App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir.
2018) (applying Florida law); Evans v. Johnson & Johnson Co., No. CV 14-1316RGA, 2020 WL 616575, at *8 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2020); McDaniel v. Upsher-Smith
Pharms., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3d 707, 711 (W.D. Tenn. 2017), aff’d, 893 F.3d 941
(6th Cir. 2018); Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 37 A.3d 549, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2008), aff’d, 28 A.3d 1245 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (on the basis of trial
court opinion); Zitney v. Wyeth, LLC, No. 4100, 2020 WL 499137, at *1 n.1 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. Jan. 9, 2020), aff’d, 234 A.3d 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020); Stirling, 2019
WL 6456186, at *2.
64. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP, 634 F.3d 1352,
1356 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying law of multiple jurisdictions); In re Schering
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(“FCA”) litigation,65 state-law medical malpractice actions,66
criminal prosecutions,67 and miscellaneous matters.68
Commentators agree. “[O]ff-label use is an essential part of
medical practice.”69
[A] life-threatening or terminal medical condition may motivate a
health care professional to give any treatment that is logical and
available, whether approved by the FDA or not.70

Thus, “[p]hysicians may prescribe drugs and devices for offlabel uses.”71 “Physicians may, in their professional judgment,
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action (Intron/Temodar III),
678 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying federal and New Jersey law); S. Ill.
Laborers, 2009 WL 3151807, at *2 n.5; In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sale Practices
Litig. (Neurontin I), 244 F.R.D. 89, 92 (D. Mass. 2007).
65. United States ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 519, 535
(D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016); Modglin II, 114 F. Supp. 3d at
999; United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Atrium Med. Corp., No. CV SA-13-CA-244OLG, 2015 WL 13799885, at *11 n.131 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2015); Modglin I, 48
F. Supp. 3d at 1371; United States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 977 F. Supp.
2d 981, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 666 (9th Cir. 2016); United
States ex rel. Nowak v. Medtronic, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317 (D. Mass.
2011); United States ex rel. Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751
(S.D. Tex. 2010); United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., No.
4:05CV570MLM, 2006 WL 1064127, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2006) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Southard, 781 A.2d at 104; Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 918; Durham v.
Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-00438-TSB, 2017 WL
510268, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2017); Zbras v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., No.
CV950323593, 2003 WL 22039876, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2003), aff’d,
91 Conn. App. 289, 880 A.2d 999 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
67. Kaplan, 836 F.3d at 1211; Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153.
68. Planned Parenthood v. Humble, 753 F.3d at 915 (reproductive rights
litigation); Sigma-Tau Pharms., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 148 (4th Cir.
2002) (administrative law); Schaffer v. Horizon Pharma PLC, No. 16-CV-1763
(JMF), 2018 WL 481883, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018) (securities litigation);
Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc. v. BTL Indus., Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (Lanham Act litigation); Smith v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 783,
803 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (employment litigation); Hologic, Inc. v. Senorx, Inc., No.
C-08-00133RMW, 2008 WL 1860035, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2008) (patent
litigation).
69. Horvath, supra note 5, at 11.
70. Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2, at 982.
71. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351 & n.5 (quoting Michael Green & William
Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J.
2119, 2133 (2000)); see Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC (Wendell I), 858 F.3d
1227, 1230 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that
“[o]ff-label use of a drug is legal, and is generally based on published scientific
reports”) (applying California law); United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc.,
822 F.3d 613, 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (Polansky I) (deciding that “[t]he physician is
permitted to issue off-label prescriptions”); Planned Parenthood of Sw. Ohio
Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “it is
standard medical practice in the United States for physicians to prescribe FDAapproved drugs in dosages and for medical indications that were not specifically
approved − or even contemplated − by the FDA” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)) (applying Ohio law); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms.,
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prescribe a drug for a purpose other than that for which it has been
approved by the FDA.”72
Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 514 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (ruling
that “[d]octors may prescribe an FDA-approved drug for non-approved uses”);
Markland, 758 F. App’x at 780 (stating that “FDA also generally permits the
off-label prescription of drugs by physicians” (citations omitted)); Longoria v.
Ethicon, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-2573-T-60CPT, 2020 WL 8641587, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 23, 2020) (ultimately quoting Buckman (other citations omitted)); Goico,
2020 WL 7078731, at *4 (articulating that “physicians may exercise their
independent medical judgment to prescribe FDA-approved drugs to treat
conditions other than those for which the drug is approved, if appropriate for
the particular patient”); Simkins v. Grandview Hosp., No. 3:19-CV-227, 2020
WL 5362054, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2020) (agreeing that “the decision to
prescribe a particular drug for ‘off-label’ use belongs to the physician, not the
drug manufacturer”); United States ex rel. Gardner v. Vanda Pharms., Inc., No.
17-CV-00464 (APM), 2020 WL 2542121, at *6 (D.D.C. May 19, 2020) (concluding
that “physicians are free to prescribe drugs for off-label uses as they see fit”
(citation omitted)); Galinis v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-CV-04980-SI, 2019 WL
2716480, at *2 n.5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019) (quoting Wendell about legality of
off-label use); In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d
94, 102 (D. Mass. 2019) (establishing that “it is generally lawful for physicians
to prescribe medications for purposes for which they have not been FDAapproved”), vacated in part on other grounds (July 15, 2019); Fertik, 186 F.
Supp. 3d at 105 (adjudging that “a physician may use any device legally on the
market in any way the physician deems appropriate”); United States v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. CV 05-6795, 2016 WL 807363, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2016) (finding
that “physicians may lawfully prescribe prescription drugs for off-label uses”
(citation omitted)); Bertini, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 257-58 (decreeing that “off-label
usage of a medical device component is a widely accepted practice” (footnote
omitted)); Connolly v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-152-WCO, 2014 WL
12480025, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2014) (specifying that “physicians may and
often do prescribe drugs for unapproved, off-label uses”); United States ex rel.
Bennett, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (expounding that “off-label use of many products
and drugs is an accepted medical practice” (footnote omitted)); Smith v. Bard,
730 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (determining that “[p]hysicians may prescribe drugs for
off-label uses at their discretion” (citation omitted)); Cox v. Depuy Motech, Inc.,
No. 95-CV-3848-L(JA), 2000 WL 1160486, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2000)
(pronouncing that “[a] physician may use any device legally on the market in
any way the physician deems appropriate”).
72. T.H. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 407 P.3d 18, 24 n.1 (Cal. 2017) (citing
Buckman); see Stiens, 2020 WL 7266398, at *9 (holding that “[o]ff-label use is
not unlawful under state or federal law” (citation omitted)); Smith v. Surgery
Ctr. at Lone Tree, LLC, ___ P.3d ___, 2020 COA 145, 2020 WL 6066273, at *7
n.2 (Colo. App. Oct. 15, 2020) (deciding that “FDA generally does not regulate
how physicians use approved drugs”) (quoting Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153);
Caltagirone v. Cephalon, Inc., 190 A.3d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018)
(concluding that “physicians may prescribe medications for purposes other than
those approved by the FDA”); Sommers v. UPMC, 185 A.3d 1065, 1072 n.6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2018) (agreeing that “[d]octors are free to exercise their professional
judgement to prescribe FDA-approved drugs for any use they see fit”); People ex
rel. C.J.R., 409 P.3d 536, 538 (Colo. App. 2016) (finding that “once a drug is FDA
approved, a licensed physician generally may prescribe it for any purpose”
(citation omitted)); Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 920 (affirming that “physicians have
the right, exercising reasonable medical judgment, to use medical devices for
off-label purposes that are not FDA approved, provided that the FDA has
approved the device for some other purpose” (citation omitted)); Klein v. Biscup,
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Once FDA-approved, prescription drugs can be prescribed by doctors
for both FDA-approved and -unapproved uses; the FDA generally
does not regulate how physicians use approved drugs . . . . [C]ourts
and the FDA have recognized the propriety and potential public value
of unapproved or off-label drug use.73

As to medical devices, the FDCA expressly exempts medical
practice from FDA oversight.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer
any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease
within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.74

Thus, “Congress clarified that off-label uses of devices were not
illegal per se by denying the FDA any power ‘to limit or interfere
with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any
condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitionerpatient relationship.’”75 “FDA can only regulate the marketing and
labeling of devices. It cannot regulate what physicians do with the
devices with respect to their patients.”76
673 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that “the decision whether to
use a drug for an off-label purpose is a matter of medical judgment, not of
regulatory approval”); In re Amiodarone Cases, No. 4956, 2020 WL 2759010, at
*4 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 22, 2020) (determining that “off-label use is not a per se
violation of state or federal law”).
73. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153 (citations omitted); see Polansky I, 822 F.3d at
615 (applying Caronia in False Claims Act context); accord Schaffer v. Horizon
Pharma PLC, No. 16-CV-1763 (JMF), 2018 WL 481883, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,
2018) (quoting and following Caronia).
74. 21 U.S.C. §396 (2021). Thus, “[t]he FDCA explicitly protects physicians’
ability to prescribe devices for off-label use.” Modglin II, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 999
(citing 21 U.S.C. §396). Similarly, with respect to prescription drugs, FDA has
left unregulated “the use in the practice of medicine for an unlabeled indication
of a new drug product.” 21 C.F.R. §312.2(d) (2021). If Congress desired to
condition FDA product approvals on the absence of off-label use, it could have
done so, as it has with new animal drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §360b(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2021)
(FDA can deny approval of an animal drug if “the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling are not reasonably certain
to be followed in practice[.]”).
75. Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson (Cornett II), 48 A.3d 1041, 1052 (N.J.
2012) (quoting §396) (abrogated on other grounds, McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207, 220 (N.J. 2017) (conflict of laws)); accord In re Reglan
Litig., 2014 WL 5840281, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 12, 2014)
(discussing holding in Cornett II) (unpublished); Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 784
(finding that “off-label usage is not illegal or even disfavored under federal law.
Rather, it is an accepted and indeed valuable part of the practice of medicine.”).
76. Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *15 (citations omitted); see Davenport, 302
F. Supp. 2d at 439 (stating that “FDA controls the marketing and labeling of
medical devices, [but] does not attempt to interfere with the practice of
medicine” (citations omitted)); Svidler v. U.S. Dep’t of HHS, No. C 03-3593 MJJ,
2004 WL 2005781, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2004) (holding that the FDA “can
not prevent a doctor from prescribing a device for an off label use for any
purpose she deems medically necessary” (citation omitted)).
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Federal regulation of medical products is grounded in the
introduction of [articles] in interstate commerce for commercial
distribution, not use by physicians. This concept forms the basis for
the ‘practice of medicine’ doctrine, which maintains that FDA lacks
authority under the FDCA to regulate patient treatment decisions
made by licensed physicians.”77

The FDA “makes clear that it does not regulate the practice of
medicine, such as how and which physicians can use a device.”78 “[A]
health care professional can generally choose to use or prescribe an
approved or cleared medical product for an unapproved use, if the
off-label use is appropriate based on his or her judgment.”79 The
FDA’s recognition of off-label use as a frequent part of the practice
of medicine dates back decades, to at least 1972.80 In 1982, the FDA
stated:
The FD & C Act does not, however, limit the manner in which a
physician may use an approved drug. Once a product has been
approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in
treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in
approved labeling. Such “unapproved” or, more precisely, “unlabeled”
uses may be appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and
may, in fact, reflect approaches to drug therapy that have been
extensively reported in medical literature.
The term “unapproved uses” is, to some extent, misleading. It
includes a variety of situations ranging from unstudied to thoroughly
investigated drug uses. Valid new uses for drugs already on the
market are often first discovered through serendipitous observations
and therapeutic innovations, subsequently confirmed by wellplanned and executed clinical investigation.81

77. John Smith, Physician Modification of Legally Marketed Medical
Devices: Regulatory Implications Under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 251-52 (2000).
78. Nicolas Terry, Of Regulating Healthcare AI & Robots, 18 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 133, 149 (2019) (citing §396 and Buckman).
“Whether for political or medical reasons, the agency has traditionally
considered regulating the prescribing decisions of physicians as beyond its
mandate.” Comanor & Needleman, supra note 5, at 125.
79. Revised Draft Guidance: Distributing Scientific & Medical Publications
on Unapproved New Uses – Recommended Practices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Feb. 2014), at 6, www.fda.gov/media/88031/download [perma.cc/JFG9-RB8B];
see Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label”, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 5, 2018), www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expandedaccess-and-other-treatment-options/understanding-unapproved-use-approveddrugs-label [perma.cc/XA93-KG6B] (stating that “healthcare providers
generally may prescribe the drug for an unapproved use when they judge that
it is medically appropriate”).
80. Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing
for Uses Unapproved by the Food & Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503,
16503 (1972) (conceding that “[o]nce the new drug is in a local pharmacy . . . the
physician may, as part of the practice of medicine, lawfully . . . vary the
conditions of use from those approved in the package insert”).
81. 12 FDA Drug Bulletin 4-5 (1982) (cited in 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821
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Likewise, while granting a citizen petition submitted by the
industry-backed Medical Information Working Group (“MIWG”) in
2014, the FDA stated:
The Agency has recognized − and continues to recognize − that there
can be utility in the dissemination of truthful and non-misleading
scientific or medical information regarding off-label uses under
appropriate circumstances. . . . [A]ny individual patient may have
characteristics and needs that deviate from the patient population for
which a medical product is indicated. Thus, FDA’s regulatory
framework also recognizes the role that medical professionals play in
making treatment decisions for individual patients; this recognition
is embodied in FDA’s long-standing recognition of the practice of
medicine and in the device-specific “practice of medicine” provision of
the FD&C Act, section 1006 (21 U.S.C. 396). In general, FDA does not
seek to regulate the practice of medicine, including the off-label use
of legally marketed drugs and devices for individual patients. Indeed,
for some health conditions, off-label uses of medical products have
made valuable contributions to patient care.82

(Nov. 18, 1994)); see Notice of Request for Comments, Citizen Petition
Regarding the Food & Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of
Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs & Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821
(Nov. 18, 1994) (quoting 1982 Drug Bulletin) (citing same); United States v.
Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing government concession that
FDA regulations “do not prevent [a physician] from prescribing for uses not
approved by the FDA drugs which have been approved by the FDA for some
other purpose”); Amarin, 119 F. Supp.3d at 202 (quoting 1982 Drug Bulletin)
(citing same) (pointing out that “FDA itself has long recognized the benefits of
using prescription drugs for off-label purposes”). A 2009 final FDA guidance
repeated:
Once a drug or medical device has been approved or cleared by FDA,
generally, healthcare professionals may lawfully use or prescribe that
product for uses or treatment regimens that are not included in the
product’s approved labeling (or, in the case of a medical device cleared
under the 510(k) process, in the product’s statement of intended uses).
These off-label uses or treatment regimens may be important and may
even constitute a medically recognized standard of care.
Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles &
Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of
Approved Drugs & Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 2009), www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/good-reprint-practices-distribution-medical-journal-articles-andmedical-or-scientific-reference [perma.cc/WY57-YH3K].
82. Letter re: Docket Nos. FDA-2011-P-0512 and FDA-2013-P-1079,
REGULATIONS, at 7 (June 6, 2014), www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA2011-P-0512-0009 [perma.cc/LW7Q-3Y9Z]. Likewise, in 2016 FDA reiterated:
[H]ealth care professionals are generally permitted to prescribe or use
approved/cleared medical products for unapproved uses when they judge
that the unapproved use is medically appropriate for their individual
patients, and relevant, truthful, and non-misleading scientific or medical
information regarding unapproved uses of approved medical products
may help health care professionals make better individual patient
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Thus, the “FDA has explicitly endorsed physicians’ ‘off-label’ uses of
medical products to treat patients in ways that the agency has not
reviewed and approved.”83
In 2016, FDA’s grant of the MIWG petition produced actual
results, as the FDA finalized guidance that expressly allowed offlabel promotion to third-party “payors, formulary committees, or
other similar entities,” which it viewed as “a sophisticated
audience” with “established procedures for carefully considering
evidence about medical products.”84 In so doing, the Agency
specifically recognized that:
In this way, we can help ensure patients have more timely access to
cutting-edge medical technologies. . . . [P]roviding payors with
truthful and non-misleading information about unapproved products
and unapproved uses of approved or cleared products will help
facilitate communications that can allow payors to provide coverage
for these new products and new uses more quickly after FDA
approval or clearance.85

In 2019, the FDA announced that it was creating online forums
for physicians to discuss their clinical success with off-label uses of
prescription medical products.86 Facilitating such discussions
“mak[es] it easier to spot promising new uses for existing
[products],” which is important because:
Health care professionals generally may choose to prescribe or use a
legally marketed human drug or medical device for an unapproved or
uncleared use when they judge that the unapproved use is medically
appropriate for an individual patient.87

decisions.
Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments, Manufacturer
Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical
Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 60299, 60300 (Sept. 1, 2016) (footnote omitted).
83. Laakmann, supra note 55 at 938 (citing 1982 FDA Drug Bulletin); see
MKB Mgmt. Corp., 855 N.W.2d at 77 (quoting 1982 Drug Bulletin).
84. Drug & Device Manufacturer Communications with Payors, Formulary
Committees, & Similar Entities – Questions & Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., at 1, 3, www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/drug-and-device-manufacturer-communications-payors-formularycommittees-and-similar-entities?source=govdelivery [perma.cc/Q2UE-SE4T]
(last updated Dec. 17, 2019).
85. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner, FDA, On New Efforts to Advance Medical
Product Communications to Support Drug Competition and Value-Based Health
Care (June 11, 2018), www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/stateme
nt-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-efforts-advance-medical-productcommunications [perma.cc/AL4W-7NZJ].
86. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Launches App for Health
Care Professionals to Report Novel Uses of Existing Medicines for Patients with
Difficult-to-Treat Infectious Diseases (Dec. 5, 2019), www.fda.gov/news-eve
nts/press-announcements/fda-launches-app-health-care-professionals-reportnovel-uses-existing-medicines-patients-difficult [perma.cc/Z99U-XJS2].
87. Id. Increased communication concerning successful off-label uses “will
help identify drug candidates for additional study, encourage further drug
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This initiative marks an important step in FDA’s evolution from
obstructing to facilitating off-label medical advances.
An off-label use may, in an emergency, be formally authorized
by the FDA through an “emergency use authorization” (“EUA”).88
The FDA, advised by the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) may
issue off-label EUAs “because, under emergency circumstances,
licensed prescribers may not be able to make the case-by-case
individual patient prescribing decisions that occur within the
practice of medicine.”89 EUAs require manufacturers to promote
such the off-label uses involved via “fact sheets” directed to
physicians and patients.90 During the COVID-19 crisis, EUAs for
the off-label use of FDA-approved drugs and medical devices was
widespread.91 In connection with the COVID-19 crisis, the FDA
stated:
Disseminating information about promising off-label uses of drugs we
already have, investigating their effectiveness, and pursuing other
therapeutics will help give American healthcare providers the tools

development, and may serve as a resource for practitioners making individual
patient treatment decisions.” Id.; see Davis, supra note 16, at 436 (opining that
FDA’s guidance is “with a view to increasing the use of pharmaceuticals for nonapproved uses” because “physicians using drugs in different ways . . . can
discover important uses”); Dresser & Frader, supra note 5, at 480 (explaining
that “[p]rofessional organizations and the academic community should actively
identify emerging off-label uses and gather information about such uses. As
physicians learn about patient responses to off-label uses, they should share
information about side effects and outcomes with colleagues.”).
88. 21 U.S.C. §§360bbb-3(a)(1), 360bbb-3(a) (2021) (describing off-label use
as “unapproved use of an approved product”); see Goico, 2020 WL 7078731, at
*4 (stating that “[w]hen necessary to respond to ‘an actual or potential
emergency,’ the FDA may issue an EUA for . . . unapproved uses of approved
drugs, under certain circumstances and for the duration of the emergency”).
89. Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products and Related
Authorities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at n.22, www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/search-fda-guidance-documents/emergency-use-authorizationmedical-products-and-related-authorities#footnote22 [perma.cc/QT7G-X6AR]
(last updated Oct. 17, 2018).
90. Id. §E(1)(a-b) & App. A.
91. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Update: FDA Reiterates Importance of Close Patient Supervision for ‘Off-Label’
Use of Antimalarial Drugs to Mitigate Known Risks, Including Heart Rhythm
Problems (Apr. 24, 2020), www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements
/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-reiterates-importance-close-patientsupervision-label-use [perma.cc/X9HY-XQQ2] (listing all COVID-19 EUAs,
both off-label and unapproved); see also Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA evokes Emergency Use
Authorization for Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine (June 15, 2020),
www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-updatefda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and
[perma.cc/2K4ZANQP] (“FDA approved products may be prescribed by physicians for off-label
uses if they determine it is appropriate for treating their patients, including
during COVID.”).

22

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

they need to save lives.92

Over the past couple decades, “courts and . . . FDA have
recognized the propriety and potential public value of unapproved
or off-label drug use.”93 “Prescription drugs frequently have
therapeutic uses other than their FDA-approved indications.”94
FDA’s approval process generally contemplates that approved devices
will be used in off-label ways. Off-label use may even be a recognized
standard of care. And congress has prohibited the FDA from limiting
or interfering with the authority of a health care practitioner to
prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for
any condition or disease.95

Because “experiments with off-label uses often prove vital to
patients,” Congress “went out of their way to protect the liberty of
doctors and patients to use approved devices in any manner they
wish − including off-label.”96 “[T]he fact that the FDA has not
approved labeling of a drug for a particular use does not necessarily
bear on those uses of the drug that are established within the
medical and scientific community as medically appropriate.”97 “[A]
manufacturer’s label is not proscriptive, and does not prohibit use
for a longer period, or in any other manner not described in the
labeling.”98 In product liability, off-label uses can be evidence of the

92. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Update: FDA Continues to Facilitate Development of Treatments (Mar. 19,
2020), www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19update-fda-continues-facilitate-development-treatments
[perma.cc/F85P5HV3]. “[I]t is worthwhile looking to the FDA to adopt a role where it works
alongside physicians and pharmaceutical companies to ensure that consumers
derive the maximum benefit from off-label uses.” Teo, supra note 5, at 326.
93. Polansky I, 822 F.3d at 615 (quoting Caronia, 703 F.3d at 153).
“Congress has not only declined to prohibit off-label uses: it has actually
permitted, and regulated, a degree of involvement by drug and device
manufacturers in getting the word out concerning such uses of their products.”
Scoggins v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 07-4049, 2010 WL 8911977, at *9 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 18, 2010).
94. Intron/Temodar III, 678 F.3d at 239. “Because the FDCA does not
regulate the practice of medicine, physicians may lawfully prescribe drugs for
off-label uses.” Id. at 240 (citations omitted); see Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Cephalon, Inc. (Travelers Indem. II), 620 F. App’x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Schering Plough to same effect) (applying Connecticut law).
95. Angeles v. Medtronic, Inc., 863 N.W.2d 404, 411-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)
(citing 21 U.S.C. §396) (other citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Shuker, 885 F.3d at 773 (holding that “the statutory scheme
contemplates that physicians will prescribe or administer” products off-label);
Humble, 753 F.3d at 915 (affirming that “FDA not only expects off-label use but
encourages it as part of the effective practice of medicine”).
96. Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc. (Caplinger II), 784 F.3d 1335, 1344 (10th
Cir. 2015) (citing §396) (applying Oklahoma law).
97. Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989).
98. Holtshouser v. United States, No. CV 11-114-BLG-RFC, 2013 WL
1855775, at *8 (D. Mont. May 1, 2013), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 687 (9th Cir. 2014).
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“benefits” of prescription medical products.99
Further, as Buckman established, “[t]he decision to prescribe
such ‘off-label usage’ . . . is regarded as a professional judgment for
the healthcare provider to make.”100 “Once the FDA approves a
drug, the FDA does not prohibit physicians from using the drug in
a different manner than the label provides.”101 Numerous courts
and commentators have therefore concluded that, “off-label
prescriptions . . . are common and permissible,”102 and that once an
99. Georges v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. CV 06-05207 SJO (VBKx), 2013
WL 5217198, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2013) (discussing how evidence of
beneficial off-label uses is relevant to a prescriber’s “risk/benefit ratio,” the
“likelihood” that the prescriber “would still have used a drug even if a particular
warning had been given,” and damages).
100. Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 589 F.3d
881, 884 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying Illinois law); see Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that “off-label uses are
presently an accepted aspect of a physician’s prescribing regimen”), vacated in
part as moot, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
101. Planned Parenthood v. Iowa Bd., 865 N.W.2d at 254; see In re Celexa &
Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 915 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding
that the FDCA “does not prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs for off-label
uses” (citation omitted) (applying federal and Minnesota law)); Coleman, 167
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307 (finding “[n]othing in the MDA [that] prevents a doctor from
using a medical device in an off-label manner” (citation omitted)); Inchen Huang
v. Higgins, No. 17-CV-04830-JST, 2019 WL 1245136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,
2019) (stating that “health care practitioners may also prescribe the product for
‘off-label’ uses, meaning uses not approved by the FDA” (citations omitted));
Markland v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325 (M.D. Fla.
2017) (deciding that “it is not unlawful for a doctor to prescribe a drug for
purposes other than those approved by the Food and Drug Administration”
(citations omitted)), aff’d, 758 F. App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2018); Raab v. Smith &
Nephew, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 671, 696 (S.D.W. Va. 2015) (pointing out that
“‘off-label’ use, however, is not prohibited or even regulated by the FDCA, which
focuses on the product as produced by device manufacturers.” (citation
omitted)); Bennett, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (explaining that the FDCA “does not
restrict a hospital from purchasing or a doctor from prescribing or using a
medical device for an off-label purpose”).
102. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 927
(7th Cir. 2015); see Planned Parenthood v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 505 (commenting
that off-label use is “a widely employed practice”); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Henney, 202 F.3d at 333 (observing that “prescription of drugs for unapproved
uses is commonplace in modern medical practice and ubiquitous in certain
specialties” (citation omitted)); Goico, 2020 WL 7078731, at *4 (quoting and
following Planned Parenthood v. Taft); Gardner, 2020 WL 2542121, at *10
(quoting Henney concerning ubiquity of off-label use); Takeda Pharms. U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Par Pharm. Cos., Nos. 13-1524-SLR, 13-1729-SLR, 2014 WL 4402965, at
*4 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2014) (holding that “there can be no dispute that off-label
prescribing − the prescription of a medication in a manner different from that
approved by the FDA − is legal and common” (citations omitted)); Takeda
Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., No. 14-268-SLR, 2014 WL 4403077,
at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2014) (same as previous); McCarthy v. Danek Med., Inc.,
65 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. La. 1999) (stating that “‘off-label’ use of this
product is not illegal and is in fact common place”); see also Laakmann, supra
note 55, at 938 (explaining that “[o]ff-label prescribing is a widespread,
generally accepted clinical practice” (footnote omitted)); Wittich, Burkle, &
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FDA-approved drug is on the market, “physicians are permitted to
prescribe [it] for off-label uses,”103 and the “FDA cannot prevent
physicians from prescribing the drug for other uses.”104
In holding that a company’s off-label promotion was truthful,
and therefore First Amendment protected,105 Judge Paul
Engelmeyer discussed off-label use at length:
Significant here, however, the FDA does not regulate doctors. After a
drug has been approved by the FDA, a doctor may lawfully prescribe
it for both FDA-approved and non-FDA approved (“off-label”) uses.
The prescription of FDA-approved drugs for off-label purposes is
widespread. The most comprehensive study on off-label prescriptions
in the United States, conducted in 2001, found that approximately
21% of prescriptions were for off-label purposes. . . . And the
therapeutic − indeed, sometimes life-saving − value of off-label uses
of FDA approved drugs has been widely recognized. . . . In other areas
of medicine, too, there are numerous examples in which drugs have
been successfully prescribed to treat conditions other than those for
which the FDA approved them.106

Also, as the Supreme Court recognized in Buckman, off-label
use “is well known, and not illegal.”107 “[N]on-FDA-approved, or ‘offLanier, supra note 2, at 983 (agreeing that “[i]ndeed, OLDU is common”).
103. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 451,
454 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see Bennett v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc., No. CV 19-2126-CFC, 2021 WL 797834, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 2, 2021)
(stating that “doctors are free to prescribe a drug for off-label use if they deem
it medically appropriate for a patient”); Kashani-Matts v. Medtronic, Inc., No.
SACV 13-01161-CJC, 2013 WL 6147032, at *1 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013)
(ruling that “FDA does not prohibit or regulate off-label use of medical devices
by medical professionals”); Fertik, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 104 (quoting Holland);
Holland v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D. Mass.
1999) (explaining that “FDA has recognized that it cannot regulate the medical
judgments that lead to off-label use”); Bailey, 37 A.3d at 576 (agreeing that
“[o]ff-label prescribing of drugs is both legal and ethical”); Lawrence v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. 27CV131197, 2013 WL 4008821, at *7 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug.
7, 2013) (finding that “[o]ff-label use of a device, in and of itself, is not illegal”).
104. United States v. King-Vassel, 728 F.3d 707, 709 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted); see Reddick v. Medtronic, Inc., No. CV 18-8568, 2021 WL
798294, at *8, *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2021) (holding that “the FDCA does not
prohibit off-label uses for drugs or medical devices” (footnote omitted)); Wittich,
Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2, at 982 (expounding that “FDA does not limit or
control how the medications are prescribed by physicians once the medications
are available on the market”).
105. See Part IV infra.
106. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 200-01 (footnotes omitted) (citations
omitted); see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 112 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (rejecting claims that would have prohibited an off-label use), rev’d in part
on other grounds, 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
107. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emp.’s Ret. Sys., 74 A.3d 612, 614 (Del. 2013);
see Sullivan, 2015 WL 13799885, at *11 (affirming that “off-label use of many
products and drugs is an accepted medical practice”) (quoting United States ex
rel. Bennett, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 751); Modglin I, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1370 (agreeing
that off-label use is “generally accepted”); United States ex rel. Hartwig v.
Medtronic, Inc., C.A. No. 3:11cv413-CWR-LRA, 2014 WL 1324339, at *11 (S.D.
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label,’ use of medications by physicians is not prohibited by the FDA
and is generally accepted in the medical profession.”108 “[I]t is
undisputed that the prescription of drugs for unapproved uses is
commonplace in modern medical practice and ubiquitous in certain
specialties.”109 The original 1998 article cited estimates for off-label
use ranging from 25% to 60% of all prescriptions in the United
States.110 More recent estimates indicate the prevalence of off-label
use remains “notoriously high among some patient populations.”111
“[A]n estimated twenty-one to fifty percent of all prescriptions are
for off-label indications” and “[i]n some patient groups, this number
may exceed eighty percent.“112 Off-label use is particularly

Miss. Mar. 31, 2014) (stating that “off-label use of medical devices is generally
accepted in medical practice, and is expressly permitted under the [FDCA]”)
(quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351).
108. Moore v. K-Mart Corp., 769 S.E.2d 35, 41 (2015) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see United States ex rel. George v. Bos. Sci.
Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that “[o]ff-label use of
many medical devices and drugs is an accepted medical practice”) (footnote
omitted); see also Hall & Berlin, supra note 5, at 655-56 (articulating that “offlabel use of many products is an accepted medical practice” (footnote omitted)).
109. Henney, 202 F.3d at 333 (citation omitted). “[O]ff-label use applies to
all or most drugs − prescription or OTC.” Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. FDA,
754 F. App’x 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
110. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 80 (citations omitted).
111. “[T]wenty to sixty percent of all drug prescriptions are written for offlabel uses” (footnote omitted). Rodney Adams & Leslie Crudele, The Eroding
Off-Label Drug Use Promotion Prohibition, 12 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 5
(2019). “[A]s many as forty percent of all prescriptions issued involv[e] off-label
use.” Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 46 (2005). See In re Sebela
Patent Litig., No. CV146414CCCMF, 2017 WL 3449054, at *23 (D.N.J. Aug. 11,
2017) (describing “overwhelming” off-label use in treatment of “hot flashes”);
Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 200-01 (agreeing that “in certain fields, off label
prescription is the norm rather than the exception”) (collecting research); Perry
v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating
that “in many clinical areas, [off-label use] apparently, quite common”).
112. Horvath, supra note 5, at 102 (footnotes omitted); see Stafford, supra
note 5, 1427 (finding a 21% off-label prescription rate for 45 “leading drugs”);
David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians,
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006) (determining that over 20% of
all prescriptions of 160 frequently prescribed drugs was off-label, as well as 46%
of cardio-vascular prescriptions off-label); Shane M. Ward, WLF & the TwoClick Rule: The First Amendment Inequity of the Food & Drug Administration’s
Regulation of Off-Label Drug Use Information on the Internet, 56 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 41, 45-46 (2001) (expounding that over 30% for cancer patients, 40% for
AIDS patients, 80% for children, and 90% for rare disease sufferers).
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prevalent in oncology113 and in pediatrics.114
On the other hand, the original article also acknowledged that
off-label uses can be risky, and that “[e]xamples of off-label uses
that have serious medical risks abound.”115 The risks of specific offlabel uses cannot, and should not, be gainsaid:
Off-label uses have not been subjected to the information-forcing
mechanisms imposed by the new drug application process. This has
two major consequences. First, the safety and effectiveness of offlabel uses have not been evaluated by the . . . staff of the FDA’s CDER
[Center for Drug Evaluation & Research] . Second, the safety and
effectiveness of some off-label uses cannot be evaluated by
clinicians.116

“[T]here are harms that have been associated with [off-label use] −
harms to health, as well as fraud and the diversion of limited
resources to ineffective treatments.”117 Further, the frequency of
adverse events involving off-label use has correlated with strength
of the available scientific evidence.118
113. See Off-Label Drugs: Reimbursement Policies Constrain Physicians in
Their Choice of Cancer Therapies, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., at 4 (1991),
www.gao.gov/assets/160/151121.pdf [perma.cc/24AR-69LW] (determining that
25% of all anticancer drug prescriptions off-label) (56% of cancer patients
received at least one off-label prescription.); Adams & Crudele, supra note 111,
at 5 (concluding that “fifty percent of chemotherapy treatments are used offlabel” (footnote omitted)); Teo, supra note 5, at 321 (writing that oncology is a
“perfect example of an area of medicine in which patients and physicians often
must rely on innovative uses of off-label drugs”); Alan Bennett et. al., Back to
First Principles: A New Model for the Regulation of Drug Promotion, 2 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 168, 191 (2015) (finding that “50-75 percent of all oncology drug
use is estimated to be off-label” (footnote omitted)).
114. Teo, supra note 5, at 322 (“80% of drugs prescribed for children are
being prescribed for off-label uses.” (footnote omitted)); Comanor & Needleman,
supra note 5, at 126 (Pediatric “off-label prescribing varie[s] from eleven to
eighty percent.”); Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2, at 983 (“78.9% of
children discharged from pediatric hospitals were taking at least 1 off-label
medication.” (citation omitted)); Alicia Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to
Children in the United States Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 81
(2009) (off-label prescriptions written in 62% of outpatient pediatric visits;
subspecialty pediatric off-label prescribing: cardiovascular/renal, 96%; pain,
86%; gastrointestinal, 80%; pulmonary/dermatologic, 67%.); Tomaszewski,
supra note 5, at 87 (Pediatric antidote usage “ranges 20-30% for inpatients and
as a high as 60% in newborns.”).
115. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 71-72, 72 n.6 (discussing, in particular,
the off-label use of fen-phen).
116. Horvath, supra note 5, at 112; see Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 204-05
(discussing harmful off-label uses).
117. Public Health Interests & First Amendment Considerations Related to
Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or
Cleared Medical Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at 5, 5 n.12 (Jan. 2017),
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2016-N-11490040&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
[perma.cc/8CLS-ELX3]
(collecting examples of harmful or ineffective off-label uses).
118. Id. at 113 (citation omitted). Research indicates that “off-label use with
strong scientific evidence ha[s] the same risk for [adverse events] as on-label
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The ubiquity of off-label use explains why the “FDA’s drug
approval process generally contemplates that approved drugs will
be used in off-label ways.”119 “[L]ack of FDA approval of a drug or
device for a particular use does not imply that using the drug or
device for that use is either disapproved or improper.”120 Therefore,
“there is nothing improper per se about off-label uses of drugs and
medical devices.”121 Off-label use is “acceptable, and sometimes
essential, clinical practice,” and is “an integral part of the modern
practice of medicine.”122 Some have even suggested, contrary to
many regulatory actions, “that the FDA itself has a ‘permissive
attitude toward the promotion of off-label uses of drugs.’”123
Indeed, off-label use is a function of medical necessity, as FDA
regulatory actions will inevitably lag behind scientific advances
essential to state-of-the-art medicine. Off-label use has been viewed
as necessary to allow medicine to “progress”:
[H]uman progress is not static: medical research and advances do not
stop upon a particular drug’s approval by the FDA. Researchers
continue to perform clinical trials, doctors continue to gain
experience, and widespread use of a particular treatment allows the
medical community to collect data about side effects, alternative
doses, and potential new uses for treatments.124

In many clinical situations, “the option of waiting years for possible
FDA approval of a new use for an existing drug will often be

use.” Tewodros Eguale, et al., Association of Off-label Drug Use & Adverse Drug
Events in an Adult Population, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 55, 55 (2015). But
“[t]he association of a lack of strong evidence with the risk of off-label use is
striking.” Horvath, supra note 5, at 113.
119. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
120. Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. App. 2000) (citation
omitted); see Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 n.3 (holding that “off-label
use is not illegal or even disfavored under federal law but is an accepted and
valuable part of the practice of medicine”); Alton v. Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp.
2d 1069, 1078 (D. Or. 2013) (ruling that “the off-label application of medical
devices is not discouraged by the FDA, and is generally accepted to be both
necessary and valuable” (citation omitted)); Kashani-Matts, 2013 WL 6147032,
at *1 n.4 (finding that “off-label use is not merely legitimate but important in
the practice of medicine” (citation omitted)).
121. United States ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 519, 535
(D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016).
122. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 13, 14 (citations omitted).
123. Takeda Pharms. USA, Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., No. 14-1268SLR, 2014 WL 5088690, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2014) (quoting Stafford, supra
note 5, at 1428), aff’d in pertinent part, 785 F.3d 625, 631-32 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
124. Cline, 313 P.3d at 260; see Promotion of Drugs & Medical Devices for
Unapproved Uses: Hearing Before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental
Relations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 102d Cong. 103
(1991) (statement of George Lundberg, M.D., editor of JAMA) (asserting that
“[t]here are too many variations in clinical circumstances and too much time
delay in regulations to allow the government to impede the physician’s ability
to practice . . . when it is medically appropriate”).
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untenable.”125 “The full and ultimate role of a drug is rarely evident
at the time of its initial approval and labeling.”126 Economic realities
can also keep uses off the label.
Because of the time and expense of obtaining FDA approval of new
uses for an already approved drug, drug manufacturers frequently do
not voluntarily request FDA approval for a new use unless the change
in the labeling will pay for itself in increased profits.127

Thus, “[a]fter the FDA approves a drug for use, and absent any
state regulation to the contrary, doctors may prescribe that drug for
indications, in dosages, and following treatment protocols different
than those expressly approved by the FDA.”128 “Once the FDA has
cleared a [product] for introduction into the stream of commerce,
physicians may use [it] in any manner they determine to be best for
the patient, regardless of whether the FDA has approved [it] for this
usage.”129
Various cases in various contexts recognize that off-label use
can be the standard of care.
The practice of providing approved medications using regimens
different from that described in the medication’s final printed label is
known as an “off-label use,” or an “evidence-based regimen.” The FDA
has stated that evidence-based regimens are common, permissible,
and can be required by good medical practice.130

Such holdings have occurred in medical malpractice litigation,131
medical discipline proceedings,132 product liability litigation,133
125. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 201.
126. Am. Acad. Pediatrics, Comm. on Drugs, supra 55, at 182.
127. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 12 (citations omitted).
128. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
129. Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).
130. Cline, 313 P.3d at 258 (footnote omitted); accord id. at 261 (concluding
that an “FDA-approved label likely no longer meets the standard of care” and
has been supplanted by an off-label use (footnote omitted)).
131. Southard, 781 A.2d at 104 (recognizing that an off-label use “was
considered to be the standard of care by the surgical community” (citation
omitted)); Gajewsky v. Ning, 997 So. 2d 567, 570-71 (La. Ct. App. 2008)
(testimony that off-label use was standard of care supported defense verdict in
malpractice case); Sita v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr. (Sita II), 803
N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (recognizing that an off-label use “was
considered the standard of care in the medical community” (citation omitted)).
132. State Bd. v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 162 (Mo. 2003) (Wolff, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There are many off-label uses of
medicines that are generally accepted by the medical profession.”).
133. Stiens, 2020 WL 7266398, at *2 (The “evidence is in agreement that”
the off-label use at issue “is the standard of care.”); King v. Danek Med., Inc.,
37 S.W.3d 429, 458 (Tenn. App. 2000) (discussing off-label use that was
“recognized by the FDA as being the nationwide standard of care”); Baron v.
Pfizer, Inc., 840 N.Y.S.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (observing that “offlabel use is a widespread and accepted medical practice” (citations omitted));
Bailey, 37 A.3d at 558 (“Following the accepted medical standard of care,
physicians frequently prescribe drugs for off-label or unapproved uses.”
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False Claims Act cases,134 regulatory challenges,135 and
constitutional litigation.136 That off-label use often represents the
medical standard of care has also been recognized by the American
Medical Association (“AMA”)137 by the FDA,138 and by multiple
(footnote omitted)); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 415
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Some off-label uses of a prescription drug may be medically
necessary.”) (applying Mississippi law); Intron/Temodar I, 2009 WL 2043604,
at *17 (“[The d]rugs were as effective and sometimes more effective than
available alternatives for treating many off-label conditions.”); Conger v. Danek
Med., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (“[O]ff-label use is
appropriate, rational, and accepted medical practice and can be of great value.”);
Hanohano v. Uppal, No. 257344, 1997 WL 33426414, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. June
3, 1997) (Off-label use “is neither illegal nor contraindicated.”).
134. United States ex rel. King, 871 F.3d at 328 (“[I]n many cases, off-label
drug prescription may represent the standard of care[.]” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. Mallinckrodt Ard LLC v. Verma, 444 F. Supp. 3d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 2020)
(Medicare rebate litigation) (An off-label use “became the premier treatment”
for a condition. (citation omitted)); Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v.
FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206 (D.D.C. 2002) (administrative challenge to
regulation); id. (“Off-label use of pharmaceuticals appears to be ‘generally
accepted’ in the medical community.” (citations omitted)).
136. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 855 N.W.2d at 76 (An off-label use “had become
accepted practice in the medical community[.]”); Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, 865 N.W.2d at 254 (Relevant medical society “accepts and approves
of this off-label protocol as the standard of care to administer these drugs.”); id.
at 266 (“[T]he off-label protocol is safer and more effective than the FDA
approved protocol[.]”); Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 200-01 (“In certain fields, offlabel prescription is the norm rather than the exception.”) (several examples
omitted); id. at 202 (Off-label use can “constitute a medically recognized
standard of care.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (“The medical community recognizes offlabel, non-FDA-approved alternatives[.]”); Henricks v. Pickaway Corr. Inst., No.
2:08-cv-580, 2013 WL 4804983, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2013) (Failure to fill an
off-label prescription could constitute “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth
Amendment.), aff’d, 782 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2015).
137. See American Medical Association, MEMORANDUM OF THE AMA HOUSE
OF DELEGATES, Resolution 820: Off-Label Use of Pharmaceuticals (Sept. 21,
2005) (“Up to date, clinically appropriate medical practice at times requires the
use of pharmaceuticals for ‘off-label’ indications.”); Fran Kritz, FDA Seeks to
Add Drugs’ Uses to Labels, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 1997) (quoting AMA vice
president as stating, “[i]n some cases, if you didn’t use the drug in the off-label
way, you’d be guilty of malpractice”).
138. See Draft Guidance for Industry: Responding to Unsolicited Requests
for Off-Label Information About Prescription Drugs & Medical Devices, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at 2 (Dec. 2011), www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidanc
ecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm285145.pdf [perma.cc/46VLQWX2] (Off-label use “may even constitute a medically recognized standard of
care.”); Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles
and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of
Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, supra note 81.
(“[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be important and may even
constitute a medically recognized standard of care.”) (last updated Sep. 27,
2018); “Off-Label” & Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics &
Medical Devices-Information Sheet, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 1998),
www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/label-
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commentators.139 Indeed, in some cases, off-label use may provide
not only “the best available intervention for a patient,” but actually
“the only treatment option.”140
In a 2014 draft guidance concerning informed consent in
clinical trials, the FDA stated that investigators are expected to
include off-label uses in their discussions with patients where such
uses are standard of care medicine:
[D]isclosure must include a description of the current medically
recognized standard of care, particularly in studies of serious illness.
Standard of care may include uses or treatment regimens that are
not included in a product’s approved labeling (or, in the case of a
medical device cleared under the 510(k) process, in the product’s
statement of intended uses).141

“In the view of many physicians, the drugs of choice for many
disorders are not approved by the FDA for use in those disorders.”142
“Without giving healthcare providers the ability and autonomy to
use products in off-label fashions, effective and safe treatment

and-investigational-use-marketed-drugs-biologics-and-medical-devices
[perma.cc/B83E-7BGJ] (“Good medical practice and the best interests of the
patient require that physicians use legally available drugs, biologics and devices
according to their best knowledge and judgment.”).
139. “[O]ff-label uses that are accepted by the relevant medical community
are considered consistent with the standard of care.” Horvath, supra note 5, at
131; see id. at 987 (“[T]hese [off-label] indications may even become the
standard of care.”); Leanne Hay, Stopping the Confusion: Why Widening the
Preemption Gap Through the Parallel-Claims Exception Promotes Off-Label
Uses of Medical Devices, 60 JURIMETRICS J. 83, 86 (2019) (“[O]ff-label uses can
even be the standard of care.”); Teo, supra note 5, at 312 (“[U]se of off-label
drugs is so ubiquitous that, not only are they being used in most medical
specialties, they can be part of guideline-recommended practices . . ., and can
even be a first-line therapy in some cases.”); Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra
note 2, at 983-85 (“Off-label drug uses can become widely entrenched in clinical
practice and become predominant treatments for a given clinical condition.”);
id. (chart of common off-label uses, and mention of others that “had poor or no
scientific support”); Tomaszewski, supra note 5, at 88 (“In toxicology, off-label
use of a drug more often than not defines the standard of care.”).
140. Dresser & Frader, supra note 5, at 481. At least one malpractice case
has been explicitly premised on a physician’s failure to prescribe off-label. E.g.,
Bridges v. Shelby Women’s Clinic, 323 S.E.2d 372, 374-76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(observing that plaintiff claimed she should have been prescribed a drug off
label for labor suppression).
141. Information Sheet: Informed Consent: Draft Guidance for IRBs,
Clinical Investigators, and Sponsors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at 9 (July
2014) (other footnote admitted), www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/searchfda-guidance-documents/informed-consent [perma.cc/D75L-DKZ7] (citing Good
Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical
or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs
and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, supra note 81).
142. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS & REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 151
(2d ed. 1986); see Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, & Authenticity: The Gap Between
Ethics & Law in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1165-66
(2005) (discussing examples).
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options would often be overlooked or never discovered.”143 The
medical reasons for off-label use are many and varied:
First, a medication may not have been studied and approved for a
specific population (e.g., pediatric, geriatric, or pregnant patients).
Second, a life-threatening or terminal medical condition may
motivate a health care professional to give any treatment that is
logical and available, whether approved by the FDA or not. Third, if
one medication from a class of drugs has FDA approval, physicians
commonly use other medications in the same class without specific
FDA approval for that use for the same indication. In addition, if the
pathologic or physiologic features of 2 conditions are similar, a
physician may use a medication approved for 1 of these conditions for
both.144

The federal government itself has successfully advocated that
mentally ill inmates be the involuntarily medicated with off-label
doses of a drug.145 The government’s position, expressed through
expert testimony that persuaded the court, was:
[T]here are instances when psychiatrists may prescribe medications
off-label. Sometimes literature will be published after FDA approval
showing that a greater dosage than what is prescribed in the PDR is
medically appropriate. Doctors do keep the PDR maximums in mind,
but they are legally allowed to prescribe a greater amount.146

Nor does the FCA147 restrict off-label use where the FDCA does
not. A qui tam relator148 may not rely upon non-mandatory
143. Hay, supra note 139, at 98 (footnote omitted).
144. Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2, at 982-83 (footnotes omitted).
145. United States v. Ruark, No. 1:10-CR-160-ODE-GGB, 2014 WL
4966913, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2014).
146. Id. at *19 (citations and footnotes omitted). “PDR” is a reference to the
Physicians’ Desk Reference, a compilation of FDA approved drug labeling. Once
available in book form, as of 2017, the PDR was renamed the “Prescribers’
Digital Reference,” and became entirely electronic. See Browse by Drug Name,
PRESCRIBERS’ DIGITAL REFERENCE, www.pdr.net/browse-by-drug-name
[perma.cc/22A9-4EF4] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). The pre-digital PDR advised
doctors:
The FDA has always recognized that the [FDCA] does not, however, limit
the manner in which a physician may use an approved drug. Once a
product has been approved for marketing, a physician may choose to
prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that
are not included in approved labeling. The FDA also observes that
accepted medical practice often included drug use that is not reflected in
approved drug labeling.
PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 1997 (Physicians’ Desk Reference ed., 51st
ed. 1997) (quoted in Morlino v. Med. Ctr., 706 A.2d 721, 730 (N.J. 1998)).
147. 31 U.S.C. §§3729-33 (2021).
148. “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our
Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160).
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guidelines to bring an FCA claim for “off-label marketing” of uses
beyond certain suggested guidelines incorporated into a product’s
label:
The False Claims Act, even in its broadest application, was never
intended to be used as a back-door regulatory regime to restrict
practices that the relevant federal and state agencies have chosen not
to prohibit through their regulatory authority.149

Similarly, an FCA “fraud on FDA” claim – that the applicant
supposedly concealed its intent to engage in future off-label
promotion during the FDA approval process – fails to state a cause
of action because the FCA is not a vehicle to “reevaluate” FDA
decisions to allow products to be marketed:
The FDA is charged with the difficult task of balancing the risk and
benefits of placing drugs and medical devices on the market, and
[relator] in effect is asking this court to usurp the FDA and assume
that function. [Relator] proposes, in the guise of an FCA action, that
this court reevaluate years of FDA decisions concerning the approval
or recall of [defendant’s] medical devices. The FCA is a vehicle for
rooting out undetected financial fraud against the federal
government by giving generous financial incentives to insider
whistleblowers; it is not a substitute for the certiorari review of
discretionary decisions taken by the FDA in the area of competence
delegated to it by Congress.150

Off-label use is reimbursable under various governmental
health programs. “As off-label uses are reported, drug compendia
evaluate the available evidence and present an assessment of
appropriate uses.”151 “Medicaid does reimburse” for “[o]ff-label uses
of a drug that are medically ‘essential’ or recognized in certain

149. United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc. (Polansky II), 914 F. Supp.
2d 259, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); see Polansky I, 822 F.3d at 618 (holding that “[w]e
expressly endorse and adopt [the trial court’s] carefully considered and
thorough analysis, and affirm on that basis”).
150. United States v. Ev3, Inc., C.A. No. 10-11822-RGS, 2014 WL 4926369,
at *9 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014). This decision was vacated on non-substantive
grounds, United States ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 802 F.3d 188 (1st Cir.
2015) (abuse of discretion not to allow amendment of complaint), but dismissed
a second time as legally insufficient. See United States ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3,
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 519, 535 & n.35 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2016). The claim rejected in that litigation was almost identical to the state-law
claim held preempted in Buckman, 531 U.S. at 346-47 (dismissing identical
allegations that an FDA-approved use was subterfuge to enable off-label
promotion).
151. Comanor & Needleman, supra note 5, at 124 (listing compendia), 138
(“Acceptable off-label prescribing is often reflected in published drug compendia
offering recommendations on appropriate use.” (footnote omitted)).
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medical compendia.”152 Under the terms of the Medicare statute,153
government reimbursement programs,154 as well as most cases,
have considered compendia-supported off-label uses of drugs to be
medically accepted and thus “reasonable and necessary.”155
Whether off-label uses that do not appear in the specified
compendia, but have other scientific support, are reimbursable is
an open question.156 The FCA claims alleging fraud against the
compendia to influence inclusion of off-label uses have been made

152. United States ex rel. Booker v. Pfizer, Inc., 847 F.3d 52, 55 n.1 (1st Cir.
2017) (citations omitted). “Medicaid reimbursement is available for certain offlabel uses that are medically ‘essential’ or recognized within one of several
medical compendia.” Lawton ex rel. United States v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 842
F.3d 125, 128 n.2 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§1396r-8(a)(3), (g)(1)(B)(i),
(k)(6) (2021)); accord Polansky I, 822 F.3d at 615 (discussing compendia
requirements for reimbursement of off-label use); King-Vassel, 728 F.3d at 715
(holding the same).
153. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §102(a), 79 Stat.
290, 291 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1395 (2021)) (“Nothing in [the Medicare
statute] shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to
exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine.”); 42 U.S.C.
§1396r-8(k)(6) (2021) (“The term ‘medically accepted indication’ means any use
for a covered outpatient drug which is approved under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act or the use of which is supported by one or more citations
included or approved for inclusion in any of the compendia described in
subsection (g)(1)(B)(i).”).
154. Medicare Benefits Policy Manual, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., ch. 15, §50.4.5.1, www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/M
anuals/Downloads/bp102c15.pdf [perma.cc/QD3U-YXBT] (last visited Mar. 4,
2021) (discussing compendia used for reimbursement of off-label uses); see 32
C.F.R. §199.4(g)(15)(i)(A) (2021) (Tricare may reimburse off-label use based on
“demonstrations from medical literature, national organizations, or technology
assessment bodies that the off-label use of the drug or device is safe, effective,
and in accordance with nationally accepted standards of practice in the medical
community.”). But cf. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1811 (2019)
(holding invalid all CMS “substantive legal standards” not adopted through
notice and comment rulemaking).
155. Cf. U.S. v. Pfizer, C.A. No. 05-6795, 2016 WL 807363, at *12
(recognizing compendium rule with caveat that use “must also not ‘be identified
as not indicated’” in other compendia (quoting 42 U.S.C. §1395x(t)(2)(B))).
156. “The statutory language is somewhat ambiguous” on this point. United
States v. Pfizer, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 122, 131 (D. Mass. 2016), aff’d, 847 F.3d
52 (1st Cir. 2017). However, the Medicare Benefits Policy Manual provides that
off-label uses may be reimbursed “on a case-by-case basis” “taking into
consideration the major drug compendia, authoritative medical literature
and/or accepted standards of medical practice.” Medicare Benefits Policy
Manual, supra note 154, §50.4.2; see Cline, 313 P.3d at 262 (holding that
“[n]owhere . . . is the [Medicaid] board constrained by uses authorized in the
FDA-approved labels for prescription drugs in making its determinations”); id.
(“Instead, the statute uses the term ‘medically necessary’ in deference to the
knowledge and experience of physicians exercised in the practice of medicine.”
(citation omitted)); Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 584-86 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (rejecting strict “compendia requirement”). But see United States ex rel.
Fox Rx, Inc. v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00962-WSD, 2012 WL 8020674, at
*8 n.7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012) (disagreeing with Layzer).
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but have yet to succeed.157
Probably due to §396, federal reimbursement of off-label use is
“relatively more permissive” for devices than for drugs.158 Thus,
“[a]n FDA determination regarding the safety and effectiveness of
a device is not a substitute for CMS [Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services] review of whether the device is eligible for
coverage.”159 “While Medicare and Medicaid typically do not
reimburse off-label prescriptions for drugs, . . . eligibility for
reimbursement [of Category B medical devices] depends on whether
the procedure performed is ‘medically necessary’ or ‘reasonable and
necessary,’”160 “which in turn depends on whether the use is safe,
effective, and appropriate.”161
Medicaid “leaves . . . to the discretion of the states” whether to
provide “reimbursement for off-label prescriptions.”162 State
reimbursement standards for off-label uses therefore vary, and
comprehensive treatment is beyond the scope of this article.163
157. United States ex rel. King, 871 F.3d at 331 (“Relators failed to produce
any evidence suggesting that [defendant’s] studies misled [a compendium]
publisher and caused [the drug] to be listed . . . for off-label uses[.]”).
158. Nowak, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48; see Modglin I, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1395
(holding that “Medicare regulations and the Medicare Manual do not bar
reimbursement of devices supplied for off-label use”).
159. United States v. Abbott Labs., No. 3:06-CV-1769-M, 2016 WL 80000, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2016).
160. Modglin I, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1392 (quoting United States ex rel. Bennett,
747 F. Supp. 2d at 754); see United States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 977 F.
Supp. 2d 981, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (ruling that “off-label use of a medical device
is not the same as a medically unnecessary use of that drug or device”) (quoting
United States ex rel. Bennett, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 751) ), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 666
(9th Cir. 2016; Dan Abrams Co., 2017 WL 4023092, at *8 (deciding that “CMS
does not categorically prohibit reimbursement for off-label use of FDA-approved
medical devices” (citation omitted)); Abbott, 2016 WL 80000, at *3 (same);
United States ex rel. Bennett, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (finding no “categorical
restriction on reimbursement for Category B medical devices”); see 42 C.F.R.
§405.201(b) (2021) (defining “Category B (Non-experimental/investigational)
device”); 42 C.F.R. §411.15(o)(1) (2021) (providing for Medicare reimbursement
of devices “[c]ategorized by the FDA as a Category B (nonexperimental/investigational device”).
161. United States v. Medtronic, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 259, 275 (D. Mass.
2016) (citing Medicare, Tricare, and Veterans Affairs publications).
162. United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc. (Polansky III), No. 04-CV0704, 2009 WL 1456582, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. §1396r8(d)(1)(B) (2021)); accord Gardner, 2020 WL 2542121, at *9. (discussing state
reimbursement discretion). “[W]hether state Medicaid programs actually have
the discretion to reimburse for off-label uses of a drug under the Medicaid
statute ‘is up for debate.’” Booker, 847 F.3d at 59 n.7 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
163. “Many states cover certain off-label, non-compendia uses.” United
States v. Pfizer, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 131 (citation omitted); e.g., Harborth v. State
ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 424 P.3d 1261, 1266 (Wyo. 2018) (holding that
“[f]or off-label use of medical services, the health care provider must submit a
comprehensive review of the medical literature . . . including at least two (2)
reliable prospective, randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind trials”
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B. Distinctions Between “Experimental,”
“Investigational,” and “Off-Label” Use
“Medical practice refers to the diagnosis and treatment of the
individual patient while medical research refers to the general
development of scientific knowledge of the human body.”164 The
medical standard of care is a function of recognized and accepted
clinical practices.165 As discussed, off-label use is common and can
represent the medical standard of care.166 Thus, precedent rejects
as “improper” attempts to equate off-label use generally with
“experimental” or “investigational” uses of prescription medical
products:
Merely because a device is deemed “investigational” for purposes of
an IDE does not establish that the device is “experimental” or
“investigational” for all medical purposes. In fact . . . the prevailing
standard of care may dictate the opposite conclusion. We therefore
decline to subject those physicians who do not voluntarily participate
in FDA clinical investigations to the purview of the FDA’s
requirements for such investigations.167

“[T]he off-label use of a drug or device by a physician seeking an
optimal treatment for his or her patient is not necessarily
considered to be research or an investigational or experimental
treatment when the use is customarily followed by physicians.”168
Even before the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”)169
gave the FDA authority to regulate such products, a California
appellate court rejected the notion that a physician’s off-label use of
a medical device, characterized as a deviation from the
“manufacturer’s
recommendation,”
could
be
considered
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. Teo, supra note 5, at 322.
165. “Standard of care” in the medical context is typically defined in terms
of what a “reasonable” or “reasonably prudent” physician with the learning and
experience “ordinarily possessed by others in the profession” would do under
“similar circumstances.” E.g., Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 865 (Okla.
2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Palandjian v.
Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Mass. 2006) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §299A (1965) (explaining
that a member of profession is “required to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession”)
166. See Part III(A) supra.
167. Southard, 781 A.2d at 108 (footnote omitted); see 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§198.2(a) (2021) (providing that off-label use not to be treated as
“investigational”).
168. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 12-13 n.9 (citations omitted); see Femrite v.
Abbott Nw. Hosp., 568 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (commenting that
plaintiffs “deny that physicians could consider ‘off-label’ usage to be a standard
of care in some cases and simultaneously investigational in others. The record,
however, demonstrates otherwise.”).
169. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
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“experimental”:
The mere fact of a departure from the manufacturer’s
recommendation where such departure is customarily followed by
physicians of standing in the locality does not make that departure
an “experiment.” There was in this case no evidence of experiment
and the instructions concerning “experiment” should not have been
given.170

Likewise, subjecting off-label use to a statute governing informed
consent to “experimental” medical treatment is “completely
misplaced” in an off-label use situation:
[The act] deals with experiments on human subjects in the course of
pure research. . . . Here [the prescriber] used the . . . implant not in
the course of a medical research program but in a course of
therapeutic treatment for plaintiff.171

Off-label “surgeries ha[ving] a therapeutic purpose” that is not
“incidental to a broader research goal” are not “experimental.”172
Any “broad[er] definition” would “swallow up all off-label use”
contrary to the statute’s purpose:
The legislative history of the [statute] reflects that California
purposefully excluded therapeutic off-label use from [its] scope. . . .
The Assembly Bill originally included off-label use and the use of a
drug or device for which an application had been denied or withdrawn
by the FDA. . . . Those provisions were deleted before the bill became
law.173

Neither “[a] doctor’s desire to profit from a procedure” nor an offlabel treatment’s “elective nature” bears on whether a medical
treatment is “experimental.”174 “Physicians who treat their patients
170. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal.
App. 1957) (citation omitted).
171. Trantafello v. Med. Ctr., 227 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(construing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §24174(a) (2021)) (defining an
“experiment” as medical treatment conducted “in a manner not reasonably
related to maintaining or improving the health of the subject or otherwise
directly benefiting the subject”); see Daum v. SpineCare Med. Grp., Inc., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 260, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a physician not designated
as an “investigator” under federal law had no liability under state statute).
172. Perez, 711 F.3d at 1115.
173. Id. (citations omitted); see Moorer v. Stemgenex Med. Grp., Inc., No.
316CV02816AJBNLS, 2017 WL 1281882, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) (finding
that “treatments [that] are at least ‘reasonably related’ to maintaining or
improving the health of prospective customers . . . do not constitute ‘pure
research’” (citing Perez)).
174. Perez, 711 F.3d at 1116;. see Tarraferro v. State, 123 P.3d 912, 919-20
(Wyo. 2005) (distinguishing between “experimentation,” “research,” and “novel
techniques” in off-label use situation); Sparks v. Downing, No. 2009-CA-001349MR, 2010 WL 4669011, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010) (rejecting argument
that off-label use was “experimental” in malpractice case); Femrite, 568 N.W.2d
at 542 (concluding that patients of doctors practicing off-label use “were not
participants in experimental research”); Elliott-Lewis v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No.
14-CV-13155-IT, 2017 WL 1826627, at *3 (D. Mass. May 5, 2017) (rejecting
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using an approved medical device in a new, unapproved way may
subject themselves to potential malpractice claims but are not
engaging in an activity requiring oversight by an [institutional
review board].”175
Nor have allegations of off-label use been found to support
claims of “experimental” use in the context of the False Claims Act.
“[O]ff-label use of a drug or medical device is not the same as a
medically unnecessary use of that drug or device.”176
Medicare may cover Class II devices even though they require special
controls, such as performance standards or postmarket surveillance,
to provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. . . .
Alleging that [off-label] use of the [device] . . . is “experimental” does
not allege a basis for an inference that such use . . . is categorically
medically unnecessary.177
Commentators have reached the same conclusion.
Off-label uses are not necessarily unusual or experimental. In fact,
they are widely accepted within the medical community and may
sometimes be the most effective treatment for certain types of medical
conditions. . . . Courts have repeatedly held that certain off-label uses
are legitimate forms of therapy.178

An equally relevant distinction exists between “research” and
“therapeutic” uses of prescription medical products. Research is by
definition “nonvalidated,” in the sense that there is a “lack of
suitable validation of the safety or efficacy of the practice.”179
Indeed, “research” is precisely the process designed to bring about
such validation.180 “Therapy,” or “practice of medicine,” by contrast,

argument that off-label use was “investigational” in FCA case); cf. Shapira v.
Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 99 A.3d 217, 222 (Del. 2014) (holding that
off-label procedure could be “experimental” where surgeon was “gathering data
about the procedure’s efficacy”).
175. In re Otero Cnty. Hosp. Ass’n, 527 B.R. 719, 774-75 (Bankr. D.N.M.
2015) (footnote omitted), on reconsideration on other grounds, 584 B.R. 746
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2018).
176. United States ex rel. Bennett, 747 F. Supp. at 751 (citations omitted);
accord Sullivan, 2015 WL 13799885, at *11 (following United States ex rel.
Bennett in truthful off-label promotion situation); Ruhe, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 993
(following United States ex rel. Bennett in distinguishing between off-label and
“unnecessary” use).
177. United States ex rel. Bennett, 747 F. Supp. at 778 (regulatory citations
omitted) (regulatory internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Ausness, supra note 5, at 1254-55; see Teo, supra note 5, at 322 (“[T]he
unethical human experimentation objection to off-label drug use is severely
undermined, especially when one draws a distinction between medical research
and medical practice.”); Danielle Holley, Balancing on the Edge: The
Implications & Acceptability of Off-Label Drug Use, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
633, 639 (2009) (“If it benefits the patient the off-label usage of a drug is deemed
therapy, but if the purpose is to gain general knowledge for a broader population
then it is considered human experimentation.” (footnote omitted)).
179. LEVINE, supra note 142, at 4.
180. Id. at 3 (“‘[R]esearch’ refers to a class of activities designed to develop
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can be either validated on nonvalidated:
“[P]ractice” of medicine [“therapy”] refers to a class of activities
designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual. . . . The
customary standard for [practice/therapy] is a reasonable expectation
of success. The absence of validation or precision on which to base
such an expectation, however, does not in and of itself define that
activity in question as research. Uncertainty is inherent in
therapeutic practice because of the variability of . . . responses of
humans. This kind of uncertainty is, itself, routine and accepted.181

While “on-label” therapies are “validated” by the FDA
evaluation for safety and effectiveness, it does not follow that all
“off-label” uses are “nonvalidated.” As discussed above,182 many
standard-of-care therapies involve off-label use of drugs and
medical devices. Validation depends on “the degree of departure
from the standards of customary medical practice. . . . This is not
accomplished by comparing the physician’s plans with the FDAapproved package label.”183 As will be discussed,184 in the context of
duty to warn, off-label uses are often closely related to labeled uses
of the same product such that they present many, if not all, of the
same risks.185
In many cases, the distinction between “research” and
“therapy” will lie primarily in the intent of the prescribing
physician. If the intent is to benefit the patient, off-label use − even
if novel − is considered therapy.
The uncertainties of clinical innovation can reach even further, as the
physician modifies a procedure, puts an existing drug to a new use,
or tries some other significant deviation from standard practice in
hopes it will help a particular patient. Perhaps no existing approach
will help that patient, or sometimes the physician simply thinks he

or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”); see Ancheff v. Hartford Hosp., 799
A.2d 1067, 1081-82 (Conn. 2002) (approving jury instruction defining “research”
as not “substantiated by the [medical] literature”); Butler v. Juno Therapeutics,
Inc., No. CV H-18-898, 2019 WL 2568477, at *18 (S.D. Tex. June 21, 2019)
(explaining that “in a clinical trial, the investigator does not weigh the risks and
benefits of different drugs or treatments, but instead focuses primarily or only
on the experimental drug” (citation omitted)). Federal physician financial
disclosure regulations likewise define “research” as “a systematic investigation
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge relating broadly
to public health.” 42 C.F.R. §403.902 (2020). An “investigation” is defined as
“any experiment involving one or more human subjects.” Id.
181. LEVINE, supra note 142, at 3.
182. See Part III(A) supra.
183. LEVINE, supra note 142, at 3.
184. See Part VII(C)(3) infra.
185. Accord Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2, at 986 (discussing the
“line of demarcation between a drug’s use in research vs practice.”); id. (“The
goal of medical practice is to provide diagnosis, preventative treatment or
therapy. Research, on the other hand, is designed to test a hypothesis, permit
conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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can improve on existing options. In any event, the bare fact that an
innovation elevates the uncertainties does not, of itself, render that
innovation a form of research − even if one might rightly argue that
innovations like new surgical procedures or off-label drug uses ought
to be validated by research before they become widely used. . . .
Ordinary and innovative practices both aim to benefit a single
individual patient, responding to that individual’s specific needs and
interests. Indeed, innovation is often the ultimate individualization
of care, a customized therapy.186

“This distinction is crucial, because medical research is highly
regulated while medical practice is subject to comparatively little
regulation.”187
However, if the purpose of medical treatment is to acquire
general knowledge for a broader population, then even an identical
off-label use may be considered human experimentation.188
Furthermore, the interests of the researcher and the subject may
conflict in human experimentation. Therapeutic misconception arises
from this conflict when patients believe that the research is going to
benefit them directly, even though the intent and purpose of the study
is to gain general knowledge and not necessarily benefit the
patient.189

“In research, the study participant’s ‘well-being is
subordinated to the dictates of a research protocol designed to
advance knowledge for the sake of future patients.’”190 Thus, the
ultimate purpose of research is discovery and knowledge − unlike
therapy, which promotes the best interest of the patient:
Research is not treatment. Experiments require measurements and
conditions that may not be therapeutically significant. The
disappointment of patient-participants is not the result of a wrong
inflicted on them; they are frustrated in not receiving a potential cure,
but they were permitted to have the drug for the purpose of research
− the [investigator’s] purpose not theirs. They were the incidental,
gratuitous beneficiaries of the research. . . . Research is not standard;
186. E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice
Doctrines Versus Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 474, 475 (2004)
(footnotes omitted). “The ‘practice of medicine’ or . . . therapy refers to a class of
activities designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient.”
LEVINE, supra note 142, at 3. Its “purpose . . . is to provide diagnosis, preventive
treatment or therapy.” Id. “Uncertainty is inherent in therapeutic practice
because of the variability” of “responses in humans.” Id.
187. Laakmann, supra note 55, at 935 (footnote omitted).
188. Kathryn Tuthill, Commentary, Human Experimentation: Protecting
Patient Autonomy Through Informed Consent, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221, 223
(1997).
189. Holley, supra note 178, at 657 (footnotes omitted).
190. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 851 (Md. 2001)
(quoting Jay Katz, Human Experimentation & Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 7, 8 (1993)). Grimes did not involve drug/device testing, but rather
recognition of a “special relationship” between researchers and study subjects
to support a negligence duty. 782 A.2d at 844-46.
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it is speculation, approximation, and inquiry.191

The FDA likewise recognizes the distinction between off-label
use of products for therapeutic purposes and “investigational” use
of products for research. As for off-label use:
Good medical practice and the best interests of the patient require
that physicians use legally available drugs, biologics and devices
according to their best knowledge and judgment. . . . Use of a
marketed product in this manner when the intent is the “practice of
medicine” does not require the submission of an Investigational New
Drug Application (IND), Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) or
review by an Institutional Review Board (IRB).192

“Investigational” use is the exact opposite:
The investigational use of approved, marketed products differs from
the situation described above. [It] suggests the use of an approved
product in the context of a clinical study protocol. When the principal
intent of the investigational use of a test article is to develop
information about the product’s safety or efficacy, submission of an
IND or IDE may be required.193

In a more recent guidance the FDA likewise stated:
[U]se of a lawfully marketed drug for an unapproved use in the course
of medical practice is not a clinical investigation and does not require
an IND because it involves the use in an individual patient where the
primary intent is to treat the patient.194

Thus, FDA regulations concerning “clinical investigations of
products” do not apply to off-label use.195
An analogous principle exists in product liability. “[F]ailing to
191. Spenceley v. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 938 F. Supp. 398, 398 (S.D.
Tex. 1996); see LEVINE, supra note 142, at 3 (explaining that “[t]he term
‘research’ refers to a class of activities designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge. Generalizable knowledge consists of theories,
principles, or relationships . . . that can be corroborated by accepted scientific
observation and inference.”).
192. “Off-Label” & Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, &
Medical
Devices,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm
[perma.cc/2MLE-4YUA] (last updated May 6, 2020). As FDA has no authority
over the practice of medicine, Part II supra, the Agency’s observations about
physician “responsibility” are advisory only.
193. Id. (citation omitted).
194. Guidance for Clinical Investigators, Sponsors, and IRBs:
Investigational New Drug Applications (INDs) − Determining Whether Human
Research Studies Can Be Conducted Without an IND, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., at 4 (Sept. 2013), www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplian
ceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm229175.pdf [perma.cc/4FDM-A552]; see
id. at 15 (“If you are a health care provider and you prescribe a marketed drug
to treat a patient for an unlabeled indication (also referred to as off-label use),
an IND is not required because this use is considered to be within the scope of
medical practice and not a clinical investigation.”) (Q&A format).
195. 21 C.F.R. §312.2(d) (2021) (“This part [IND regulations] does not apply
to the use in the practice of medicine for an unlabeled indication.”).

2021]

Off-Label Use in The Twenty-First Century

41

make proper filings with the FDA . . . in and of itself, has nothing
to do with the safety and effectiveness of the device as such.”196
Thus, “[t]he mere fact that the FDA has not cleared a product for a
particular use does not mean that the product is not in fact suitable
for that purpose; it simply means that the FDA has not cleared
it.”197 Off-label use is not synonymous with product defect; rather,
“that FDA has not approved [a product] for a particular use does not
mean that it is unsafe or defective.”198 Similarly, “absence of data or
evidence affirmatively proving” the safety and effectiveness of a
particular medical use “without more, does not support the
conclusion that the [product] is actually ineffective or unsafe for
that use.”199

196. Knoth v. Smith & Nephew Richards, 195 F.3d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1999)
(applying Missouri law).
197. Southard, 781 A.2d at 107 (quoting Holland v. Smith & Nephew
Richards, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D. Mass. 1999)); see McMurdie v. Wyeth,
71 Pa. D. & C.4th 225, 230 (Pa. C.P. 2005) (quoting Southard for proposition
that lack of labeling for a use does not make use unsuitable).
198. Southard, 781 A.2d at 107 (quoting Minisan v. Danek Med., Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 970 (N.D. Ind. 1999)). “The fact that a [product] has not been approved
by the FDA for a particular use does not, however, mean that [it] is unsafe,
much less that the device is defective.” Sita v. Danek Med., Inc. (Sita I), 43 F.
Supp. 2d 245, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see Horrillo v. Cook Inc., No. 08-60931-CIV,
2014 WL 6455768, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2014) (finding that off-label
promotion did not automatically “render[] the device defective and
unreasonably dangerous”); Guinan v. A.I. duPont Hosp. for Children, 597 F.
Supp. 2d 485, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (deciding that “[t]he lack of FDA approval,
without more, is not enough to create an inference of a manufacturing or design
defect” (footnote omitted)) (applying Delaware law), rev’d on other grounds, 393
F. App’x 884 (3d Cir. 2010); Menges v. Depuy Motech, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 817,
828 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (reaching same result and quoting Sita I) (applying
Wisconsin law); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1363 (N.D. Ga.
1999) (holding that “failure to seek FDA approval does not constitute a defect”);
Lester v. Danek Med. Inc., No. 2:96CV1006, 1999 WL 1061973, at *4 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 16, 1999) (stating that “the status of the [product] by the FDA cannot
constitute a defective product”); Richardson v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc.,
No. 5:95-CV-68-B03, 1998 WL 1166780, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 1998)
(concluding that off-label use “does not render a [product] defective or unsafe”
(citation omitted)), adopted, 1999 WL 1132962 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 1999); Uribe
v. Sofamor, S.N.C., No. 8:95CV464, 1999 WL 1129703, at *15 n.9 (D. Neb. Aug.
16, 1999) (ruling that “the status of FDA approval does not constitute a ‘defect’
in the product”).
199. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cephalon, Inc. (Travelers Indem. I), 32 F. Supp.
3d 538, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), aff’d, 620 F. App’x 82 (3d Cir.
2015); see In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action
(Intron/Temodar II), No. 2:06-cv-5774 (SRC), 2010 WL 2346624, at *4 (D.N.J.
June 9, 2010) (explaining that “a lack of data or evidence affirmatively proving
that a Subject Drug was effective in treating a condition was not the same as
the actual ineffectiveness of the Subject Drug”), aff’d, 678 F.3d 235 (3d Cir.
2012).
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C. The Conundrum of Off-Label Promotion
“[The] FDA has had a tortured relationship with off-label drug
prescribing and promotion.”200 Historically, The FDA has directly
prohibited advertising that recommends or suggests an off-label
drug uses.201 Further, the FDA has “long taken the position” that
any and all “promotion” of off-label use “violates the FDCA” and is
thus illegal.202 Echoing this position, courts have often stated as a
general proposition that the FDCA “prohibit[s] a device
manufacturer from promoting the use of a device in a manner
inconsistent with premarket approval”203 or “prohibits
pharmaceutical companies from marketing drugs for off-label
uses”204 without significant examination of this issue.
200. Horvath, supra note 5, at 116 (footnote omitted).
201. 21 C.F.R. §202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2021) (“An advertisement for a prescription
drug . . . shall not recommend or suggest any use that is not in the labeling
accepted in such approved new-drug application or supplement.”).
202. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 203; see Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485
F.2d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 1973) (discussing 1955 FDA regulation (21 C.F.R. §
1.110(d) (1955)) that “provided for FDA approval of any proposed change in the
conditions under which such drug is to be used” (footnote omitted)); Smolla,
supra note 5, at 90 (“The FDA regime banning off-label drug advertising has
been in place, essentially unchanged, for decades.”).
203. Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307 (citations omitted); see Carson, 365
F. App’x at 815 (asserting that “promotion of a Class III device for an
unapproved use violates Section 331 of the FDCA”); BHR II, 401 F. Supp. 3d at
561 (ruling that FDCA “expressly prohibits” “off-label promotion of devices by
manufacturers” (citations omitted)); Modglin II, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (stating
that “[t]he FDCA does, however, expressly prohibit Class III device
manufacturers from marketing a PMA-approved device for an off-label use”
(citation omitted)); Garross v. Medtronic, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 809, 815 (E.D.
Wis. 2015) (articulating that “FDA prohibits device manufacturers from
promoting off-label uses of their products” (citation omitted)); Scovil v.
Medtronic Inc. (Scovil II), No. 2:14-CV-00213-APG-VCF, 2015 WL 880614, at
*9 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2015) (quoting Carson); Zaccarello v. Medtronic, Inc., 38 F.
Supp. 3d 1061, 1068 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (concluding that “the MDA prohibits offlabel promotion”); Beavers-Gabriel v. Medtronic, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1034
(D. Haw. 2014) (expounding that “there are ample ‘requirements’ in both the
FDCA and its regulations establishing that off-label promotion is prohibited”);
Houston II, 2014 WL 1364455, at *5 (pronouncing that “the MDA prohibits . . .
off-label promotion”); Ramirez, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (decreeing that “[o]fflabel promotion, then, violates federal law”); Houston v. Medtronic, Inc.
(Houston I), 957 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (pointing out that
“federal regulations prohibit device manufacturers from promoting off-label
uses of medical devices” (citations omitted)).
204. Lawton, 842 F.3d at 128 n.4; see Celexa/Lexapro, 915 F.3d at 5 (noting
that “[t]he FDCA creates both civil and criminal penalties for drug
manufacturers that promote the use of approved drugs for unapproved uses
(referred to here as ‘off-label’ uses)” (citations omitted)); Bober v. Glaxo
Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934, 939 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (asserting that “FDA
prohibits drug companies from promoting off-label uses for medications they
manufacture or market” (citation omitted)) (applying Illinois law); RhonePoulenc, 93 F.3d at 514 n.3 (mentioning that “the manufacturer may not
promote non-approved uses”); Travelers Indemnity II, 620 F. App’x at 85
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(explaining that “[t]he FDCA . . . generally prohibits manufacturers from
marketing, advertising, or otherwise promoting drugs for such unapproved or
‘off-label’ uses”) (quoting Intron/Temodar III, 678 F.3d at 239-40); United
States ex rel. Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 493 F. App’x 380, 383 (4th Cir. 2012)
(deciding that “federal regulations prohibit drug manufacturers from marketing
their drugs for off-label purposes” (citations omitted)); Sommers, 185 A.3d at
1072 n.6 (declaring that “drug makers may not promote their wares for off-label
uses”); Dusa Pharms., Inc. v. Biofrontera, Inc., No. CV 18-10568-RGS, 2020 WL
5995979, at *4 n.3 (D. Mass. Oct. 9, 2020) (pronouncing that “promotion of a
non-FDA-approved use by a pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer is
not permitted under FDA branding regulations”); Markland, 270 F. Supp. 3d at
1325 (observing that “it is generally accepted that a manufacturer’s off-label
promotion of a drug runs afoul of federal law”); Di Donato v. Insys Therapeutics
Inc., No. CV-16-00302-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 3268797, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 1,
2017) (finding that “FDA regulations prohibit marketing approved drugs for ‘offlabel’ uses”); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig.
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings (Testosterone II), No. 14 C 1748, 2017 WL
1836443, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017) (agreeing that FDA regulations “prohibit
a drug manufacturer from promoting off-label uses of its prescription drugs”
(citation omitted)); U.S. v. Pfizer, 2016 WL 807363, at *9 (expounding that
“manufacturers are prohibited from marketing off-label uses” (citation
omitted)); United States ex rel. Worsfold v. Pfizer Inc., C.A. No. 09-11522-NMG,
2013 WL 6195790, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2013) (assuming that
“pharmaceutical companies may not market drugs for off-label uses”); Smith v.
Bard, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (expressing that “FDA prohibits drug
manufacturers from marketing or promoting a drug for a use that the FDA has
not approved” (citation omitted)); Cent. Reg’l Emps. Benefit Fund v. Cephalon,
Inc., C.A. No. 09-3418 (MLC), 2010 WL 1257790, at *6 n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 29,
2010) (commenting that “FDA regulations prohibit drug manufacturers from
marketing or promoting prescription drugs for off-label uses” (citation omitted));
In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., 614 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1041 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(concluding that “[i]t is unlawful to market, advertise or otherwise promote the
off-label use of the drug” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir.
2011); Intron/Temodar I, 2009 WL 2043604, at *2 (stating that “[a]dvertising
or otherwise promoting a drug for off-label use is prohibited under the FDCA
and its implementing regulations” (citations omitted)); Hopper v. Solvay
Pharms., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (claiming that “FDA
prohibits a drug manufacturer from marketing or promoting a drug for nonapproved use” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 588 F.3d 13188 (11th Cir. 2009);
Neurontin I, 244 F.R.D. at 92 (professing that “[u]nder the [FDCA],
pharmaceutical manufacturers may not market or promote a drug for a use
which the FDA has not approved” (citation omitted)); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 443 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (determining
that “[t]he FDCA prohibits the promotion of approved drugs for non-approved
or off-label uses” (citation omitted)); Hess, 2006 WL 1064127, at *1 (specifying
that “FDA prohibits drug manufacturers from marketing or promoting a drug
for a use that the FDA has not approved” (citation omitted)); Faison v. Wyeth,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (S.D. Ga. 2004) (adjudging that “manufacturers
are prohibited from promoting an ‘off-label’ use”); TorPharm, Inc. v. Thompson,
260 F. Supp. 2d 69, 74 n.6 (D.D.C. 2003) (believing that “[d]rug companies are
forbidden by law from promoting their products for such unapproved uses”),
aff’d mem., 354 F.3d 87 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Stiens, 2020 WL 7266398, at *2
(judging that “federal regulations bar drug manufacturers from marketing their
products for off-label use”); Zitney, 2020 WL 499137, at *1 n.1 (articulating that
“[p]harmaceutical manufacturers are prohibited from marketing a drug or
device for ‘off-label’ uses” (citation omitted)); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret.
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However, the regulatory basis for a complete FDA ban on offlabel promotion is problematic, since “[t]he FDCA and its
accompanying regulations do not expressly prohibit the ‘promotion’
or ‘marketing’ of drugs for off-label use.”205 The FDA’s position rests
upon “a convoluted series of statutory provisions and
regulations.”206 The FDA’s “conclu[sion] that an approved drug that
is marketed for an unapproved use (whether in labeling or not) is
misbranded because the labeling of such drug does not include
‘adequate directions for use,’”207 involves a four-step process. First,
the FDCA prohibits the “misbranding” of drugs and devices.”208
Second, the FDA approved products are “misbranded” if the
labeling does not bear “adequate directions for use.”209 Third,
“adequate directions for use” may only be included with respect to
a product’s “intended use.”210 Fourth, if a product is “offered and
used” for an off-label purpose, such promotion (be it true or false)
can establish a different “intended use” that lacks the required
“adequate directions for use.”211
Sys. v. Corbat, No. CV 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at *24 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18,
2017) (repeating that “drug manufacturers are forbidden to market drugs for
off-label uses” (footnote omitted)); see also Hall & Berlin, supra note 5, at 657
(opining that “FDA generally prohibits the promotion of uses of the product that
are not approved” (footnote omitted)).
205. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 154 (pointing out the absence of definitions for
these terms); accord United States v. Facteau, No. 15-CR-10076-ADB, 2020 WL
5517573, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2020) (holding that “there is no statute that
specifically prohibits off-label marketing”); Otis-Wisher v. Fletcher Allen
Health Care, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600 n.3 (D. Vt. 2013), aff’d, 616 F. App’x
433 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that off-label promotion allegation is not “sufficiently
specific” to plead a crime); id. (following Caronia). FDA’s interpretation has
been described both as “muddy,” Wright, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 610 (quoting
Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 702); Thorn, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (quoting Schouest,
13 F. Supp. 3d at 702), and “murk[y].” Mendez v. Shah (Mendez I), 28 F. Supp.
3d 282, 292 (D.N.J. 2014); see Adams & Crudele, supra note 111, at 5 (explaining
that “an explicit, flat ban on off-label use promotion is nowhere to be found in
the FDA’s implementing regulations or the . . . FDCA” (footnote omitted));
Smolla, supra note 5, at 82 (“No federal statute or regulation imposes, in so
many words, a direct ban on off-label promotion of drugs.”).
206. In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., No. C 08-02376 MHP, 2010 WL 3463491,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2011).
207. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155 (citations omitted).
208. 21 U.S.C. §331(a) (2021).
209. 21 U.S.C. §352(f) (2021); see United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC,
741 F.3d 1314, 1323-24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing interplay between
misbranding and “adequate directions for use” FDCA provisions).
210. 21 C.F.R. §§201.5, 801.5 (2021). Thus, “it is unlawful for a
manufacturer to introduce a drug into interstate commerce with an intent that
it be used for an off-label purpose.” Henney, 202 F.3d at 332; see United States
ex rel. Palmieri v. Alpharma, Inc., C.A. No. ELH-10-1601, 2016 WL 7324629, at
*3 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2016) (agreeing with and quoting Henney, 202 F.3d at 33233).
211. 21 C.F.R. §§201.128, 801.4 (“intended use” determined by the “objective
intent” of the manufacturer, as evidenced by “labeling claims, advertising
matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their representatives”);
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“On the basis of this web of statutes and regulations, the FDA
takes the position that off-label promotion can constitute
misbranding in violation of the FDCA.”212 According to the FDA’s
reasoning, if a manufacturer or its representatives promote the “offlabel” use of a product, then that product’s labeling will not bear
adequate directions for the “purposes for which it is intended,” and
the drug can be treated as “misbranded.”213 However, recent courts
have found that the disposition of off-label promotion is not that
simple. “[T]here has been some dispute over the extent to which
federal law actually prohibits a manufacturer’s promotion that is
not false and misleading but that nonetheless fails to comply with
federal regulatory requirements.”214 An alternative is that off-label
promotion is just “evidence,” not an ipso facto violation. “According
to the FDA, if a drug manufacturer promotes a drug for off-label
uses, such promotion may constitute evidence to support a violation
of the [FDCA].”215 Indeed, the Department of Justice has taken
similar legal positions at least twice in filed briefs.216
see Alton v. Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078-79 (D. Or. 2013)
(detailing the chain of regulations); see supra note 24 (discussing status of these
regulations).
212. McCormick, 101 A.3d at 485 (citation omitted).
213. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 154 (citation omitted); accord Gardner, 2020 WL
2542121, at *6; Zyprexa, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 414-15; Actimmune, 2010 WL
3463491, at *6; United States v. Livdahl, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1266 (S.D. Fla.
2005) (quoting Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55); see Good Reprint Practices
for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles & Medical or Scientific
Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs & Approved
or Cleared Medical Devices, supra note 81:
An approved new drug that is marketed for an unapproved use is an
unapproved new drug with respect to that use. An approved drug that is
marketed for an unapproved use (whether in labeling or not) is
misbranded because the labeling of such drug does not include “adequate
directions for use.” Similarly, a medical device that is promoted for a use
that has not been approved or cleared by FDA is adulterated and
misbranded.
(citations omitted). A similar FDA explanation of the regulatory basis for its
position on off-label promotion was offered in 2014. See Letter from Leslie Cux,
Acting Comm’r, to Alan R. Bennett, Joan McPhee, & Coleen Klasmeier, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., www.reedsmith.com/files/uploads/DrugDeviceLawBlog/F
DA_2014_Citizen_Petition_Grant.pdf [perma.cc/UQ97-59UW].
214. Raab, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 697 (citation omitted); cf. Zeltiq Aesthetics,
Inc. v. BTL Indus., Inc., No. 13-cv-05473-JCS, 2015 WL 1359048, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (rejecting argument that lack of off-label adequate
directions for use renders promotion illegal under parallel state statute).
215. Electronic Drug Labeling: No Consensus on the Advantages and
Disadvantages of Its Exclusive Use, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., at 7 n.11 (July 2013),
www.gao.gov/assets/660/655760.pdf [perma.cc/3JNL-Y7F3].
216. Brief of United States, at 51, United States v. Caronia, No. 09-5006-cr,
2010 WL 6351497, at *51 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2010) (“Promoting an approved drug
for off-label uses is not itself a prohibited act under the FDCA, nor is it an
element of any prohibited act.” (citation omitted)); United States’ Statement of
Interest in Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by Pharm. Rsch. &
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However, “[c]ourts appear split on . . . whether off-label
promotion − by itself − constitutes misbranding in violation of
[federal law].”217 Another group of courts have held that “[t]he
[FDCA] and its accompanying regulations do not expressly prohibit
the ‘promotion’ or ‘marketing’ of drugs for off-label use.”218 With
“promotion,” being undefined, “the FDCA and FDA regulations
reference ‘promotion’ only as evidence of a drug’s intended use.”219
“[N]othing in the FDCA actually prohibits manufacturers from
promoting off-label uses.”220 “Federal law does not expressly define,
or ban, off-label promotion.”221 “Multiple courts have held that
federal law does not prohibit off-label promotion.”222 Further, “to the
extent that the FDA has undertaken to regulate off label marketing,
such regulation has been in the form of ‘Guidances,’” which are not
Mfrs. of America at 2, United States ex rel. Solis v. Millennium Pharm., Inc.,
No. 2:09-cv-03010, PACER Doc. #141 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014) , www.reeds
mith.com/files/uploads/DrugDeviceLawBlog/Solis_DoJ_brf.pdf [perma.cc/6ZU
5-KS6X] (“[O]ff-label promotion by a manufacturer is not by itself a violation of
federal law. The promotion of an approved drug for an unapproved use, without
more, does not violate the False Claims Act, nor is it among the comprehensive
list of prohibited acts in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).”).
217. Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc. (Hawkins II), 62 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1151
(E.D. Cal. 2014) (citation omitted); see Reddick, 2021 WL 798294, at *7
(observing that “[i]t is less clear that federal law bans truthful off-label
promotion, on which courts have come to differing conclusions”) (footnote
omitted).
218. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 154; accord id. at 160 (observing that “the statute
and its accompanying regulations do not expressly prohibit or criminalize offlabel promotion” (citation omitted)); Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 207-09
(following Caronia); see Nagel v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-00927
(JAM), 2016 WL 4098715, at *7 (D. Conn. July 28, 2016) (concluding that
“[f]ederal law does not explicitly ban off-label promotion unless it is false or
misleading” (citations omitted)).
219. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160 (citation omitted).
220. Underwood v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 890 So. 2d 429, 431
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see United States v. Solvay, No. CV H-06-2662, 2016
WL 470850, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2016) (finding that although the “dossiers
likely contained off-label information,” plaintiff failed to establish that “sending
the dossiers [to third-party payors] constituted unlawful promotion”).
221. Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 702; see Raab, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 697
(quoting Schouest, 13 F. Sup. 3d at 702); Arthur v. Medtronic, Inc. (Arthur I),
No. 4:14-CV-52 (CEJ), 2014 WL 3894365, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2014)
(quoting Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 702); Schuler v. Medtronic, Inc., No. CV
14-00241-R, 2014 WL 988516, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) (deciding that
“federal law does not bar off-label promotion”); Alton v. Medtronic, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 2d 1069, 1098 (D. Or. 2013) (holding that “the FDCA neither prohibits
off-label applications of an approved device nor prohibits device manufacturers
from promoting off-label applications”); Dawson v. Medtronic, Inc., C.A. No.
3:13-cv-663-JFA, 2013 WL 4048850, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2013) (asserting that
“[t]his court is not convinced that off-label promotion violates the FDCA”).
222. Cales v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 14-CI-1774, 2014 WL 6600018, at *10 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2014), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 4081908 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
July 1, 2015); see Norabuena, 86 N.E.3d at 1208 (holding that “FDA did not
prohibit [defendant] from promoting the off-label uses of” its product (citation
omitted)).
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“binding statement[s] of public policy.”223
The absence of any simple statutory or regulatory prohibition
of off-label promotion has consequences where parties attempt to
pursue promotion-related allegations as state-law claims for
negligence per se. The absence of a simple, easily understood FDA
standard to substitute for the usual common-law “reasonable man”
standard precludes resort to negligence per se under the laws of
most states.224 Most states refuse to replace common-law principles
with “vague” or “imprecise” legislative or regulatory
requirements.225 To the extent that the FDA’s rationale is set forth
only in guidance (or “draft” guidance) documents, or turns upon
mere “evidence of intent,”226 state law is universal that negligence
per se cannot be based on the “violation” of mere guidelines that
lack the force of law.227
The FDA limits inclusion of information about the risks of offlabel use in approved labeling. Generally, the “FDA will not approve
a new drug application if the labeling contains instructions
regarding uses other than those for which the drug has been shown
to be safe and effective.”228 The FDA regulations require prior FDA
review and approval of warnings pertaining to adult off-label uses
of drugs, and limit such off-label warnings to “commonly prescribed”
uses.229 Similarly, if there is a “common belief” in the effectiveness
223. Long v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., No. 3:98CV7037, 1999 WL
680867, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 1999); see Underwood v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharms., Inc., 890 So. 2d 429, 430-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (following Long,
1999 WL 680867). See generally Limiting Use of Agency Guidance Documents
in Affirmative Civil Enforcement Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at 2 (Jan. 25,
2019), www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1028756/download [perma.cc/DT5
X-RZQF] (asserting that “the Department may not use its enforcement
authority to effectively convert agency guidance documents into binding rules”).
224. See Cantwell v. De La Garza, C.A. No. 18-272-D, 2019 WL 2166541, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. May 17, 2019) (observing that a negligence per se claim for offlabel promotion leaves one “to wonder what duty of care established by any
statute or regulation”); Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *9 (holding that
“encourag[ing] off-label use . . . would not support a product defect case for
inadequate warning,” for, although “actionable” by FDA, “it would not result in
a viable products liability action” (footnote omitted)).
225. See Zeltiq, 2015 WL 1359048, at *9 (refusing to incorporate FDA’s
“complex and extensive regulatory scheme [for off-label promotion] that, by its
terms, applies only to the federal statute” into California’s Sherman Act). A
comprehensive discussion of negligence per se standards is beyond the scope of
this article. State law precedent addressing, and almost always precluding,
negligence per se based on complex or vague enactments is collected at JAMES
M. BECK & ANTHONY VALE, DRUG & MEDICAL DEVICE PRODUCT LIABILITY
DESKBOOK §4.02[3][e] (2021).
226. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161.
227. BECK & VALE, supra note 225, §4.02[3][b] (addressing negligence per se
based on claimed violations of guidelines and other material lacking legal force).
228. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 11; see Salbu, supra note 2, at 187-88 (stating
that “[i]f a manufacturer wishes an off-label use to be added to a drug’s labeling,
it must apply to the FDA for approval”).
229. “A specific warning relating to a use not provided for under the
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of an off-label use of a drug, the FDA may require a contrary
statement when a “preponderance of the evidence . . . shows the
drug is ineffective.”230 Thus, “[i]n addition to warning about risks
from approved uses, the FDA has authority to impose warnings
about off-label or unapproved uses when there is evidence of a
clinically significant risk.”231 Exceptions exist, and require drug
manufacturers to include, ab initio, information about “specific
hazards” of pediatric232 and geriatric233 off-label uses, as well as
“recognized” off-label uses for labor and delivery.234 The FDA also
prohibits citations in drug labeling to clinical studies that “imply or
suggest” off-label uses.235
Similarly, for medical devices, FDA,
may require a statement in labeling . . . regarding a use of the device
not identified in the proposed labeling if . . . there is a reasonable
likelihood that the device will be used for an intended use not
identified in the proposed labeling . . .[and] such use could cause
harm.236

The FDA requires that the labeling of “restricted devices”237
include “prominent display” of “warnings, hazards or precautions
important for the device’s safe and effective use.238
[FDA] may require the . . . person(s) responsible for the labeling or
advertising of the device to include . . . if the device is a restricted
‘Indications and Usage’ section may be required by FDA . . . if the drug is
commonly prescribed for a disease or condition and such usage is associated
with a clinically significant risk or hazard.” 21 C.F.R. §201.57(c)(6)(i) (2021); see
21 C.F.R. §201.80(e) (2021) (containing similar language pertaining to certain
older drugs).
230. 21 C.F.R. §§201.57(c)(2)(ii), 201.80(c)(3)(iv) (2021).
231. Bailey, 37 A.3d at 556 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); see Church
& Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmBH, 843 F.3d 48, 56 (2d
Cir. 2016) (stating that the “FDA may . . . require changes to the product’s
labeling or promotional materials designed to discourage potential off-label use
of the product that might cause harm to consumers” (citation omitted));
Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 11-12 (holding that when off-label use is
“widespread,” FDA “may require the manufacturer to include statements in the
drug’s labeling”).
232. 21 C.F.R. §§201.57(c)(9)(iv)(E-F) (2021), 201.80(f)(9)(v-vi) (2021).
233. 21 C.F.R. §§201.57(c)(9)(v)(D) (2021), 201.80(f)(10)(iv) (2021).
234. 21 C.F.R. §§201.57(c)(9)(i)(C)(5) (2021) (“expected” effects of any offlabel use), 201.80(f)(7) (2021) (“recognized” off-label uses).
235. 21 C.F.R. §§201.57(c)(9)(15)(i) (2021), 201.80(m)(1)(i) (2021).
236. 21 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(E)(i)(I-II) (2021); see Church & Dwight Co. Inc. v.
SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, No. 14 Civ. 00585(AJN), 2014 WL
2526965, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2014) (quoting FDA warning requirement
concerning anticipated off-label use); Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *4 (quoting
FDA warning requirement concerning anticipated off-label use).
237. All prescription medical devices are “restricted devices.” 21 U.S.C.
§360j(e)(1)(A) (2021)(restrictions include “use . . . only upon the written or oral
authorization of a practitioner licensed by law to administer or use such
device”).
238. 21 C.F.R. §814.82(a)(3) (2021).

2021]

Off-Label Use in The Twenty-First Century

49

device, a statement, notice, or warning. Such statement, notice, or
warning shall be in the manner and form prescribed by the
Commissioner and shall identify the . . . risk of illness or injury or the
unreasonable, direct, and substantial danger to the health of
individuals associated with the device as previously labeled.239

Thus, the “FDA can require a [device] manufacturer to provide
additional labeling that addresses potential off-label uses.”240

IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON FDA
PROHIBITION OF TRUTHFUL OFF-LABEL
SPEECH/PROMOTION
When the original off-label use article was published in 1998,
a First Amendment defense to allegations that all off-label
promotion was illegal, regardless of its truth, was tenuous at best.
“Until the last 30 years, such an argument would have been laughed
out of court.”241 The Supreme Court’s first recognized First
Amendment protection of any sort for so-called “commercial speech”
occurred in 1976242 – more than 20 years after the FDA’s “intended
use” definition was created.243 Thereafter, commercial speech
received “qualified but nonetheless substantial protection,”244 with
lesser protection justified “protect consumers from misleading,
deceptive or aggressive sales practices.”245 First Amendment
jurisprudence “presum[es] that the speaker and the audience, not
the Government, should be left to assess the value of accurate and
239. 21 C.F.R. §895.25(b) (2021); see 21 C.F.R. §§895.21(c) (2021) (providing
that pursuant to §895.25, FDA may order a “change in labeling, or change in
advertising” of any restricted device in response to “any substantial deception
or unreasonable and substantial risk”); 814.82(a)(1) (2021) (stating that “FDA
may impose . . . [r]estriction[s] of the sale, distribution, or use of the device”).
240. Reeves, 44 F.3d at 305-06 (citing §895.25); see McGuan v. Endovascular
Tech., Inc., 106 Cal. Rptr.3d 277, 281-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing FDA’s
power to “condition its approval on adherence to various requirements” extends
to “off-label promotion”); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
MDL 1014, 1996 WL 221784, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1996) (recognizing that
“[t]hrough [§895.25(a)] the FDA regulates off-label uses of medical devices”).
241. United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
242. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 773 (1976) (answering “in the negative” “whether a State may completely
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely
lawful activity” in the commercial context).
243. See Part II supra. “[T]he FDCA’s drug-approval framework predates
modern First Amendment law respecting commercial speech.” Amarin, 119 F.
Supp. 3d at 226.
244. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
245. “[W]here a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation
of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
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non-misleading information about lawful conduct.”246

A. First Amendment Protection of Off-Label Speech in
Commercial Contexts
First Amendment protection of truthful speech about off-label
use was initially (and often still is) evaluated under the “Central
Hudson” test:
For commercial speech to come within [First Amendment protection],
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.247

Under Central Hudson, beginning in 1998, the FDA lost a
number of First Amendment-based legal challenges.248 Most
notably, a total FDA ban on advertising of pharmaceutical
compounding, justified as necessary to prevent evasion of the
FDCA’s regulatory scheme, failed in the Supreme Court.249 First, it
was paternalistic:
Bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech usually rest
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond
“irrationally” to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark
for what the government perceives to be their own good.250

Second, the total ban was not narrowly tailored. “[I]f the
Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not
restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must
do so.”251 Several “alternative means” existed that would
distinguish between “compounding and large-scale manufacturing”
that were less restrictive if speech than a total ban on
246. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195
(1999) (citation omitted).
247. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). For a balanced assessment of the competing interests pertinent to
evaluating the substantiality of FDA’s (and the public’s) interest in restricting
off-label promotion, see Teo, supra note 5, at 317-19 (pro), 319-24 (anti). For
FDA’s view, see Public Health Interests & First Amendment Considerations
Related to Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of
Approved or Cleared Medical Products, supra note 117, at 5-20. For an antiFDA/pro-free speech perspective, see Smolla, supra note 5, at 128-32.
248. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656-59 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Alliance for
Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 70 (D.D.C. 2010);
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 66-69; Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp.
2d 81, 85-87 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated as moot, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
249. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
250. Id. at 375 (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503).
251. Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
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advertising.252
Restrictions on commercial speech that target specific “topics”
or “speakers” is now subject to stricter scrutiny than Central
Hudson.253 “Content-based laws . . . are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”254 “First Amendment’s hostility to content-based
regulation extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an
entire topic.”255 Likewise, “laws favoring some speakers over others
demand strict scrutiny.”256 Rejecting a state’s “aimed, content-based
burden” on in-person marketing of drugs to physicians as
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court declared that “[s]peech in aid
of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”257 “The statute
thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content.
More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely
pharmaceutical manufacturers.”258 Such laws pose the risk that
“the State has left unburdened those speakers whose messages are
in accord with its own views.”259
The First Amendment has “great relevance in the fields of
medicine and public health, where information can save lives.”260
The FDA’s off-label promotion ban may be viewed as both topic- and
speaker-based under Sorrell. It is directed against a specific topic –
information concerning the safety and effectiveness of regulated
products for off-label use – and limited to specific speakers261 and

252. Id. at 372 (mentioning banning “commercial scale manufacturing,”
limiting compounding to “prescriptions already received,” forbidding
“wholesale” pricing, and volume restrictions).
253. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571-72 (2011).
254. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Id. at 2230 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557, 564.
258. Id. at 564. “While the burdened speech results from an economic
motive, so too does a great deal of vital expression.” Id. at 567 (citations
omitted).
259. Id. at 580.
260. Id. at 566. “[B]anning or severely restricting off-label promotion may
deprive physicians of valuable sources of information. Drug manufacturers
typically possess the largest amount of information regarding the effectiveness
and risks of the drugs they market.” Horvath, supra note 5, at 117 (footnote
omitted).
261. While banning manufacturer speech about off-label uses, FDA now
publicizes off-label uses itself. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Another federal agency, the National Institutes of Health, also maintains
websites discussing off-label use research. E.g. CLINICAL TRIALS,
www.clinicaltrials.gov/ [perma.cc/C64G-YPJH] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021); OffLabel Drug Use in Cancer Treatment, NAT’L CANCER INST., www.cancer.gov/a
bout-cancer/treatment/drugs/off-label [perma.cc/TW53-5VAW] (last visited Jan.
26, 2021); see 42 U.S.C. §§282(j), 284m (2021) (requiring disclosure of clinical
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audiences.262 States can also mandate disclosure of off-label use
information.263 Exceptions such as these further contribute to the
First Amendment vulnerabilities of the FDA’s off-label promotion
ban.264
Sorrell’s content-based First Amendment rationale has been
extended into the realm of truthful off-label promotion. In Caronia,
the FDA’s off-label promotion ban was found lacking under
“heightened” First Amendment scrutiny:
We construe the misbranding provisions of the FDCA as not
prohibiting and criminalizing the truthful off-label promotion of FDAapproved prescription drugs. Our conclusion is limited to FDAapproved drugs for which off-label use is not prohibited. . . . [T]he
government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and
their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the
lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.265

This construction was necessary to avoid declaring the FDCA
unconstitutional.266 “In the ordinary case, it is all but dispositive to
conclude that a law is content-based.”267
First, we conclude that the government’s construction of the FDCA’s
misbranding provisions imposes content- and speaker-based
restrictions on speech subject to heightened scrutiny. Second, we
conclude the government cannot justify a criminal prohibition of offstudies of pediatric, oncological, and AIDS-related off-label uses).
262. Off-label information may be provided to a physician in response to an
“unsolicited” request, but not otherwise. 21 C.F.R. §99.1(b) (2021); see Hologic,
2008 WL 1860035, at *18 (stating that “a manufacturer is permitted to respond
to questions about off-label uses” (statutory citation omitted)). Manufacturers
may also discuss off-label uses with third party payors, supra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text, as well as “stock analysts” and investors. FDA and the
Internet: Advertising and Promotion of Medical Products - Discussion Group 1,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 16, 1996), www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drugevaluation-and-research-cder/fda-and-internet-advertising-and-promotionmedical-products-discussion-group-1 [perma.cc/DG4F-ZNUV].
263. New York successfully sued to force such disclosures. See Consent
Order & Judgment, New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 04-CV-5304 MGC,
2004 WL 1932763, ¶¶3, 8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2004). Compelled speech, however,
must “factually accurate and uncontroversial.” Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v.
Zeise, 309 F. Supp. 3d 842, 853 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (scientifically inaccurate
Proposition 65 warning held unconstitutional).
264. See Greater New Orleans Broad., 527 U.S. at 190 (holding that a
“regulatory regime [may be] so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that
the Government cannot hope to exonerate it” (citation omitted)); Ralph Hall &
Elizabeth Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label
Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New
Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 263 (2007).
265. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168-69.
266. Before the Second Circuit, the government conceded, “[p]romoting an
approved drug for off-label uses is not itself a prohibited act under the FDCA,
nor is it an element of any prohibited act.” Brief of United States, United States
v. Caronia, Nos. 09-5006-cr(L), 10-0750(CON), 2010 WL 6351497, at *51 (2d
Cir. Oct. 8, 2010) (citation omitted).
267. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571).
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label promotion even under Central Hudson’s less rigorous
intermediate test.268

The FDA’s absolute off-label promotion ban failed because
“speech about the government-approved use of drugs is permitted,
while certain speech about the off-label use of drugs . . . is
prohibited, even though the off-label use itself is not.”269 Further,
“this construction is speaker-based because it targets one kind of
speaker − pharmaceutical manufacturers − while allowing others to
speak without restriction.”270 “[P]rohibiting off-label promotion by a
pharmaceutical manufacturer while simultaneously allowing offlabel use ‘paternalistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians
and patients to receive potentially relevant treatment
information.”271 “[T]he government could pursue several
alternatives without excessive First Amendment restrictions.”272 As
to the FDA’s treatment of truthful off-label promotion, “regulating
speech must be a last − not first − resort.”273
Given Sorrell and Caronia, truth is now a probable defense to
off-label promotion allegations.274 “[S]peech about off-label use is
not misleading merely because the FDA has not approved that offlabel use or reviewed or approved the speech.”275 “Compelling
private persons to toe the government’s line, or shut up, is
unconstitutional.”276 While “Caronia left open the government’s
ability to prove misbranding on a theory that promotional speech

268. Id.
269. Id. at 165 (citations omitted).
270. Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he FDCA permits physicians and academics
. . . to speak about off-label use without consequence, while the same speech is
prohibited when delivered by pharmaceutical manufacturers.” Id. (citations
omitted); see United States v. Lebeau, No. 10-CR-253, 2016 WL 447612, at *9
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 3, 2016) (wondering why “[d]octors and academics could promote
off-label use of a drug without prohibition, while [sales reps] could not”)
(construing Caronia), aff’d, 654 F. App’x 826 (7th Cir. 2016).
271. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
272. Id. at 167-68 (listing “guid[ing] physicians and patients in
differentiating between misleading and false promotion, exaggerations and
embellishments, and truthful or non-misleading information,” “warning or
disclaimer systems,” requiring new drug applications “to list all applicable or
intended indications,” imposing “other limits, including ceilings or caps on offlabel prescriptions,” or even prohibiting “exceptionally concerning” off-label
uses “altogether” (citations omitted)).
273. Id. at 168 (quoting Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373). Nor was defendant’s
“intent” a contested issue, since in Caronia “[p]romoting [an off-label] use, in
fact, was transparently [the defendant’s] intent.” Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at
228 (footnote omitted).
274. “Caronia’s construction of the misbranding provisions so to exclude
truthful promotion speech affords no protection to a manufacturer that uses
false or misleading communications to promote an off-label use.” Amarin, 119
F. Supp. 3d at 228.
275. United States v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 342, 346 (W.D.
Tex. 2016) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Caputo, 517 F.3d at 939.
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provides evidence that a [product] is intended for a use that is not
included on the [product’s] FDA-approved label,”277 in practice, both
off-label promotion prosecutions278 and tort claims279 after Caronia
have taken care to more than just truthful off-label speech so as to
avoid First Amendment challenges.280 Courts have been revising
their description of FDA restrictions on “off-label promotion” to
include truthfulness caveats, such as “pharmaceutical
manufacturers are generally prohibited from promoting off-label
uses of their products if the off-label marketing is false or
misleading.”281
After decades of governmental monetization of its absolute offlabel promotion ban,282 regulated entities have recently had better
results in challenges to FDA attempts to preclude truthful off-label
promotion, since “under Caronia, the FDA may not bring such an
277. Polansky I, 822 F.3d at 615 n.2 (citing Caronia, 703 F.3d at 162).
278. The Facteau convictions emphasized conduct rather than speech. 2020
WL 5517573, at *13 (“[T]he Court clearly instructed the jury that it could not
convict Defendants simply for making truthful, non-misleading off-label
statements.”). Similarly, in United States v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., No. SA14-CR-926-FB (W.D. Tex.), the government proposed to instruct the jury that
“[i]t is also not a crime for a device company or its representatives to give doctors
wholly truthful and non-misleading information about the unapproved use of a
device.” PACER Doc. No. 172, at 31 (Jan. 7, 2016) (“Unapproved Use by Doctors”
(footnote omitted)), www.reedsmith.com/files/uploads/DrugDeviceLawBlog/Vas
cular%20Solutions%20US%20proposed%20jury%20instructions.pdf
[perma.cc/7EKU-KRDJ]. Earlier, the government similarly stated, “off-label
promotion by a manufacturer is not by itself a violation of federal law. The
promotion of an approved drug for an unapproved use, without more, does not
violate the False Claims Act, nor is it among the comprehensive list of
prohibited acts in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).” United States’
Statement of Interest in Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief, United States ex
rel. Solis v. Millennium Pharms., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-03010, PACER Doc. No. 141,
at 2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014), www.reedsmith.com/files/uploads/DrugDeviceL
awBlog/Solis_DoJ_brf.pdf [perma.cc/A2TZ-PXYN] (footnote omitted).
279. Hawkins II, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 1152 (“[I]f nothing else − the MDA
prohibits false or misleading off-label promotion of a Class III FDA approved
medical device.”).
280. See Aaron Kesselheim & Michelle Mello, Prospects for Regulation of
Off-Label Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding Commercial Speech
Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539, 1584 (2014) (recommending a “misleadingspeech strategy for prosecuting off-label promotion”).
281. Polansky I, 822 F.3d at 615; see In re Smith & Nephew Birmingham
Hip Resurfacing Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2775, 2019 WL
3975457, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2019) (holding that “[f]ederal law prohibits the
off-label promotion of devices that rises to the level of misbranding or
adulterating a product” (citations omitted)); Inchen Huang, 2019 WL 1245136,
at *1 (quoting Polansky I); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (Martin III), No.
115CV00994DADMJS, 2017 WL 825410, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017)
(concluding that FDA’s PMA process “establishes conditions for approval that
prohibit false or misleading off-label promotion” (citations omitted)).
282. See Adams & Crudele, supra note 111, at 21 & n.5 (collecting examples
of “billions of dollars” of federal government enforcement settlements involving
alleged off-label promotion); Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 204 (discussing large
off-label promotion prosecution settlements).
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action based on truthful promotional speech alone, consistent with
the First Amendment.”283 Under Caronia, a judge makes the
ultimate determination whether or not off-label promotion was
“truthful,”284 as opposed to virtually unreviewable FDA
discretion.285 The FDA has likewise adjusted its position, admitting
that “the public health may benefit when health care professionals
receive truthful and non-misleading scientific or medical
publications on unapproved new uses.”286
Future litigation over truthful off-label promotion is more
likely to arise in the context of qui tam-based, FCA litigation,
instead of cases that the government itself prosecutes and thus can
be expected to include a falsity element.287 In light of the First
Amendment, an FCA claim that lacked allegations of false or
misleading off-label promotion was dismissed on First Amendment
grounds:
[An FCA] complaint must allege that [the defendant] engaged in false
or misleading speech to promote the [product]; otherwise the
resulting claim would not be “false” or “fraudulent” and would not be
actionable under the FCA. Plaintiff’s allegations of false and
misleading off-label promotions of the [product] are not sufficient to
state a claim for relief.288

Thus, “general allegations that [defendant] promoted [its product]

283. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 224. “Where the speech at issue consists of
truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label use of an FDAapproved drug, such speech, under Caronia, cannot be the act upon which an
action for misbranding is based.” Id. at 226.
284. Id. at 229-36 (evaluating truthfulness of specific statements).
285. First Amendment rights in Caronia were asserted by a sales
representative, and in Amarin by a small company with a single product. Why
them? FDA has employed a variety of tactics to intimidate and frustrate those
it regulates, including threats of adverse publicity and debarment from
supplying government programs, claims that legal action is not ripe when it is
sued, and claims of mootness when a would-be litigant complies. See Lars Noah,
Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(Lessness?) at the FDA, 93
NEB. L. REV. 89, 126-29 (2014) (describing disincentives to asserting First
Amendment rights in litigation against the government). “[O]verwhelming
leverage that federal law provides to prosecutors tends to lead inexorably to
guilty pleas in [off-label promotion] prosecutions.” Smolla, supra note 5, at 82
(footnote omitted).
286. Revised Draft Guidance: Distributing Scientific & Medical Publications
on Unapproved New Uses − Recommended Practices, supra note 79, at 6. But
see Public Health Interests & First Amendment Considerations Related to
Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or
Cleared Medical Products, supra note 117, at 21-25 (reiterating FDA legal
arguments supporting off-label promotion ban on last day of Obama
administration).
287. See Comanor & Needleman, supra note 5, at 132 (describing
government’s “emphasizing the misleading means that were used” postCaronia).
288. Sullivan, 2015 WL 13799885, at *12 (footnotes omitted) (following
Caronia and Amarin).
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for off-label uses,” without “also alleg[ing] the promotions were false
and misleading,” fail as a matter of law “because truthful and nonmisleading promotions fall within the protection of the First
Amendment and cannot render any subsequent claim false.”289
Given the public health implications, more truthful and nonmisleading information about off-label uses is better than less.290
Restricting truthful speech about valuable medical information that
manufacturers are uniquely situated291 to provide to those who need
to know is illogical:
[I]f a given use is lawful, and thus can be written about freely in
newspapers or blogs, and discussed among hospitals that already
have purchased [the product], doesn’t it make a good deal of sense to
allow speech by the [product]’s manufacturer, which after all will
have the best information? Why privilege speech by the
uninformed?292

Ultimately, the First Amendment may force the FDA to shift
to non-speech mechanisms for limiting manufacturer promotion of
off-label uses.293 By purporting to ban truthful off-label promotion,
FDA has long “exaggerate[d] its overall place in the universe.”294 A
First Amendment reckoning is coming, and the FDA “probably
cannot [postpone it] indefinitely.”295
289. Id. at *13 (citations omitted).
290. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167 (“[I]t only furthers the public interest to
ensure that decisions about the use of prescription drugs, including off-label
usage, are intelligent and well-informed.” (citations omitted)); see Osborn, supra
note 5, at 307 (arguing that “where the challenged off-label information is
truthful, what is the public interest in forbidding it? The billions of dollars in
corporate fines flowing into government coffers or absorbed by legal fees, which
might otherwise be put to good use in discovering new medicines, compel us to
question the wisdom of government policy[.]”).
291. “[M]anufacturers have superior access to information about their
drugs.” Wyeth v. Levine (Levine), 555 U.S. 555, 578-79 (2009).
292. Caputo, 517 F.3d at 939.
293. The author has suggested that FDA could require manufacturer
reporting of off-label uses and could set “benchmarks” – either dollar amounts
or percentages of sales – for requiring submission of off-label uses for agency
approval. See Elizabeth Blackwell & James Beck, Drug Manufacturers’ First
Amendment Right to Advertise & Promote Their Products for Off-Label Use:
Avoiding A Pyrrhic Victory,” 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439, 459 (2003). More recent
commentators have proposed more sophisticated versions of this mandatory
FDA submission concept. See Horvath, supra note 5, at 127-30 (suggesting
submission of existing “off-the-shelf” off-label data, with FDA making a
“stratified” evaluation of the strength of scientific support); Aaron Kesselheim,
Off-Label Drug Use & Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals & Commercial
Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 254-57 (2011) (proposing “scaled oversight” of
promoted off-label uses by FDA). Similar benchmarks could also be employed to
demand clinical trials of off-label uses, whether or not FDA approval is
ultimately required. Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence & Extrapolation:
Mechanisms for Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs & Devices, 64 DUKE L.J.
377, 412 (2014).
294. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
295. Comanor & Needleman, supra note 5, at 133.
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B. First Amendment Protection of Off-Label Speech as
Scientific Speech
A number of forms of speech that the FDA considers “off-label
promotion” – such as dissemination of articles from medical
journals, providing free medical textbooks, and providing
continuing medical education – involve speech that may not be
“commercial” at all. “[T]he core notion of commercial speech” is
“speech which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.”296 “[T]here is an abundance of case law to support the
proposition that a scientific article is protected noncommercial
speech despite the potential for erroneous content.”297 Thus,
scientific expression is ordinarily entitled to full First Amendment
protection.298 While “secondary dissemination can constitute
296. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422
(1993) (affirming that commercial speech is an “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
297. Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384,
456 (D.N.J. 2009) (citations omitted).
298. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973) (“[I]n the area of freedom
of speech . . . courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on
genuinely serious . . . scientific expression.”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (contending that “[f]reedom to
reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment
are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge.”);
ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that “statements about contested and contestable scientific
hypotheses” are protected “for purposes of the First Amendment”); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that
‘“[i]t is . . . settled . . . that the First Amendment protects scientific expression
and debate just as it protects political and artistic expression’” (citations
omitted)); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 542 (9th
Cir. 1988) (agreeing that “the constitutional wall against government
censorship protects . . . the heartland of political, literary and scientific
expression and debate”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir.
1982) (determining that “the First Amendment extends as readily to the scholar
in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom” (citation omitted)) (citation
omitted); Pellegrini v. Ne. Univ., No. 12-CV-40141-TSH, 2013 WL 5607019, at
*4 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2013) (stating that “scientific and academic speech which
reside at the core of the First Amendment . . . are typically never subject to
regulation” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted,
2013 WL 5755327 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2013); Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc.,
464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (decreeing that “[c]ourts cannot
inquire into the validity of scientific works”), aff’d, 279 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir.
2008); McMillan v. Togus Reg’l Office, 294 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(adjudging that “[t]he First Amendment protects public debate on matters of
public concern, including scientific matters” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 120 F.
App’x 849 (2d Cir. 2005); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that “[i]t is equally
settled . . . that the First Amendment protects scientific expression and debate
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commercial speech if it is given a pecuniary gloss,”299 an unbiased
presentation of scientific information, particularly when the
information has been peer-reviewed,300 should be entitled to full
First Amendment protection.301
That money is involved in the creation of speech does not,
without more, deprive it of First Amendment protection. “[T]he
degree of First Amendment protection is not diminished merely
because the . . . speech is sold rather than given away.”302 “Some of
our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a
profit.”303 “[S]trict liability” or “liability without fault” may not be
imposed upon First Amendment protected speech.304

C. First Amendment Protection of Off-Label Against
Tort Claims
The Supreme Court gives the First Amendment the same
preclusive effect on private tort claims as it does on other forms of
governmental restrictions on speech.
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, [it involves]
just as it protects political and artistic expression” (citations omitted)); Katahn
v. Hearst Corp., 742 F. Supp. 437, 441 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (deciding that
“divergent views about science . . . are precisely the type of free and open
discourse the First Amendment was designed to protect”); see James Beck,
Constitutional Protection of Scientific and Educational Activities from Tort
Liability: The First Amendment as a Defense to Personal Injury Litigation, 37
TORT & INS. L.J. 981, 982-83 (2002) (applying First Amendment precedent to
tort litigation).
299. Genzyme Corp. v. Shire Human Genetic Therapies, Inc., 906 F. Supp.
2d 9, 15 (D. Mass. 2012) (citation omitted).
300. “[S]peech is protected by the First Amendment if it is a bona fide
scientific and educational speech that appears in independent and peerreviewed sources, such as a journal article reprint or a medical textbook.”
United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. June 4, 2009) (press release describing scientific developments not fully
protected).
301. Pellegrini, 2013 WL 5607019, at *10 (“posting of an already-published
scientific paper” not actionable; “to hold otherwise would stifle the critical flow
of protected speech”); Genzyme, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (“[T]he original
presentation of the comparative data . . . was protected scientific expression, its
secondary dissemination in a press release . . . was not.”); see Martin Redish,
Product Health Claims & the First Amendment: Scientific Expression & the
Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1990)
(contending that commercial-scientific speech should be “viewed not as
commercial, but rather as fully protected scientific expression. To hold
otherwise would be to penalize traditionally protected expression for no reason
other than the communicator’s personal motivation”).
302. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5
(1988) (citation omitted); accord Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at
418-23 (speech does not lose protection because it arises from a speaker’s
economic interest).
303. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) (citations omitted).
304. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 347 & n.10 (1974).
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a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional rights of speech and press. It
matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that
it is common law only. . . . The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power
has in fact been exercised.305

As a tort defense, the First Amendment has had its greatest
effect in the area of economic torts. “[C]onclusions from nonfraudulent data, based on accurate descriptions of the data and
methodology underlying those conclusions, on subjects about which
there is legitimate ongoing scientific disagreement . . . are not
grounds for a claim of false advertising.” 306 Although some courts
construe the First Amendment to mean that “scientific disputes
must be resolved by scientific means,” not litigation,307 in tort
litigation over off-label use, plaintiffs often allege that the science
supporting the medical treatment at issue is false and misleading
so as to avoid First Amendment defenses.308 However, where they
305. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (citations omitted); see
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). (holding that “state rules
of law in state courts” that “restrict First Amendment freedoms constitute[]
‘state action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment” (citations omitted)); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (concluding that “[c]ivil
liability may not be imposed . . . [by] means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
306. ONY, 720 F.3d at 498; see HipSaver, Inc. v. Kiel, 984 N.E.2d 755, 770
(Mass. 2013) (finding that First Amendment protects study that “accurately
reported data”); Bracco Diagnostics, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 456-59 (ruling that
actionable claims are limited to “secondary dissemination”); Neurotron, Inc. v.
Am. Ass’n of Electrodiagnostic Med., 189 F. Supp. 2d 271, 275-77 (D. Md. 2001)
(determining that journal article unlikely to constitute commercial speech
because the authors did not “advocate for a commercial transaction”); Oxycal
Labs., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 723-26 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (holding
allegedly false book not actionable, as “the commercial elements of the speech
[were] intertwined with the central message” which was noncommercial);
Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521,
1541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (ruling medical journal article not actionable).
307. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2005); see
Arthur v. Offit (Arthur II), C.A. No. 01:09-cv-1398, 2010 WL 883745, at *6 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 10, 2010) (observing that “unresolved − and perhaps unresolvable −
scientific arguments” are “not the sort of thing that courts or juries resolve”);
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, No. Civ. 00CV1839B(CGA), 2001 WL 290333, at
*4-5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001) (dismissing unlawful promotion claims against
medical societies on First Amendment basis as “strategic lawsuits against
public participation”), aff’d in pertinent part, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108, 1110-11 (9th
Cir. 2003) (as to two of three defendants).
308. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 793-94
(3d Cir. 1999) (allegations that “speech at the seminars was highly misleading
and deceptive” created fact issue on First Amendment defense to off-label
promotion claim); United States ex rel. Gohil v. Aventis, Inc., No. CV 02-2964,
2017 WL 85375, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2017) (plaintiff pleaded that
“defendants’ off-label promotion . . . was false and/or misleading” (citation
omitted)); Baker v. Danek Med. (Baker v. Danek I), 35 F. Supp. 2d 865, 867-68
(N.D. Fla. 1998) (discussing Third Circuit decision).
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do not, the First Amendment can affect pleading requirements.
When truth is a defense, it becomes a claimant’s responsibility to
plead falsity.
[G]eneral allegations that [defendant] promoted the [device] for offlabel uses . . . do not meet the [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8] plausibility standard
because truthful and non-misleading promotions fall within the
protection of the First Amendment and cannot render any subsequent
claim false.309

Finally, in tort cases, allegations that a defendant has a First
Amendment right to engage in truthful off-label promotion – when
raised by a plaintiff – have not affected preemption. “[T]he ability
to promote off-label uses is irrelevant as to whether the FDA’s
rejection of a labeling change for an on-label use constitutes clear
evidence of conflict with state law.”310

V. EFFECT OF OFF-LABEL USE AND PROMOTION ON
PREEMPTION
Under the federal constitution’s Supremacy Clause,311
preemption of state common-law product liability litigation against
manufacturers of FDA-regulated products exists on three312
relevant bases: implied conflict preemption, implied impossibility
preemption, and express preemption. The provisions of the FDCA
concerning prescription drugs do not contain any express
preemption language relevant to personal injury litigation, so only
implied preemption is available in off-label use cases, chiefly under
the conflict preemption Buckman decision.313 Impossibility
preemption can also be raised, most notably in cases involving
generic prescription drugs,314 but more generally as to defect
allegations that would require prior FDA review and approval to
rectify.315 Where a product has some attributes of a drug and other
309. Sullivan, 2015 WL 13799885, at *13 (citations omitted).
310. Swanson v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:14-CV-1052, 2017 WL 5903362, at *8
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2017) (citation omitted); see Willis v. Abbott Labs., No. 1:15CV-00057-JHM, 2017 WL 5988215, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2017) (rejecting
same argument).
311. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
312. Vaccines are subject to a separate preemption regime, 42 U.S.C.
§300aa-22(b) (2021), but are rarely, if ever, used off-label. Over-the counter
drugs are governed by 21 U.S.C. §379r(e) (2021), which expressly exempts
“product liability” actions from preemption. See Greager v. McNeil-PPC, Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (implied preemption remains
applicable to OTC drugs).
313. Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 350.
314. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett (Bartlett), 570 U.S. 472, 483-84 (2013);
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (Mensing), 564 U.S. 604, 614 (2011).
315. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht (Albrecht), ___ U.S. ___, 139
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attributes of a device, the applicability of preemption is governed by
FDA’s administrative decision whether to regulate that product as
a device or as a drug.316
Preemption in litigation involving medical devices, on the
other hand, is governed by an express preemption clause:
No State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement −
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter.317

This “preemption provision . . . doesn’t distinguish between onand off-label uses.”318 In litigation involving pre-market approved
(“PMA”) medical devices, this clause has been enforced according to
its terms.319 But as to “substantially equivalent” – also called
“§510(k)” − medical devices,320 a now-questionable “presumption
against preemption” effectively nullified express preemption.321
Thus, express preemption has little application on litigation
involving §510(k) medical devices used off-label.322
As applied in prescription drug cases involving off-label use,
implied preemption is guided primarily by the principles
established in Buckman. First, liability theories that would allow
juries to ignore in-force FDA decisions due to alleged concealment
S. Ct. 1668, 1677, 1679 (2019) (applying 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2021)to
set scope of implied preemption); Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-73 (same, in less
detail).
316. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 779-80 (express preemption available in offlabel use case involving combination product because “FDA exercised its
authority to regulate medical devices, not its authority to regulate drugs”
(footnote omitted)).
317. 21 U.S.C. §360k(a) (2021).
318. Caplinger II, 784 F.3d at 1346 (“Any additional state duties on top of
those imposed by federal law, even if nominally limited to off-label uses, might
check innovation, postpone access to life-saving devices, and impose barriers to
entry without sufficient offsetting safety gains.”).
319. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324-25 (2008).
320. “Substantial equivalence” to previously marketed medical devices as a
basis for market entry was originally provided by MDA §510(k). Currently,
substantial equivalence is governed by 21 U.S.C. §360c(i) (2021).
321. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (Lohr), 518 U.S. 470, 493-96 (1996). The
Supreme Court has since abolished that presumption in express preemption
cases. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1938,
1946 (2016) (“[B]ecause the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, we
do not invoke any presumption against pre-emption[.]” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). However, the Court has yet to reconsider
Lohr.
322. Edwards v. Ethicon, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558-59 (S.D. W.Va. 2014)
(rejecting preemption argument as to off-label use of a §510(k) device).
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of information from the FDA “inevitably conflict” conflict with those
FDA decisions.323 “[T]he federal statutory scheme amply empowers
. . . FDA to punish and deter fraud,” and as to off-label use,, “this
authority is used by the Agency to achieve a somewhat delicate
balance of statutory objectives.”324 “FDA is charged with the
difficult task of regulating [product] marketing and distribution”
but “without intruding upon decisions statutorily committed to the
discretion of health care professionals” to use those products offlabel.325 Implied conflict preemption is available to bar claims that
would “deter off-label use despite the fact that the FDCA expressly
disclaims any intent to directly regulate the practice of medicine.”326
Second, Buckman recognized that the FDCA expressly bars
would-be private enforcement. “[W]e have clear evidence that
Congress intended that the [FDCA] be enforced exclusively by the
Federal Government.”327 Buckman thus preempts private plaintiffs
from attempting to enforce the FDCA under the guise of state law.
“The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government
rather than private litigants who are authorized to file suit for
noncompliance with the medical device provisions: ‘[A]ll such
proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this
chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.’”328
In addition to Buckman, conflict preemption may arise in offlabel use and promotion situations by virtue of the “complete
discretion” that the FDA enjoys in deciding “how and when [its
enforcement tools] should be exercised.”329 “Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed as requiring [FDA] to report for prosecution . . .
minor violations . . . whenever [the Agency] believes that the public
interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or
warning.”330 FDA prosecutorial discretion has also supported
preemption of FDCA violation allegations, since “[t]his broad
authority” provides “FDA with the option of refusing to waste its
‘efforts on what may be no more than technical violations of law.’”331
323. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350. “Applicants would then have an incentive
to submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants nor
needs, resulting in additional burdens on the FDA’s evaluation of an
application.” Id. at 351.
324. Id. at 348.
325. Id. at 350
326. Id. at 350-51 (citation omitted). “Would-be applicants may be
discouraged from seeking . . . approval of devices with potentially beneficial offlabel uses for fear . . .[of] unpredictable civil liability.” Id. at 350.
327. Id. at 352 (citing 21 U.S.C. §337(a) (2021)).
328. Id. at 349 n.4 (quoting §337(a)). The only exceptions permit state
enforcement of some food-related violations. 21 U.S.C. §337(b) (2021).
329. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985).
330. 21 U.S.C. §336 (2021), cited in Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837. “FDA thus has
“rather broad discretion − broad enough undoubtedly to enable [it] to perform
[its] duties fairly without wasting [its] efforts on what may be no more than
technical infractions.” United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948).
331. Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. (Baker v. SNR I), No. 95-
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Because [FDA] decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature
[and] frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the
first chance to exercise that discretion. . . . [Plaintiff’s] position would
require us to usurp [FDA’s] responsibility for interpreting and
enforcing potentially ambiguous regulations.332

Given §336, “[i]t is for . . . FDA to exercise its discretion to
determine whether [regulated products] are on the market
lawfully.”333
a. Express Preemption and Off-Label Use
Express preemption unquestionably applies to off-label use of
PMA medical devices. Indeed, Riegel, the Supreme Court decision
establishing PMA preemption generally, involved off-label use,
albeit not acknowledged as such.334 The MDA preemption clause, 21

58737, 1999 WL 811334, at *18 (Tex. Dist. June 7, 1999) (quoting Sullivan, 332
U.S. at 694), aff’d mem., No. 14-99-00616-CV, 2000 WL 991697 (Tex. App. July
20, 2000). Private parties may not “act as a prosecutor when the FDA has
declined to accept that role.” Id.
332. Sandoz Pharms. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d
Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Borchenko
v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01426-R-AS, 2019 WL 3315289, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. July 18, 2019) (preempting “claim [that] interferes with the FDA’s
enforcement and regulatory authority” under §336); Zimmerman v. Novartis
Pharms. Corp., 889 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D. Md. 2012) (observing that FDA has
“flexibility to decide whether and what type of enforcement claim to bring”);
Anthony v. Country Life Mfg., L.L.C., No. 02 C 1601, 2002 WL 31269621, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2002) (citing §336 in support of preemption), aff’d, 70 F. App’x
379 (7th Cir. 2003); cf. Brinkerhoff v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 3d 1308,
1316 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing §336 in connection with FDA primary jurisdiction
finding).
333. Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 817, 841 (W.D. Tex.
2001); see Wyeth v. Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd., No. 09-11726, 2010 WL 746394, at
*4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2010) (declaring that “it is solely the FDA’s duty to
investigate and prosecute allegations of misbranding or adulterating drugs”
(citations omitted)); see also Montgomery County v. Leavitt, 445 F. Supp. 2d
505, 512 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that it is FDA’s “decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is . . . committed to [its]
absolute discretion” (quoting Heckler)); Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med.
Instruments Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 934 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that
“proper interpretation and enforcement of the relevant FDA regulation is not
an issue properly decided as an original matter by a district court” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
334. 552 U.S. at 320 (“[T]he device’s labeling stated that [the] use [at issue]
was contraindicated[.]”); see Caplinger II, 784 F.3d at 1345 (pointing out that
Riegel involved off-label use); White v. Medtronic, Inc. (White I), No. 18-11590,
2019 WL 1339613, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 1330923,
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2019), aff’d, 808 F. App’x 290 (6th Cir. 2020); Houston
II, 2014 WL 1364455, at *4; Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *12; Latimer v.
Medtronic, Inc., C.A. No. 2014-CV-245871, 2015 WL 5222644, at *7 (Ga. Super.
Ct. Sept. 4, 2015); Scoggins, 2010 WL 8911977, at *9; Brief of FDA at 7-8,
Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, No. 16-3785, 2017 WL 4151264, at *8 (3d Cir.
Sept. 14, 2017) (all same).
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U.S.C. §360k(a) (2021), establishes preemption of “any claim that
seeks to impose a state law duty that differs from or adds to federal
duties, whether those duties concern on- or off-label uses.”335 Also,
as to medical devices, in enacting §396,336 Congress “evinced an
intent . . . to ‘protect[] manufacturers that have complied with
detailed federal requirements from being subject[] to liability under
state law for doing what federal law required.”337
In PMA medical device cases, plaintiffs have contended, mostly
unsuccessfully, that off-label use ousts preemption because such
uses, by definition, have not been evaluated by the FDA. But no
appellate case “has suggested that §360k(a)’s preemptive effect
depends on a dichotomy between on- and off-label uses,”338 nor have
the great majority of trial courts.339 The FDA’s lack of review of offlabel uses does not translate into an absence of any preemptive FDA
“requirements.”340 Rather, the process of FDA pre-market approval

335. Caplinger II, 784 F.3d at 1346 (citation omitted).
336. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
337. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 773 (quoting Brief of FDA, supra note 334, at 9);
see Caplinger II, 784 F.3d at 1344 (deciding that §396 enacted “to protect the
liberty of doctors and patients” to engage in off-label use); White II, 808 F. App’x
at 296 (citing §396 as demonstrating that “regulatory scheme” includes off-label
use); Reddick, 2021 WL 798294, at *8, *11 (quoting and following Caplinger II
as to effect of §396); Clements v. Sanofi-Aventis, U.S., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 586,
601 (D.N.J. 2015) (concluding that Congress “acknowledg[ed] − and perhaps
even tacitly encourag[ed] − off-label usage in §396”).
338. Caplinger II, 784 F.3d at 1346 (such a distinction would “require . . .
reject[ion of] every circuit case since Riegel” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see White II, 808 F. App’x at 294 (“[W]e are not
convinced that the use of the [component off-label] precludes federal
preemption.”).
339. The notable outliers are Hornbeck v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13 C 7816,
2014 WL 2510817, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2014) (“To the extent . . . [d]efendants
failed to comply with federal requirements, the Plaintiffs may proceed[.]”), and
more importantly, Ramirez, 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, which held that “[w]hen the
device is not being used in the manner the FDA pre-approved and the
manufacturer is actually promoting such use, there is no law or policy basis on
which to pre-empt the application of state law designed to provide that
protection.” Id. at 991. “To be preempted, [plaintiff’s] claims must conflict with
applicable federal law. In the absence of federal approval of the new use, there
is nothing to preempt state law requirements.” Id. at 993; see O’Shea v. Cordis
Corp., No. 07-4049, 2008 WL 3139428 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 19, 2008) (same result)
(no analysis), mandamus denied, 24 So. 3d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Ramirez, however, offered no authority for either proposition, and its rationale
“has been rejected − for good reason − by numerous courts.” Beavers-Gabriel, 15
F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (collecting cases). “[A]llegations of off-label use and the
promotion thereof do not immunize a plaintiff’s claims from preemption.”
Scanlon, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 411 (citation omitted).
340. “While plaintiffs are correct that the FDA does not literally ‘approve’
off-label uses, because approval would axiomatically make them label uses, they
are incorrect to argue that the absence of affirmative approval mandates the
finding that no federal requirements exist.” Cornett I, 998 A.2d at 561. “Offlabel promotion is, in fact, regulated by the FDA.” Anderson v. Medtronic, Inc.,
No. 14-CV-00615-BAS RBB, 2015 WL 2115342, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2015)
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is based on the regulation of “devices,” not “uses.”341 Thus, “the mere
fact a device is used off-label does not render express preemption
. . . inapplicable.”342 Instead, “even if . . . a state law restraining
such off-label uses [existed, it] would be an additional requirement
that is preempted.”343
Off-label promotion is viewed as a federal, not a state, legal
construct. An off-label promotion “claim exists solely by virtue of the
federal statutes and regulations that concern misbranding, and the
claim has no independent existence in [state] law.”344 “The concept
of ‘off-label’ uses” comes from “within the FDA’s administrative
framework,”345 and thus “is entirely federal.”346 Outside FDA’s
labeling, “off-label uses remain subject to federal regulation.”347
“[R]ather than escaping federal requirements by promoting an offlabel use, a device manufacturer’s off-label promotion itself is
subject to specific MDA provisions.”348 “There is no state law claim

(citations omitted); see Scanlon, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 412 (“The FDCA governs both
marketing and promotion of medical devices (even off-label).”).
341. “[P]reemption applies ‘with respect to a device,’ as opposed to a
particular use of the device.” Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1033 (quoting
§660k(a)). “[P]reemption analysis is not concerned with how a particular device
is used or whether there are federal requirements imposed on a particular use
of the device.” Bertini, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 255. “Nothing in the statute suggests
that the preemption analysis somehow depends on how the device is used.”
Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d. at 77; accord Clements, 111 F. Supp.3d at 601; Hafer, 99
F. Supp. 3d at 857; Arvizu v. Medtronic Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 783, 790 (D. Ariz.
2014); Brady, 2014 WL 1377830, at *5; Houston II, 2014 WL 1364455, at *4;
Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1218; Ledet v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:13CV200LG-JMR, 2013 WL 6858858, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2013); Gavin, 2013 WL
3791612, at *11; Cales, 2014 WL 6600018, at *9.
342. Nagel, 2016 WL 4098715, at *5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
343. Reddick, 2021 WL 798294, at *8, *11 (citing §360k(a)).
344. McCormick, 101 A.3d at 489 (citation omitted); accord Frei v. Taro
Pharms. U.S.A., Inc., No. 19 CV 2939 (VB), 2020 WL 1165975, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2020) (quoting Bean); Bean v. Upsher-Smith Pharms., Inc., No. 4:16CV-01696-RBH, 2017 WL 4348330, at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2017) (“‘[O]ff-label’
promotion exist[s] solely under the FDCA.”), aff’d, 765 F. App’x 934 (4th Cir.
2019).
345. Livdahl, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1265; see Simpkins v. Grandview Hosp.,
No. 3:19-CV-227, 2020 WL 4220460, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2020) (“The
concept of the off-label use of prescription drugs originates from the FDCA.”
(citation omitted)), adopted in pertinent part, 2020 WL 5362054 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
8, 2020); Hawkins I, 2014 WL 346622, at *19 (“Off-label promotion itself exists
only as a creation of the FDCA scheme.”); Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *17
(“[T]he very concept of ‘off-label’ use and promotion is derived from the
regulatory system imposed by the MDA and the FDCA.”).
346. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 07-CV-1933 (JBW),
2008 WL 398378, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2008); see H.R. ex rel. Reuter v.
Medtronic, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 2d 671, 679 n.6 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“entirely federal”
(quoting Zyprexa)).
347. Arvizu, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 790.
348. Houston II, 2014 WL 1364455, at *5.
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for negligence based on off-label promotion.”349 “Simply put, once a
device receives premarket approval, it remains subject to federal
requirements for purposes of §360k(a) regardless of how it is
used.”350
Also, notwithstanding off-label promotion, “any state law claim
based on a failure to seek a PMA supplement would impose
requirements ‘different from, or in addition to’ federal
requirements, and thus are expressly preempted.”351
b. “Parallel” Violation Claims Involving Off-Label Use
Given the “different from or in addition to” language governing
express preemption, “identity of requirements claims” have not
been expressly preempted.352 Dictum in Riegel that “§360k does not
prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims
premised on a violation of FDA regulations,”353 established so-called
“parallel claims” of FDCA violations as the primary exception to
preemption in PMA medical device product liability litigation.354 An
unpreempted parallel claim has three essential elements, (1) a
violation of some FDA requirement, that is (2) genuinely equivalent,
to (3) a pre-existing, state-law cause of action.355 “[T]o escape
express preemption as a parallel claim, the ‘duty’ element must
arise from federal requirements applicable to a medical device.”356
Off-label promotion is by far the most commonly advanced
supposedly “parallel” claim. However, the complex web of federal
enactments, discussed previously,357 that give rise to the FDA’s ban
on off-label promotion make it difficult accurately to identify the
349. Anderson, 2015 WL 2115342, at *6.
350. Brief of FDA, supra note 334, at 7-8.
351. Cook, 2013 WL 6154562, at *5 (citations omitted). But see Garross, 77
F. Supp. 3d at 816 (allowing “evidence” of failure to submit Supplemental PMA
in support of design defect claim).
352. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494-97.
353. 552 U.S. at 330 (making the statement in the context of a waiver
argument).
354. E.g., Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (“[S]ister circuits have uniformly” permitted “parallel” claims to escape
preemption.); Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 314 (“To avoid preemption, a
plaintiff must state a cause of action based on state law that parallels a federal
requirement.” (citing Riegel)). See generally BECK & VALE, supra note 225,
§5.01[3][c][ii].
355. “Genuine equivalence” is a general requirement of the parallel claim
exception. It arose in initially in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
454 (2005). It was first employed as a test in the off-label use context in WolickiGables v. Arrow Int’l., Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Mink
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2017); McMullen v.
Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005); Glennen v. Allergan, Inc.,
202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308
(all applying genuine equivalence standard).
356. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 776 (citations omitted).
357. See Part III(C) supra.
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“parallel” state-law claim. “Mere ‘off-label’ promotion, divorced from
any negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations, would likely not
run afoul of state tort law.”358
[Plaintiff’s] failure to warn claim cannot include a theory of off-label
promotion because he would essentially be claiming that by
promoting the off-label use of [its product], [defendant] incurred a
duty to warn plaintiff and his doctors about the risks of such use.
Because [defendant] has already complied with federal requirements
for warnings and labeling, any state law requirement to provide
additional warnings would be different from, and in addition to,
federal requirements.359

Off-label promotion claims allege that such marketing is prohibited,
whereas state-law warning claims impose a duty to warn about
knowable risks. These are not genuinely equivalent.360
Truthful off-label promotion is generally held not to be a state
law tort, and thus incapable of supporting a parallel claim. “[T]here
is no state-law duty to abstain from off-label promotion.”361
Whatever duty “exists solely by virtue of the federal prohibition of
off-label promotion and finds no independent source from
traditional state law.”362
358. Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 705 (citations omitted).
359. Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313 (citations omitted); accord Stiens,
2020 WL 7266398, at *5 n.4 (“[T]here is no corresponding state-law prohibition
against off-label marketing.”); Harris v. Medtronic, Inc., No. RG12636341, 2014
WL 866063, at *5-6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2014) (following Coleman).
360. Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 314 (“We are unaware of any case law
recognizing a state law claim for failure to warn based upon allegations that the
manufacturer had a duty to refrain from marketing altogether, rather than
marketing with adequate warnings.”).
361. Angeles, 863 N.W.2d at 416 (citations omitted); accord White I, 2019
WL 1339613, at *5; Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1010; Thorn, 81 F. Supp. 3d at
628; Wright, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 612; Zaccarello v. Medtronic, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d
1061, 1069 (W.D. Mo. 2014); Martin I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1038, 1045; BeaversGabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1041; Latimer, 2015 WL 5222644, at *7 n.3. (all
standing for same proposition).
362. Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1041 (citations omitted); see White
I, 2019 WL 1339613, at *5 (quoting Wright, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 612); Aaron, 209
F. Supp. 3d at 1010 (holding that “the very concept of off-label promotion did
not exist − and could not exist − until Congress enacted the MDA”); Hafer, 99
F. Supp. 3d at 857 (quoting Blankenship); Blankenship, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 991
(concluding that “the concept of ‘off-label use’ is a creature of the FDCA”
(quoting Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1224)); Arthur I, 2014 WL 3894365, at
*6 (finding that off-label promotion “is not rooted in any traditional state tort
law”); Dunbar, 2014 WL 3056026, at *5 (declaring that “there is no claim for
illegal off-label promotion rooted in traditional state tort law”); Evans v. Rich,
No. 5:13-CV-868-B, 2014 WL 2535221, at *2 (E.D.N.C. June 5, 2014) (holding
that a claim for “off-label promotion . . . exists solely by virtue of the
requirements of the FDCA” (citations omitted)); Dawson, 2013 WL 4048850, at
*6 (deciding that “promoting the off-label use of an FDA-approved medical
device is not unlawful under traditional state tort law” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *17 (stating
that “the very concept of ‘off-label’ use and promotion is derived from the
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Off-label promotion itself exists only as a creation of the FDCA
scheme. A state law cause of action cannot rest solely on . . . off-label
promotion. . . . [E]ven the concept of ‘off-label use’ is a creature of the
FDCA, is defined by the FDCA.”363

As the FDA’s rationale for prohibiting off-label promotion does
not depend on the veracity of any statement,364 “[c]ourts
consistently have held that off-label promotion is not inherently
deceptive, and does not support a private action for fraud or
negligent misrepresentation.”365 “[O]ff-label marketing of an
approved drug is itself not inherently fraudulent.”366 Likewise,
regulatory system imposed by the MDA and the FDCA.”); Buccelli v. Mayer, No.
2014-CA-001667 NC, 2015 WL 398594, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 2015)
(quoting Beavers-Gabriel).
363. Martin I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1038 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Nagel, 2016 WL 4098715, at *8 (concluding that “[p]laintiff
has not sufficiently alleged that the marketing was false or misleading to
constitute a parallel federal claim”).
364. See Part III(C) supra.
365. Travelers Indemnity I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 551 (citation omitted); see
Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165 (holding that “promotion of off-label drug use is not in
and of itself false or misleading” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Babich,
No. 16-CR-10343-ADB, 2020 WL 759380, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2020) (finding
“that [the drug] was prescribed off-label is in and of itself insufficient to
establish that a prescription was fraudulent”); United States, ex rel. Solis v.
Millennium Pharms., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-03010-MCE-EFB, 2015 WL 1469166, at
*5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2015) (deciding that “off-label marketing of an approved
drug is itself not inherently fraudulent” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 5146896 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1,
2015), vacated in part on other grounds, 885 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2018); In re
Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 09-2067-NMG, 2014
WL 3908126, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2014) (agreeing that “promotion of a drug
for off-label use is not inherently false or misleading” (citation omitted)); Rohlik
v. I-Flow Corp., No. 7:10-CV-173-FL, 2011 WL 2669302, at *3 n.4 (E.D.N.C. July
7, 2011) (concluding that “there is nothing inherently fraudulent or misleading
about promotion of off-label uses” (citation omitted)); Intron/Temodar II, 2010
WL 2346624, at *8 n.6 (determining that “[o]ff-label promotion . . . does not by
itself necessarily constitute fraudulent conduct” (citations omitted));
Intron/Temodar I, 2009 WL 2043604, at *10 (stating that a “theory of injury
[that] requires the Court to assume that off-label promotion is, by its very
nature, fraudulent conduct . . . is not reality” (citations omitted)); In re Epogen
& Aranesp Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. MDL 08-1934 PSG
(AGRx), 2009 WL 1703285, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2009) (decreeing that “offlabel promotion is not inherently fraudulent”); In re Epogen & Aranesp OffLabel Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (pronouncing that “[p]romotion of off-label uses is not inherently
misleading simply because the use is off-label” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at
67 (explaining that off-label statements “are not ‘untruthful’ or ‘inherently
misleading’ merely because the FDA has not yet had the opportunity to evaluate
the claim”).
366. In re Actimmune Mktg. Litig., 614 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1051 & n.6 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (citations omitted); see Ind./Ky./Ohio Reg’l. Council of Carpenters
Welfare Fund v. Cephalon, Inc., C.A. No. 13-7167, 2014 WL 2115498, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. May 21, 2014) (emphasizing “that off-label marketing is not per se
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“submission of a claim for reimbursement for [an] off-label . . . is not
by itself a false claim” under the FCA.367 Indeed, “given that it is
not uncommon for physicians to make off-label prescriptions, we
think it unlikely that prescribing off-label is material to Medicaid’s
payment decisions under the FCA.”368
But the preemption result is different when plaintiffs combine
off-label promotion allegations with one or more state-law claims
asserting that the actual content of that promotion is false or
misleading. False off-label promotion claims usually fall within the
parallel claim exception to express preemption in PMA medical
device cases.
Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants made fraudulent statements to
promote off-label uses of the . . . Device lies “parallel” to federal
requirements. First, although federal law permits Defendants to
engage in advertising beyond the subject device’s label, it requires
that such representations not be false or misleading. Second, federal
regulations prohibit device manufacturers from promoting off-label
uses of medical devices. In sum, federal law forbids device
manufacturers to promote any off-label uses, and certainly prohibits
false or misleading off-label promotion.369

Fraudulent off-label promotion allegations can escape express
preemption as parallel claims “because they parallel the federal
prohibition of off-label promotion and are rooted in traditional state
common law claims, not violations of the MDA.”370 By contrast, a
fraudulent” (citations omitted)); Cent. Reg’l. Emps.’ Benefit Fund v. Cephalon,
Inc., C.A. No. 09-3418, 2010 WL 1257790, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2010)
(declaring that “[o]ff-label marketing activities . . . are not inherently
fraudulent” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cent. Reg’l.
Emps.’ Benefit Fund v. Cephalon, Inc., C.A. No. 09-3418, 2009 WL 3245485, at
*4 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2009) (finding it “well-established that off-label marketing of
an approved drug is itself not inherently fraudulent” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
367. Sullivan, 2015 WL 13799885, at *13 (footnote omitted); see United
States ex rel. Bennett, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 777 (observing that “[t]he cases
recognize that off-label use of a drug or medical device is distinct from a
medically unnecessary use of that drug or device” (citations omitted)).
368. United States ex rel. King, 871 F.3d at 329 n.9 (citation omitted).
369. Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Houston I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80); accord Martin v.
Medtronic, Inc. (Martin I), 32 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1039 (D. Ariz. 2014) (same).
370. Scovil v. Medtronic, Inc. (Scovil I), 995 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1096 (D. Ariz.
2014) (citation omitted); see Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 859 (explaining that
“claims regarding alleged misrepresentations . . . during promoting and
marketing . . . do not provide requirements ‘different from, or in addition to’
federal requirements, and thus avoid[] express preemption” (citations omitted));
Wright, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 615 (holding that “state tort law duties underlying
Plaintiff’s fraud claim are not ‘different from, or in addition to’ federal
requirements, which prohibit fraudulent promotion or advertising” (citation
omitted)); Anderson, 2015 WL 2115342, at *8 (determining that “federal law
prohibits false statements . . . in the context of off-label promotion” (citations
omitted)); Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC, C.A. No. 13-6158, 2015 WL
1475368, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2015) (declaring that “off-label promotion
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“fraud by omission” claim founded on alleged non-disclosure of offlabel use “exists solely by virtue of the FDCA requirements with
respect to approved use of the [product].”371
A minority of courts end their analysis at the point of an FDCA
violation, and do not address the separate existence of a parallel
state-law cause of action. “[T]he FDCA prohibits off-label promotion
such that a state-law claim for off-label promotion survives express
preemption.”372 A “negligence claim based on the theory of off-label
can be a basis for a nonpreempted parallel claim”), aff’d, 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir.
2018); Brady v. Medtronic, Inc. (Brady II), No. 13-62199-CIV, 2015 WL
11181971, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2015) (deciding that a “fraudulent
misrepresentation claim is not expressly preempted because it does not impose
a requirement . . . ‘different from or in addition to’ the federal requirements”
(citations omitted)); Scovil II, 2015 WL 880614, at *9-10 (denying
reconsideration of Scovil I); Hawkins II, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 1152-53 (reiterating
Hawkins I); Arvizu, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (stating that false off-label promotion
“claims lie parallel to federal requirements” (citation omitted)); Eidson v.
Medtronic, Inc. (Eidson II), 40 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (ruling
that “[p]laintiffs’ claims . . . escape express preemption because they allege that
specific aspects of Defendants’ promotion activities were false or misleading”);
Zaccarello, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (judging that “fraud-based claims are not
expressly preempted because they are parallel to the federal requirements
regarding off-label promotion”); Mendez I, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 292-93 (decreeing
that a claim “that defendants engaged in off-label promotion that was false or
misleading” was parallel); Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 704 (observing that
“claims premised on fraudulent representations about off-label procedures can
avoid Riegel”); Blankenship v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 979, 992 (E.D. Mo.
2014) (quoting and following Houston I and allowing false off-label promotion
claim to escape preemption); Arthur I, 2014 WL 3894365, at *7 (articulating
that an allegation of “fraudulent statements to promote off-label use are not
expressly preempted because they parallel the federal prohibitions on false or
misleading statements and off-label promotion” (citation omitted)); Dunbar v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. CV 14-01529-RGK AJWX, 2014 WL 3056026, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. June 25, 2014) (agreeing that “federal law that prohibits promotion of offlabel uses of approved devices certainly prohibits false or misleading
promotion”); Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc. (Hawkins I), No. 1:13-CV-00499 AWI
SK, 2014 WL 346622, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014) (concluding that “fraud
causes of action based on misrepresentations, concealments, and omissions that
occurred during the off-label promotion . . . escape express preemption”
(citations omitted)); Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc. (Eidson I), 981 F. Supp. 2d 868,
884 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (asserting that false off-label promotion claims present “no
likelihood that Defendants could be held liable under state law without having
violated the federal law” (citation omitted) (quoting Houston I, 957 F. Supp. 2d
at 1180)); Kashani-Matts, 2013 WL 6147032, at *5 (expounding that fraud
claims “based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions . . . while promoting
and marketing the [device] . . . could survive preemption” if properly pleased);
Buccelli, 2015 WL 398594, at *5 (specifying that a claim of “misrepresentations
and omissions in promoting off-label use . . . is neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted”).
371. Perez, 711 F.3d at 1119 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Cook v. Coe, No. 1-13-CV-245210, 2013 WL 6154562, at *6 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2013) (following Perez).
372. Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1034; see Dunbar, 2014 WL 3056026,
at *5 (finding off-label promotion claim to be “parallel” despite “no claim for
illegal off-label promotion rooted in traditional state tort law”). “[S]tate tort law
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promotion is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted, because it
‘parallels’ the federal requirements prohibiting misbranding and
adulteration.”373 Finally, one court recognized a “second category”
of unpreempted off-label promotion claims “of such generality as not
to present any risk of interference with the federal medical-device
regulatory scheme.”374
Off-label promotion-related claims have also failed the test of
genuine equivalence. Allegations of a duty to warn fail where they
diverge from the FDA’s specified obligations. Warning claims
asserting that such promotion changed the device’s “intended use”
and required additional “adequate directions for use” are preempted
because they demand warnings other than those that the FDA has
approved.
[A] finding that Defendants created a new intended use . . . giving
rise to a duty to provide adequate directions in the product label
would require making changes to the . . . label that has been approved
by the FDA. As such, a parallel claim could not be based on the federal
requirement that Defendants provide adequate directions because
doing so would require Defendants to make changes to the FDAapproved label.375

Nor does “federal law impose[] a parallel duty on a device’s
manufacturer to prevent such off-label use by third parties.”376
Beyond off-label promotion, express preemption has also
precluded claims attacking off-label combinations of medical device
components belonging to different device systems, as long as the offlabel use involves at least one pre-market-approved component. The
FDCA expressly defines “device” to “includ[e] any component, part,
or accessory” of such device.377 The FDA has taken the position that
duties . . . are not ‘different from, or in addition to’ the federal requirement
banning off-label promotion,” since “the state law claims are premised on a
violation of the federal law banning off-label promotion.” Eidson I, 981 F. Supp.
2d at 885; see Houston I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80 (reasoning that since
federal law forbids manufacturers from promoting off-label uses, there was “no
likelihood that Defendants could be held liable under state law without having
violated the federal law” (citation omitted)).
373. Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 315 (citations omitted); see Mendez I, 28
F. Supp. 3d at 293 (“[A] theory of off-label promotion . . . is not different from or
in addition to federal requirements, and therefore are not preempted[.]”).
374. Alton, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. This reasoning is questionable because
in Riegel, “[i]t did not matter that the common-law claims involved general tort
duties of care.” Perez, 711 F.3d at 1118; see Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at
1034 n.7 (criticizing Alton).
375. Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1039 (quoting Hawkins I, 2014 WL
346622, at *15).
376. White II, 808 F. App’x at 295.
377. 21 U.S.C. §321(h) (2021). “It makes no sense − indeed, it would probably
be impossible − to pick apart the components of a medical device and apply
different preemption analyses to different components.” Gross v. Stryker Corp.,
858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 487 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 780);
see Shuker, 885 F.3d at 772; Angeles, 863 N.W.2d at 411; Nagel, 2016 WL
4098715, at *5; Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (all finding preemption in light of
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its “requirements apply equally when third parties put
[components] to an unapproved use with components of another
device.”378 Since mixing of components is a permissible off-label use,
“a manufacturer should not lose the protections of express
preemption . . . because of a surgeon’s permissible choice to use the
PMA-approved component in a [non-pre]-approved device, even if
the interaction of the two components causes problems.”379
Courts have taken three different approaches to preemption in
cases involving multi-component, off-label uses. One line of
precedent evaluates such off-label uses at the component level.
“Taken together, the statutory definition of ‘device,’ the treatment
of off-label uses, and the guidance of the FDA all counsel in favor of
scrutinizing hybrid systems at the component-level.”380 A competing
line looks to the manner in which the entire system was evaluated
by the FDA and applies preemption to PMA systems, even when
hybridized by addition of non-PMA components.381 A third approach
in hybrid component/off-label use situations limits preemption to
“claims directed at [PMA] components,” and some claims involving
“the hybrid systems as a whole” where the PMA component is
essential to the claim.382
Another manner in which multi-component medical devices
can be used off-label occurs when a physician uses “a single
component of a PMA-approved device . . . in isolation.”383 “FDA
established specific federal requirements for the . . . Device, even
when [one component] is used alone.”384 Thus, where a physician
uses less than all components − usually only one component − of a
PMA-approved device system, preemption has almost always been
recognized.385
this definition).
378. Brief of FDA, supra note 334, at 7-8.
379. Nagel, 2016 WL 4098715, at *5 (citation omitted).
380. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 774.
381. Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (holding that “preemption is not defined
by a single component of a unit used, but by the unit as a whole” (citations
omitted)); Bertini, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 254 (applying same preemption analysis to
system as a whole unless a non-PMA component “alone proximately caused
plaintiffs’ injuries”); Eidson I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 881 n.3 (determining that
“preemption analysis should not be applied differently to the component parts
of a medical device and the medical device that received PMA” (citations
omitted)).
382. BHR II, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 554-55. See Lafountain v. Smith & Nephew,
Inc., No. 14CV1598 (WWE), 2016 WL 3919796, at *6 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016)
(“the combination of component parts comprising the hip implant system had
not undergone the premarket approval process”).
383. BHR II, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 552.
384. Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1004 (quoting Angeles, 863 N.W.2d at 412).
385. “Premarket approval extends to all components of an approved device,
even when a physician uses the components separately.” Aaron, 209 F. Supp.
3d at 1003; see White II, 808 F. App’x at 294-95 (ruling that “§360k is implicated
even where a physician uses only a component or part of a Class III hybrid
device in an off-label manner” (citation omitted)); Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp.
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A state tort requirement is also not “genuinely equivalent” to a
controlling federal requirement “if a manufacturer could be held
liable under the state law without having violated the federal
law.”386 Thus, design defect claims involving off-label uses are
preempted because off-label use is a factor that the FDA necessarily
considers in approving the existing design:
Although the FDA did not specifically approve the manufacturing
process of [the device] with off-label uses in mind, it knows that
doctors may use the device in an off-label manner. Accordingly, the
risk of the manufacturing process being insufficient for off-label uses
is necessarily a consideration in the risk-benefit analysis the FDA
undertakes during the PMA process.387

Since the FDCA imposes no similar warning duties, a
“negligence claim based on a failure to warn the medical
community, the general public” and patients themselves about risks
of off-label uses “imposes requirements different from or in addition
to what is required under the federal law, and is, therefore,
expressly preempted.”388 Fraud by omission claims, such as that a
defendant “must affirmatively tell patients when medical devices

3d at 1033 (holding that “even though off-label use of only a component . . . is at
issue, . . . [FDA] approval includes its components”); Hawkins I, 2014 WL
346622, at *5 (deciding that “premarket approval is as controlling of the
individual components of [a device] as it is to the device as a whole”); Houston
I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (applying preemption to off-label use of one
component “alone”); Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *12 (explaining that “arguing
that preemption is inapplicable here because using [one] component alone was
an off-label use . . . is clearly inconsistent with Riegel”); Latimer, 2015 WL
5222644, at *7 (finding “no merit” that use of single “component alone” avoided
preemption).
386. Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 308 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (precluding plaintiffs
from alleging that a PMA device is “unreasonably dangerous, even if defendants
complied with all FDA regulations”).
387. Scovil I, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (citations omitted); see Caplinger I,
921 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (holding that claim “the design was unsafe when used
in the manner promoted by Defendants” was preempted); Harris, 2014 WL
866063, at *7 (following Caplinger I); cf. BHR II, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 562
(observing that a failure-to-recall claim might escape express preemption if “offlabel promotion . . . rose to the level of designing these systems”).
388. Anderson, 2015 WL 2115342, at *6; accord White I, 2019 WL 1339613,
at *5; Martin III, 2017 WL 825410, at *7; Scanlon, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 411-12;
Eidson II, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 1230-31; Martin I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1042-43;
Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1041; Houston I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78;
Houston II, 2014 WL 1364455, at *6; Schuler, 2014 WL 988516, at *1; Caplinger
I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1221. “Plaintiffs have not identified any federal
requirement to inform the public or to update warning labels regarding the
dangers of the off-label use of medical devices.” Byrnes v. Small, 142 F. Supp.
3d 1262, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (citation omitted); Sluss v. Medtronic Sofamor
Danek USA, Inc., No. BC 496524, 2014 WL 10222608, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 2014) (dismissing claim for “failure to warn doctors” as “expressly
preempted”).
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have not been approved for a certain use,”389 are also preempted
because they challenge the sufficiency of FDA-approved labeling.390
Likewise preempted have been “additional” warnings about risks
allegedly peculiar to off-label use391 and using “other means” of
warning physicians beyond the product’s “accompanying”
labeling.392
Post-sale duty to warn claims involving off-label use have been
preempted in PMA medical device litigation because “while the
FDA permits such warnings, it does not require them,” unlike
mandatory state-law duties.393 “Where a federal requirement
permits a course of conduct and the state makes it obligatory, the
state’s requirement is in addition to the federal requirement and
thus is preempted.”394
Whether preemption bars allegations that a manufacturer
failed to report adverse events relating to an off-label depends on
the particular state’s common law-warning claims being genuinely
equivalent to the defendant manufacturer’s obligation to report
such events to the FDA. Where equivalence is found, an
unpreempted parallel claim exists.395 Where state-law warning
claims do not encompass reporting adverse events to the FDA, there
can be no parallel claim.396
389. Perez, 711 F.3d at 1118-19. See Williams v. Zimmer US, Inc., No. 5:14CV-468-F, 2015 WL 4256249, at *6 (E.D.N.C. July 14, 2015) (ruling that
preemption extends to “those claims based on a failure to disclose a lack of FDA
approval” (citation omitted)); Cook, 2013 WL 6154562, at *6 (finding that
“failure to disclose that the . . . Device has not been approved for off-label use”
was expressly preempted).
390. Perez, 711 F.3d at 1119 (holding that an omission claim “depends on a
requirement that is ‘in addition to’ those federal requirements”); accord Stengel,
704 F.3d at 1234 (Watford, J., concurring); Latimer, 2015 WL 5222644, at *8;
Harris, 2014 WL 866063, at *11 (all following Perez).
391. Mendez I, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 292.
392. Kashani-Matts, 2013 WL 6147032, at *4 (“Requiring warnings to
Plaintiff’s physicians through other means would also be subject to express
preemption.”).
393. Dunbar, 2014 WL 3056026, at *4.
394. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234 (quoting McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489); accord
Houston I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (following Stengel).
395. Jones v. Medtronic, Inc., 745 F. App’x 714, 717 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying
California law); Angeles, 863 N.W.2d at 418-19 (applying Minnesota law);
Coleman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311-12; Garross, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 815 (applying
Wisconsin law); Arvizu, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 792 (applying Arizona law); Schouest,
13 F. Supp. 3d at 706 (applying Texas law); Eidson I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 887-89
(applying California law); Ramirez, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1001-03 (applying
Arizona law); Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *14 (applying Louisiana law); Cook,
2013 WL 6154562, at *6 (applying California law); Scoggins, 2010 WL 8911977,
at *14 (applying Massachusetts law).
396. White I, 2019 WL 1339613, at *6 (applying Michigan law); Aaron, 209
F. Supp. 3d at 1004-05 (applying Ohio law); Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 860-61
(applying Tennessee law); Scanlon, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 412 (applying Delaware
law); Byrnes, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1297 (applying Florida law); Blankenship, 6 F.
Supp. 3d at 989 (applying Missouri law); Latimer, 2015 WL 5222644, at *8
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Other claims involving off-label use that courts have found
expressly preempted as “different from or in addition to” FDA
requirements are: (1) a duty “to perform and report additional
studies;”397 (2) a duty to conduct additional tests;398 and (3) claims
alleging failure to train physicians in off-label uses of PMA medical
devices.399
c.

Implied Preemption and Off-Label Use

Under Buckman, off-label-related claims are also subject to
implied preemption. The most obviously preempted cases allege
that had the defendant “complied with [its] duties to the FDA . . .,
the necessary and resultant actions by the FDA . . . would have
precluded the use of the product” − “precisely the type of ‘fraud’
claim that is impliedly preempted under Buckman.”400
More commonly, Buckman provides a second basis for
preemption of claims of liability for off-label promotion that is not
false or misleading. Such claims, for the same reasons already
stated,401 are not part of “traditional state tort law which had
predated the federal enactments.”402 Implied preemption under
Buckman – in both drug and device cases − exists because, if “the
defendant would not be liable but for the FDCA, then the plaintiff
is effectively suing for a violation of the FDCA (no matter how the
plaintiff labels the claim), and the plaintiff’s claim is thus impliedly
preempted.”403

(applying Georgia law); Cales, 2014 WL 6600018, at *14 (applying Kentucky
law); cf. Conklin v. Medtronic, Inc., 431 P.3d 571, 578-79 (Ariz. 2018) (non-offlabel use decision) (“Stengel incorrectly recited and applied Arizona law.”).
397. Scanlon, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 411.
398. Cales, 2014 WL 6600018, at *10; Scoggins, 2010 WL 8911977, at *13.
399. BHR II, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (“[P]laintiffs have not identified a
federal requirement that mandates manufacturers train physicians as to offlabel uses.”). Given FDA’s overall position on off-label promotion, there
obviously is no affirmative FDA requirement to train physicians in off-label
uses.
400. White I, 2019 WL 1339613, at *8; see Martin III, 2017 WL 825410, at
*9 (holding that Buckman preempts fraud claims “to the extent plaintiff
challenges misrepresentations made to the FDA”).
401. See supra notes 348-359 and accompanying text.
402. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353); see
Perdue v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 847, 852 (E.D.N.C. 2016)
(“[R]estrictions and guidelines placed upon pharmaceutical companies for offlabel promotion are entirely dependent upon the statutory and regulatory
scheme created by the FDCA[.]”); accord Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 857; Dunbar,
2014 WL 3056026, at *5; Dawson, 2013 WL 4048850, at *6; Caplinger I, 921 F.
Supp. 2d at 1221-22.
403. Williams, 2015 WL 4256249, at *5 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Frei, 2020 WL 1165975, at *6 (holding claim
preempted for same reason as Bean); Bean, 2017 WL 4348330, at *7 (finding
preemption because off-label promotion cannot exist without the FDCA); Polt v.
Sandoz, Inc., No. CV 16-2362, 2017 WL 11507637, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 10,
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Thus, the combination of express and implied preemption in
cases involving off-label use of PMA medical devices “create[s] a
narrow gap through which a plaintiff’s state-law claim must fit.”404
The plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA (or
else his claim is expressly preempted by §360k(a)), but the plaintiff
must not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such a
claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman.405

This narrow gap can be threaded, in cases raising off-label
promotion claims, with properly pleaded allegations that the offlabel statements in question contained false or misrepresented
statements. Where “Defendants’ alleged misconduct constituted
misrepresentation [not] because it was off-label promotion but
because it was untrue,” such a false off-label promotion claim
escapes implied preemption.406 Fraud and misrepresentation claims
“are moored in traditional state common law that exists

2017) (explaining that “[p]laintiffs have not established that there is a viable
state law tort claim for negligent [off-label] marketing” so “Plaintiffs’ allegations
rest only on violations of the FDCA”); McLeod v. Sandoz, Inc. (McLeod I), No.
4:16-CV-01640-RBH, 2017 WL 1196801, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2017) (deciding
that a claim for the negligent “off-label” promotion of [a drug] would not exist
in the absence of the FDCA”); Aaron, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 (holding that offlabel promotion claims “would not exist if the FDCA did not exist” and are
preempted (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Frere v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. EDCV1502338BRODTBX, 2016 WL 1533524, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 6, 2016) (recognizing implied preemption where none of alleged offlabel promotion “exceeded the scope of any statements approved by the FDA”
(citation omitted)); Evans v. Rich, No. 5:13-CV-868-BO, 2014 WL 2535221, at
*2 (E.D.N.C. June 5, 2014) (concluding that “off-label promotion . . . claim is
impliedly preempted as it exists solely by virtue of the requirements of the
FDCA” (citations omitted)); In re Amiodarone Cases, No. JCCP 4956, 2019 WL
9048827, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2019) (declaring that “claim that
“depend[s] solely on Defendants’ off-label promotion . . . is federally
preempted”); Buccelli v. Mayer, No. 2014-CA-001667 NC, 2015 WL 398594, at
*6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 2015) (observing that “absent the FDCA’s prohibition
of off-label promotion, Defendants have no duty”).
404. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
405. Id.. This “narrow gap” rationale has been widely adopted in PMA
preemption cases, including those involving off-label-related claims. Perez, 711
F.3d at 1120; Jones, 745 F. App’x at 716; Bean, 2017 WL 4348330, at *6; McLeod
I, 2017 WL 1196801, at *6-7; Martin III, 2017 WL 825410, at *5; De La Paz, 159
F. Supp. 3d at 1092; Frere, 2016 WL 1533524, at *6; Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at
857; Hawkins II, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 1150; Scanlon, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 411; Byrnes,
60 F. Supp. 3d at 1296; Anderson, 2015 WL 2115342, at *5; Scovil II, 2015 WL
880614, at *7; Eidson II, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 1216; Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp.
3d at 1032; Arthur I, 2014 WL 3894365, at *4; Brady v. Medtronic, Inc. (Brady
I), No. 13-CV-62199-RNS, 2014 WL 1377830, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2014);
Brown v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274-75 (M.D. Fla.
2013); Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1215; Kashani-Matts, 2013 WL 6147032,
at *3; Dawson, 2013 WL 4048850, at *4; Gavin, 2013 WL 3791612, at *5;
Latimer, 2015 WL 5222644, at *6; Scoggins, 2010 WL 8911977, at *10 (all
following Riley “narrow gap” rationale in off-label use cases).
406. Hawkins II, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
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independently from the FDCA.”407 “Notwithstanding any overlap
. . . [with] FDA’s limitations on the promotion and approved use of
[products, plaintiff’s], claims are based . . . state law duties to
refrain from misrepresentation, which exist independently of FDA
regulations.”408

407. Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (quoting Houston I, 957 F.
Supp. 2d at 1179-80); see In re Nat’l. Prescription Opiate Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d
773, 789 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (asserting that fraudulent or misleading off-label
promotion are “allegations are of the type that would traditionally be brought
as state law claims” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Testosterone II, 2017 WL 1836443, at *8 (finding no preemption where “a
reasonable jury could find [defendant] liable for making misrepresentations”);
McLeod I, 2017 WL 1196801, at *7 (deciding that a “fraud claim is premised on
state common law fraud that predates the FDCA” (citations omitted)); Hafer, 99
F. Supp. 3d at 859 (holding that a misrepresentation claim was “supported by
traditional state laws against false and misleading advertising”); Garross, 77 F.
Supp. 3d at 815 (rejecting preemption of off-label promotion involving
“misrepresenting the risks of such off-label uses”); Anderson, 2015 WL 2115342,
at *8 (explaining that both federal and state law prohibit “inaccurate or
misleading statements, in the context of off-label promotion” (citations
omitted)); Arvizu, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (following Houston I to rule that false
off-label promotion claim unpreempted), 794-95 (invoking a state-law duty “to
avoid making fraudulent misrepresentations” to deny preemption (citation
omitted)); Zaccarello, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (recognizing no preemption “based
on traditional state common law that exists independently of the MDA”
(citations omitted)); Martin I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1039 (following Houston I);
Blankenship, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 992 (following Houston I); Dunbar, 2014 WL
3056026, at *6 (concluding that “claims of fraud are moored in traditional state
common law and exist independently”); Brady, 2014 WL 1377830, at *7
(characterizing a misrepresentation claim as “sound[ing] in traditional state
common law”); Houston II, 2014 WL 1364455, at *9 (determining that
sufficiently pleaded fraud allegations escaped preemption); Hutchens v. Smith
& Nephew, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-4979-B, 2014 WL 4177306, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
22, 2014) (agreeing that “misleading” off-label promotion claims not
preempted); Hawkins I, 2014 WL 346622, at *11-12 (ruling that claims escape
preemption but are inadequately pleaded); Scovil I, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 1096
(refusing preemption of claims “parallel the federal prohibition of off-label
promotion and are rooted in traditional state common law”); Eidson I, 981 F.
Supp. 2d at 885 (declining to preempt fraud “claims are based on state common
law tort duties that exist independently from the FDCA”); Kashani-Matts, 2013
WL 6147032, at *5 (adjudging that claims “based on alleged misrepresentations
and omissions . . . made while promoting and marketing . . . could survive
preemption”); Amiodarone Cases, 2019 WL 9048827, at *4 (stating that
misrepresentations in off-label promotion not are preempted); Hayter v.
Medtronic Inc., No. 37201300065432CUPLCT, 2014 WL 8165507, at *1 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2014) (pronouncing that fraud “is rooted in traditional state
tort law and exists independently of federal law” (citation omitted)); Harris,
2014 WL 866063, at *11 (reaching result that “affirmative” misrepresentations
survive preemption); Cook, 2013 WL 6154562, at *6 (construing
misrepresentations in context of off-label promotion as not preempted); Buccelli,
2015 WL 398594, at *3 (expounding that claim of “misrepresentations and
omissions in promoting off-label use . . . is neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted”); Cales, 2014 WL 6600018, at *11 (following Houston I).
408. Aetna, Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 541, 555 (E.D.
Pa. 2018).
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Strict liability and negligence-based promotion claims, not
dependent on the falsity of the off-label promotion, have been
impliedly preempted.409 Many of the principles established in
connection with express preemption of parallel violation claims
overlap with Buckman implied preemption, since the same
“exclusively” federal nature of the off-label “concept” that precludes
a parallel state duty,410 also establishes a prohibited attempt to
enforce the FDCA. Thus, off-label promotion claims are:
not based on conduct that would give rise to a recovery under state
law even in the absence of the FDCA. The conduct plaintiff complains
of − how defendants are promoting and marketing to physicians the
off-label use of the [product] − is governed by the FDCA. To determine
whether said conduct is improper would require reliance on the
requirements of the FDCA. Further, even the concept of “off-label
use” is a creature of the FDCA, is defined by the FDCA, and is not a
part of [state] substantive law. . . . [T]his claim is in substance a claim
for violating the FDCA and, thus, is clearly preempted under
Buckman and §337(a).411

Implied preemption, however, is not keyed to expressly
preemptive statutory language such as §360k(a), so the scope of
implied preemption of off-label promotion claims under Buckman
extends also to prescription drugs. As to drugs as well, “[t]he
concept of ‘off-label use and promotion’ is derived from and defined
by the FDCA regulatory system and has no state-law equivalent,”
so that “any claim based solely on off-label promotion is impliedly
preempted.”412 Again, as with medical devices, “[i]f independent
state law grounds support [off-label promotion-related] claims, the
FDCA does not preempt them.”413 “[S]tate law duties to refrain from
making material misrepresentations . . . exist independently of

409. Latimer, 2015 WL 5222644, at *8 (“Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim
based on off-label promotion as such.”).
410. See supra notes 357-368 and accompanying text; cf. Markland, 758 F.
App’x at 780 (deciding that “a duty derived from a federal statute is insufficient
to prevent preemption”).
411. Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-20. Accord Ledet, 2013 WL
6858858, at *4 (quoting Caplinger I); Stiens, 2020 WL 7266398, at *9 & n.8
(holding that “off-label promotion is not a private right of action that exists
under state law.” (footnote omitted)); see Palmer, Jr., supra note 5, at 568
(explaining that, while “promotion . . . for unapproved use violates . . . the
FDCA,” the statute “does not allow private causes of action for violations;
therefore, only the federal government may seek to punish those who have
violated the Act” (footnotes omitted)).
412. McDaniel, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 711 (quoting Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 857)
(other citations omitted). Allegations of “promoting sales for off-label purposes
. . . in direct violation of the FDCA” are preempted due to “the general rule is
that there is no private right to enforce the law and regulations of the FDCA.”
Caltagirone, 190 A.3d at 599-600 (citations omitted); accord Kelley v. Insys
Therapeutics, Inc., No. 3:18CV1774, 2019 WL 329600, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 25,
2019) (quoting McDaniel).
413. Kelley, 2019 WL 329600, at *3 (citations omitted).
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FDA regulations,”414 and similar claims have also escaped implied
preemption as “overt acts in an alleged conspiracy.”415 Preemption
under Buckman can also extend to informed consent claims
asserted against manufacturers.416
“Where off-label promotion violates the FDCA, it is subject to
[FDA] regulatory action . . ., or enforcement actions by the
Department of Justice, but violations of the FDCA do not create
private rights of action.”417 Since such claims rest on a non-existent
state-law duty, whether or not express preemption exists, they are
impliedly preempted under Buckman as private FDCA
enforcement.418 Such claims are “not based on conduct that would
414. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 996,
1006 (D. Ariz. 2019); see Aetna, Inc. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d
541, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (deciding that claims “based on [defendant’s] state law
duties to refrain from misrepresentation . . . exist independently of FDA
regulations”); Bird v. Globus Med., Inc., No. 19-CV-1024-KJM-CKD, 2020 WL
5366300, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020) (holding that claims “based on
misrepresentations made during off-label promotion” are “not impliedly
preempted” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re
Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings, No. 14 C 1748, 2019 WL 7290560, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2019)
(finding no preemption where “law prohibiting fraudulent misrepresentation”
also allegedly violated); In re Nat’l. Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:18-OP45090, 2018 WL 4895856, at *24 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2018) (deciding that
“alleg[ations] that Defendants fraudulently and misleadingly promoted” offlabel use “are of the type that would traditionally be brought as state law
claims” and “not preempted”), rejected in part on other grounds, 2018 WL
6628898 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2018); Zafarana v. Pfizer, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 545,
553 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (not recognizing preemption “[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs
are alleging conduct that gives rise to an independent cause of action”); Grewal
v. Purdue Pharma LLP, No. ESX-C-245-17, 2018 WL 4829660, at *15-16 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 2, 2018) (deciding that recovery for false and
misleading off-label promotion not preempted). Contra Ledet, 2013 WL
6858858, at *3 (concluding that because “even the concept” of off-label use is
FDA-related, “fraud claims related to off-label use arise solely out of the
FDCA”).
415. Blue Cross v. Insys, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 1006; accord Aetna v. Insys, 324
F. Supp. 3d at 555.
416. Obermeier v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 134 N.E.3d 316, 337 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019) (An allegation that defendant must warn against off-label use
“regardless of whether the [product] was defective in any way” was preempted
as private FDCA enforcement.).
417. Travelers Indemnity I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 544 (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
418. Anderson, 2015 WL 2115342, at *6 (Negligence for “violat[ing] the
federal statutory scheme by promoting off-label use” is not a state-law claim.);
Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1041 (An asserted duty not to promote offlabel “exists solely by virtue of the federal prohibition . . . and finds no
independent source from traditional state law.” (citations omitted)); see Angeles,
863 N.W.2d at 416 (barring claim through both express and implied
preemption); Arvizu, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 793 (finding off-label promotion claim is
“an impermissible action to enforce the provisions of the FDCA” (citations
omitted)); Zaccarello, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 1069 (holding that a “duty to refrain
from off-label promotion . . . exists solely by virtue of the MDA” (citations

80

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

give rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the
FDCA.”419 “Plaintiff cannot usurp the FDA’s regulatory oversight
role for policing purported violations of the agency’s regulations.”420
“[T]he key dividing line” for preemption purposes is the “distinction
between claims premised on false misrepresentations and those
premised on omissions.”421
Negligence per se claims in off-label promotion cases have been
held impliedly preempted, unless they otherwise involve a parallel
claim.422
[T]he standard of care . . . relies exclusively on the FDCA, and
adjudication of this claim relies on the existence of the federal
requirements. While courts have generally allowed a negligence per
se claim . . ., the plain language of §337(a) and the Buckman decision
indicate that, where the FDCA is concerned, such claim fails.423

The same result is sometimes reached for claims of failure-to-report
adverse events to the FDA. As an alternative to express preemption,
without a parallel state-law duty, such allegations fail under
Buckman as private attempts to enforce the FDCA.424
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hawkins I, 2014 WL 346622, at
*19 (following Eidson I); Eidson I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 891 (determining that
“[d]efendants’ conduct is only allegedly ‘negligent’ because the FDCA bans offlabel promotion”); Houston I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (ruling that an “illegal offlabel marketing” claim “is not rooted in any traditional state tort law”); Gavin,
2013 WL 3791612, at *17 (deciding that “allegations of off-label promotion . . .
are impliedly preempted under Buckman and §337(a)” (footnote omitted));
Cook, 2013 WL 6154562, at *5 (following Eidson I); Raborn v. Albea, No.
583,675, 2012 WL 6600475, at *1 (La. Dist. Ct. Dec. 7, 2012) (preempting claim
of plaintiff seeking “to enforce the federal restriction on off-label promotion”),
aff’d, 144 So. 3d 1066 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Cummings v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 27CV-15-16417, 2016 WL 3082314, at *6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 31, 2016) (following
Angeles); Tone v. Studin, No. 7005592013, 2015 WL 725420, at *3 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Jan. 20, 2015) (decreeing off-label promotion claims impliedly preempted),
aff’d, 51 N.Y.S.3d 548, 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
419. Caplinger I, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
420. Dawson, 2013 WL 4048850, at *7.
421. Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 701 (footnote omitted).
422. McLeod I, 2017 WL 1196801, at *7 (finding preempted negligence per
se theory alleging off-label promotion); Perdue, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 852 (holding
impliedly preempted negligence per se claim that “does not identify any [state]
law paralleling and predating these FDCA requirements regarding off-label
promotion”); Blankenship, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 990-91 (determining that negligence
per se claim was “in substance, a claim for violating the FDCA.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams, 2015 WL 4256249, at
*7 (deciding that off-label negligence per se claims were preempted because they
“depend entirely upon alleged FDCA violations”). But see Coleman, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 314-15 (deciding that negligence per se claim was also a parallel
claim not impliedly preempted as dependent on FDCA).
423. Dunbar, 2014 WL 3056026, at *5.
424. Blankenship, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 989 (“[T]hese claims are simply an
attempt by private parties to enforce the MDA.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); accord Bennett, 2021 WL 797834, at *4 (holding
that, with no state-law equivalent, “claims are based on alleged failures by
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Under the implied preemption rationale enunciated in
Albrecht, Bartlett, and Mensing, simultaneous compliance with both
federal and state obligations is “impossible” “when a party cannot
satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s special
permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise of
judgment by a federal agency,” because “that party cannot
independently satisfy those state duties for pre-emption
purposes.”425 Since only the FDA can “require” warnings pertaining
specifically to off-label uses,426 regulated manufacturers cannot
“unilaterally” comply with postulated state-law duties to provide
such warnings.”427 Thus, impossibility preemption appears to be
available against off-label warning claims against generic drugs,428
and also as to branded drugs, unless a particular warning is within
a regulatory exception to the FDA’s general pre-approval
requirements for off-label information.429 “Nor does the Court
accept any argument that, if Defendants were precluded from
warning of [off-label risks], then they should not have permitted or
[defendant] to report adverse events to the FDA . . . are barred by §337(a) and
Buckman”); Hafer, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 860 (quoting and following Blankenship).
425. Mensing, 564 U.S. at 623-24; see Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1678
(“[I]mpossibility” exists where FDA regulations “prohibited the [defendant]
from adding any and all warnings . . . that would satisfy state law.”); Bartlett,
570 U.S. at 488 (“[I]t was impossible for [defendants] to comply with both the
state-law duty to label their products in a way that rendered them reasonably
safe and the federal-law duty not to change their . . . labels.” (citation omitted)).
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, “did not take up the narrower issue of whether [warning]
claims are preempted when they allege that a manufacturer failed to warn of
the dangers of a drug’s off-label use.” Kelley, 2019 WL 329600, at *2 n.3.
426. See supra notes 228-240 and accompanying text. When off-label use is
involved, a “manufacturer may not change the label, even to add warnings, until
it submits the proposed change as part of a ‘supplemental’ PMA application and
obtains FDA approval.” Cornett I, 998 A.2d at 556 (citations omitted).
427. Under “the plain language of the regulations . . . Defendants could not
unilaterally add safety information relative to unapproved populations.” Byrd
v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 111, 118 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (citation
omitted); see id. at 121 n.3 (listing applicable regulations).
428. “The purpose for which a generic drug is eventually prescribed to a
particular patient by his or her doctor is irrelevant to whether the manufacturer
labeled the drug in the manner required by the FDA and does not mean that
the drug was no longer ‘FDA-approved.’” Whitener v. PLIVA, Inc., C.A. No. 101552, 2011 WL 6056546, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2011); see Bennett, 2021 WL
797834, at *4 (holding that warning claims concerning off-label risks of generic
drugs are preempted under Mensing); Kellogg v. Wyeth, No. 2:07-CV-82, 2012
WL 368658, at *4 (D. Vt. Feb. 3, 2012) (demand for warnings about off-label use
of generic drug preempted).
429. See Byrd, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 124 (determining that off-label warning
claim was preempted because “Defendants could not have unilaterally warned
of [the relevant risk] pursuant to [FDA] regulations” governing addition of offlabel warnings to labeling); cf. A.Y. v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 224 A.3d 1, 15 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2019) (finding unilateral addition of off-label warning permitted by
“pediatric use” exception) (applying Illinois law); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham,
583 F. Supp. 2d 553, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (similar result in pediatric off-label use
case) (applying New Jersey law).
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encouraged its off-label use at all.”430
In generic drug litigation, off-label use “makes no apparent
difference in the [impossibility] preemption analysis.”431 As with all
other label changes, “[d]efendants are prohibited by the FDCA and
FDA regulations from adding or strengthening any warnings for
[generic drugs] to address any risks associated with off-label use.”432
However, whether a “parallel claim” exception, similar to that
prevailing in express preemption cases,433 exists as against generic
preemption has not been definitively resolved. A significant number
of courts have declined to dismiss false off-label promotion claims
involving generic drugs.434 An off-label promotion allegation
“distinguishes these claims from those brought in Mensing and
Bartlett.”435 “[D]efendants could refrain from engaging in their
allegedly false promotion of their drugs for off-label uses without
violating their federal duty to maintain the ‘sameness’ of their
labeling.”436
430. Byrd, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 125.
431. Whitener v. PLIVA, Inc., C.A. No. 10-1552, 2012 WL 1995795, at *4
(E.D. La. June 4, 2012). The Fifth Circuit’s affirmed dismissal “without
reaching whether the [plaintiffs’] off-label-promotion claim is a viable theory of
recovery.” Whitener v. PLIVA, Inc., 606 F. App’x 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2015)
(footnote omitted).
432. Bean v. Upsher-Smith Pharms., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-01696-RBH, 2017
WL 4348330, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’d, 765 F. App’x 934 (4th Cir.
2019); see McLeod v. Sandoz, Inc. (McLeod II), No. 4:16-CV-01640-RBH, 2018
WL 1456739, at *4 & n.4 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2018) (following Bean).
433. See supra 352-356 and accompanying text.
434. Collette v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. 16-CV-01034-JD, 2018 WL
1258105, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018) (False off-label promotion “states the
germ of a cognizable legal claim.” (citation omitted)); Arters v. Sandoz, Inc., 921
F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (allowing claim that defendant “promoted
the drug in a fraudulent or unreasonably dangerous way”); Whitener, 2012 WL
1995795, at *4 (“[I]t may be appropriate for liability to be imposed for failing to
warn of risks associated with the off-label purpose which the manufacturer
should not have been promoting in the first place.”); see Wells v. Wyeth Pharms.,
Inc., No. A-16-CV-593-LY-ML, 2017 WL 8182749, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 12,
2017) (observing that “wrongful off-label promotion is potentially viable”),
adopted, 2017 WL 8182839 (W.D. Tex. May 23, 2017); accord Wydermyer v.
Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 616CV01000RWSKNM, 2017 WL 3836143, at *3
(E.D. Tex. July 19, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 4129319 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017);
Hernandez v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 15 C 11176, 2017 WL 1386176, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2017), reconsideration denied in pertinent part, 2017 WL
3263456 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2017); Mitchell v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. A-16-CV574-LY-ML, 2017 WL 7361751, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2017), adopted, No.
1:16-CV-574-LY, 2017 WL 7361750 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2017); Priest v. Sandoz,
Inc., No. A-15-CV-00822-LY-ML, 2016 WL 11162903, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 29,
2016), adopted, 2017 WL 8896188 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2017); Rusk v. WyethAyerherst Labs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-00549-LY-ML, 2015 WL 3651434, at *5
(W.D. Tex. June 11, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 11050913 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 26,
2015).
435. Lempa v. Eon Labs, Inc., No. 18 C 3821, 2019 WL 1426011, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 29, 2019).
436. In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig.
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Other decisions disagree and have found implied preemption,
refusing to treat off-label promotion claims “separately” from other
informational claims.437 “Even if the court accepts arguendo that
Plaintiff is correct and an exception to Mensing exists when a
defendant violates FDA regulations, her argument runs into a
different hurdle in the form of 21 U.S.C. §337(a).”438 These courts
hold that “allegations claim[ing] that Defendants’ alleged
promotion resulted in failure to properly warn . . . are preempted by
federal law.”439
Buckman has also precluded FDCA-violation claims attacking
how a manufacturer chose to submit a medical device to the FDA,
which the plaintiff alleged meant the device was “investigational”:
Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that . . . [defendant] had a duty to
warn patients that [its device] had not been properly cleared by the
FDA. To allow plaintiff to recover on her failure to warn claim without
any allegation that the [device] was defective would amount to
creating a cause of action for a violation of the FDCA.440

Buckman, however, does not extend preemption to off-labelrelated drug warning claims not involving fraud on the FDA, which
today are governed by Albrecht and Levine. Thus, where the
defendant never had occasion to submit data concerning an off-label
use during the relevant period, implied preemption was
inapplicable.
[T]he FDA had no involvement in reviewing studies of [the off-label
use in question] until the filing of [a] supplemental NDA. Thus,
Defendant’s failure to provide data from [those] clinical studies prior
to that time does not constitute a fraud on the FDA during the
approval process. In turn, Plaintiffs’ allegations of nondisclosure have
no federal underpinnings that could be preempted by Buckman’ s
holding.441
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings (Testosterone I), No. 14 C 1748, 2016 WL
861213, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2016), aff’d, 880 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2018) (no
mention of off-label promotion).
437. Rojas v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (S.D. Tex.
2013).
438. Elliott v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00861-RDP, 2016 WL 4398407, at
*5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2016); id. at *6 (“Plaintiff seeks recovery because she
alleges Defendant violated FDA regulations. Although Plaintiff couches that
claim under a negligence standard, granting relief would essentially hold
Defendant liable for not following federal law and regulations.”).
439. Connolly, 2014 WL 12480025, at *6 (footnote omitted); see Bean, 2017
WL 4348330, at *6-7 (finding off-label promotion claim preempted as private
FDCA enforcement); McLeod I, 2017 WL 1196801, at *6-7 (same); Perdue, 209
F. Supp. 3d at 852 (observing that “[p]laintiff does not identify any [state] law
paralleling and predating these FDCA requirements regarding off-label
promotion”); Stephens v. Teva Pharms., U.S.A., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1251
(N.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that “in essence the plaintiffs sue for the [prescriber’s]
decision to prescribe a dangerous medication for an off-label use”).
440. Obermeier, 134 N.E.3d at 337.
441. Knipe, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (footnote omitted); see Rosenstern v.
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VI. OFF-LABEL USE ISSUES INVOLVING INFORMED
CONSENT
The original 1998 off-label use law review article was directed
specifically against a then-novel claim, purportedly based on
“informed consent,” that physicians were obligated to disclose FDA
regulatory information – that any given treatment was on- or offlabel – to their patients.442 Since publication, the vast majority of
courts have rejected such claims, and have had occasion to decide a
number of legal questions pertaining to what, if any, impact that
off-label use has on the informed consent duties of treating
physicians.
a. Informed Consent and Off-Label Use
As was advocated in the original article, courts generally
refuse to impose upon physicians a legal duty, usually asserted as
“informed consent,” to inform patients of the regulatory nature of
off-label use – above and beyond the usual informed consent duties
pertaining to the material medical risks and benefits of proposed
medical treatment. The FDCA itself creates no such requirement,
since the Act precludes Agency interference with physician
discretion.443
The majority rule holds that the duty to obtain patient
informed consent concerns material medical information, and does
not extend to regulatory information such as the FDA marketing
and labeling status of intended uses of prescription medical
products. “Actions for informed consent are limited to the
nondisclosure of medical information.”444
The category into which the FDA places the device for marketing and
labeling purposes simply does not enlighten the patient as to the
nature or seriousness of the proposed operation, the organs of the
body involved, the disease sought to be cured, or the possible results.
The FDA administrative label does not constitute a material fact,
risk, complication or alternative to a surgical procedure. It follows
Allergan, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 795, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (Implied preemption
“does not completely preclude injured parties from asserting claims of fraud or
false advertising.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
442. Beck & Azari, supra note 2, at 100-02.
443. “FDA strongly believes that health care practitioners should be able to
rely on prescription drug labeling for authoritative risk information and that
health care practitioners should not be required to convey risk information to
patients that is not included in the labeling.” Requirements on Content &
Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71
Fed. Reg. 3922, 3969 (Jan. 24, 2006).
444. Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 919 (citation omitted). Comanor & Needleman,
supra note 5, at 127 (describing how “patients do not need to be informed that
a prescribed drug is being used in an off-label manner, but only if a new use is
being formally tested as part of a research protocol” (footnote omitted)).
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that a physician need not disclose a device’s FDA classification to the
patient in order to ensure that the patient has been fully informed
regarding the procedure.445

“Information pertaining to an ‘off-label’ use provides the
patient with no information about the treatment itself” and “cannot,
therefore, be considered material information to an informed
consent discussion.”446 Thus, that a use “was not yet approved by
the FDA, is not a material fact” in the informed consent context.447
Thus most courts “[r]eject plaintiffs’ argument that the FDA’s
. . . classification was medical information concerning a material
risk.”448 Such decisions are often based on policy. Informed consent
445. Shannon v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156, 1181 (Md. 2014) (quoting Southard,
781 A.2d at 107 (citations omitted)).
446. Id. at 1182 (footnote omitted); see Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *13
(“[W]hen a surgeon uses a medical device in an ‘off-label’ manner, a failure to
disclose that information to the patient is, alone, insufficient to support a claim
that the physician failed to meet the applicable disclosure standard.”); accord
Mendez v. Shah (Mendez II), No. CV 13-1585 (NLH/JS), 2016 WL 830801, at *4
(D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016) (“agree[ing] with and adopt[ing] the analysis” in Seavey).
447. Packard v. Razza, 927 So. 2d 529, 534 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
448. Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 920; see Osburn v. Danek Med., Inc., 520 S.E.2d
88, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting informed consent jury instruction that
physician must disclose off-label use), aff’d mem., 530 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 2000);
Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“FDA status is
not a ‘medical risk’ and thus need not be disclosed in obtaining a patient’s
informed consent.”); Staudt v. Froedtert Mem’l Lutheran Hosp., 580 N.W.2d
361, 363 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (Off-label use does “not alter” informed consent
standards.); Klein, 673 N.E.2d at 231 (“Off-label use of a medical device is not a
material risk inherently involved in a proposed therapy which a physician
should disclose to a patient prior to the therapy.” (citation omitted)); Cetlinski
v. Brown, 91 F. App’x 384, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2004) (Expert properly allowed to
testify that “[t]here is no standard of care requirement that a physician discuss
off label use with their patients.”) (applying Ohio law); Cafferty v. Cayuga Med.
Ctr., No. 5:08-CV-0179, 2011 WL 541809, at *11 (N.D.N.Y Feb. 8, 2011) (Failure
to disclose off-label nature of procedure was not “an insufficiency of consent.”);
Wheat, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (“[I]nvestigational” regulatory status “is not
evidence of the failure to warn of risks associated with the product.”); Bogle v.
Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., No. 95-8646CIVRYSKAMP, 1999 WL 1132313, at
*7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 1999) (“The FDA status of a product is not a ‘medical risk’
which has to be disclosed prior to obtaining patient consent to surgery.” (citation
omitted)); Broderick v. Danek Med., Inc., No. 95-8644-CIV-RYSKAMP, 1999
WL 1062135, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 1999) (“The FDA status of a product is not
a ‘medical risk’ which has to be disclosed prior to obtaining patient consent to
surgery.” (citation omitted)); Huntman v. Danek Med., Inc., No. 97-2155-IEG
RBB, 1998 WL 663362, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 1998) (Off-label use is not
subject to informed consent disclosure “outside of an IDE.”); Orthopedic Bone
Screw, 1996 WL 107556, at *3 (“FDA’s labeling or ranking of a particular
medical device for its administrative or regulatory purposes is not a ‘risk’ of a
medical procedure.); see also Smith, 2020 WL 6066273, at *7 n.3 (acknowledging
majority rule, but not reaching issue); Daum, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271-73 (holding
that no duty to explain FDA regulatory status exists at common law and
postulating that, if FDA informed consent obligations include such a duty,
actionable state-law claim may exist); Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, supra note 2,
at 986 (“No court decision to date has mandated that a physician must disclose,
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encompassing off-label use can deter use of appropriate medical
procedures.449 Off-label status “does not inform the fact-finder of the
likelihood or severity of any risk.”450 Lack of FDA labeling for a
particular use “is not a qualitative determination that the device is
risky or unsafe.”451 Further, because “the mechanics of the FDA
approval process” can be complicated, time spent on such disclosure
could “dilute” other, more important medical information.452 Only a
couple of contrary cases exist.453
b. Informed Consent and Medical Experimentation
Where a particular off-label prescription or procedure is truly
an “experiment” – either where the product has no FDA approval at
all, or where clinical experience is so profoundly lacking that the
treatment’s risks and benefits are unknown,454 the law of informed
consent requires disclosure of such an absence of evidence-based
support.
It seems logical and consistent with [informed consent] that the
patient would want to know and should know whether a proposed
treatment is, for example, rare, experimental, or (we will assume for
our analysis here) not commonly used by [practitioners]. . . . There
may be no specifically known risks of such a treatment that require
disclosure. However, there may be unknown or unforeseeable risks
associated with an experimental or uncommon treatment. We see no
reason why the doctrine of informed consent would not logically apply
to injuries that occur from such risks when the unusualness of such

through an informed consent process, the off-label use of a drug.” (footnote
omitted)).
449. Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 918 n.3 (“to require all appropriate uses of a drug
to undergo approval by the FDA may deny patients the ability to obtain
medically effective treatment” (citation omitted)).
450. Shannon, 89 A.3d at 1182.
451. Southard, 781 A.2d at 107 (citations omitted).
452. Blazoski, 787 A.2d at 920-21 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
453. DeNeui v. Wellman, No. Civ. 07-4172-KES, 2009 WL 4847086, at *4 &
n.5 (D.S.D. Dec. 9, 2009) (allowing informed consent claim based on failure to
inform of off-label use “under the facts of this case” but not as a general rule);
Reetz v. Jackson, 176 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D.D.C. 1997) (equating off-label use with
“experimental” use) (finding fact issue on disclosure obligation).
454. The term “experiment” is itself controversial. Refusing to use the term,
a leading medical ethicist argues that ordinary medical practice is quite often
“experimental” in that physicians embark upon a therapeutic course “with
uncertainty as to whether it will bring about the desired purposes or results”:
[M]uch of the practice of diagnosis and therapy is experimental in
nature. One tries out a drug to see if it brings about the desired result.
If it does not, one either increases the dose, changes to another therapy
or adds a new therapeutic modality. . . . All of this experimentation is
done in the interests of enhancing the well-being of the patient.
LEVINE, supra note 142, at 10.
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a treatment has not been disclosed.455

Courts usually hold that, a physician proposing “experimental”
treatment is required to “inform the patient” that such treatment
means “the patient is part of a study . . . [and] must not only explain
for the patient [] the known risks of the treatment, as . . . in a
conventional setting, but must also inform the patient that there
may be unknown risks.”456
With experimental procedures the most frequent risks and hazards
will remain unknown until the procedure becomes established. If the
health care provider has a duty to inform of known risks for
established procedures, common sense and the purposes of the statute
equally require that the health care provider inform the patient of
any uncertainty regarding the risks associated with experimental
procedures. This includes the experimental nature of the procedure
and the known or projected most likely risks.457

In circumstances involving “drastic or experimental
treatment,” “for a physician to avoid liability . . . [the] patient must
always be fully informed of the experimental nature of the
treatment and of the foreseeable consequences.”458 The “innovative
455. Hampton v. Jecman, 50 S.W.3d 897, 904-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001),
overruled on other grounds, Marion v. Marcus, 199 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (procedure).
456. Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted) (applying Massachusetts law); see Estrada v. Jaques, 321
S.E.2d 240, 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (ruling that “the health care provider has
a duty, in exercising reasonable care under the circumstances, to inform the
patient of the experimental nature of the proposed procedure”); Taylor v. Wilkie,
31 Vet. App. 147, 161 (2019) (holding ineffective informed consent absent
“evidence that the appellant was told that the potential long-term effects of his
participation were unknown”); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., No. 2:11CV-1016, 2017 WL 2964901, at *17 (S.D. Ohio July 12, 2017) (finding that
“strict controls of medical experimentation, includ[e] the requirement of
informed consent”); cf. Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288, 290 (7th Cir.
1972) (deciding that a manufacturer must warn when a product “is a new and
experimental drug”) (applying Indiana law).
457. Estrada, 321 S.E.2d at 254. The informed consent statute in Estrada
imposed a “prudent physician” (as opposed to patient-centric) standard and
required disclosure of “information” that “[a] reasonable person . . . would have
a general understanding of . . . [the] most frequent risks and hazards” of
proposed treatment. Id. at 251 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-21.13 (2021)). The
statute imposed no IRB requirements.
458. Ahern v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 1976)
(applying New Mexico law); see Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 907 (Tenn.
2007) (finding that, “if applicable” the patient “must also be informed” “that the
proposed treatment is experimental.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 232 P.3d 529, 537 (Utah
Ct. App. 2010) (“holding that [a]n expert is not needed to establish that [the
patient] should have been informed that the [device] was in the hospital on a
trial basis for experimental purposes”); Burek v. Hart, No. 283729, 2009 WL
3683313, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009) (reasoning that “risks . . .
necessarily encompassed the question whether [plaintiff] was informed that the
treatment was investigational and experimental”); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors
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nature of the treatment” must be disclosed.459 This duty includes
informing the patient of any use of drugs or medical devices that
have not received any FDA approval for any purpose.460
[A]part from the duty recognized by some courts requiring physicians
simply to reveal “experimental” status to the patient, no other special
informed consent requirements apply in this [therapeutic] setting. 461

Nevertheless, informed consent to innovative treatment does
not amount to strict liability.462 Disclosure of unknown and
unknowable risks is not required:
[I]n the battle against deadly diseases, progress often will be made
only when medical experimentation is permitted. Doctors must give
fair warnings of risks that are known or that reasonably should have
been known [but] . . . were not required to warn [plaintiff], as she
embarked bravely on an experimental procedure that might have
helped her and others, of an unperceived risk of which they
reasonably were not aware.463

c.

FDA Regulated Intended Uses and the Medical Standard
of Care

In litigation against medical professionals, courts vary on the
relevance of FDA labeling. Some courts refuse to measure the
medical standard of care by labeling that the FDA has approved. In
Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880-81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (reasoning that informed
consent requires that patient be told of being enrolled in an “experimental
study”)
459. Trantafello, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 87 n.2.
460. Livdahl, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67 (duty to disclose where a product
“has not been approved by the FDA for any use in humans”); Gaston v. Hunter,
588 P.2d 326, 351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (ruling that “when a physician
contemplates a novel or investigational procedure he must inform his patient of
the novel or investigational nature of the procedure”) (drug was
“investigational” with no FDA-approved use); Retkwa v. Orenteich, 584
N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1992) (finding relevant lack of any FDA
regulatory history to informed consent where product never approved for any
intended use).
461. Lars Noah, Informed Consent & the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard & Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 379 (2002).
462 Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 314 (D. Mass.
1999) (“[M]edical experimentation should be analyzed under the legal
standards governing ordinary medical treatment.”); see Karine Morin, The
Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J. LEGAL MED.
157, 202 (1998) (observing that “courts have been presented with cases arising
from experiments, . . . and have applied to experimentation the standard of
disclosure ordinarily applied in the therapeutic setting”).
463. Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying Maryland law); see Farrell v. Johnson & Johnson, 238 A.3d 698, 716
(Conn. 2020) (“Because a reasonable patient could not expect to be informed of
currently unknown risks, we decline to replace this state’s informed consent
action with one that would make physicians strictly liable for innocent
statements made in the course of treatment.”).
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Morlino v. Medical Center, the court rejected a claim that a doctor’s
nondisclosure of a risk warned of in the PDR,464 was ipso facto proof
of malpractice:
[D]rug manufacturers do not design package inserts and PDR entries
to establish a standard of medical care. Manufacturers write drug
package inserts and PDR warnings for many reasons including
compliance with FDA requirements, advertisement, the provision of
useful information to physicians, and an attempt to limit the
manufacturer’s liability. . . . Those considerations highlight the
reasons expert testimony must accompany the introduction of PDR
warnings to establish the applicable standard of care in prescribing a
drug.465

464. See supra note 146.
465. 152 N.J. 563, 706 A.2d 721, 729 (N.J. 1998) (citations omitted); see
Thone v. Reg’l. West Med. Ctr., 745 N.W.2d 898, 906 (Neb. 2008) (affirming that
“without expert testimony, the [device] manual has no bearing on the standard
of care”); Spensieri v. Lasky, 701 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. 1999) (“reject[ing] the
contention that the PDR constitutes prima facie evidence of a standard of care”);
Bissett v. Renna, 710 A.2d 404, 408 (N.H. 1998) (finding that the law “does not
permit the PDR, absent expert testimony, to serve as prima facie proof of the
standard of care”); Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138, 157 (Haw. 1995) (recognizing
that “package inserts do not, by themselves, set the standard of care” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 135 (Utah 1989)
(declaring that “the better rule is that manufacturers’ inserts and parallel
P.D.R. entries do not by themselves set the standard of care”), abrogated on
other grounds, Miller v. Utah DOT, 285 P.3d 1208 (Utah 2012) (standard of
review); Thompson v. Carter, 518 So. 2d 609, 613 (Miss. 1987) (deciding that
“the package insert . . . should not be taken as conclusive evidence of the
physician’s standard of care”); Nolan v. Dillon, 276 A.2d 36, 49 (Md. 1971)
(determining that a “package insert . . . does not standing alone establish a
standard of care”); Doctors Co. v. Plummer, 210 So. 3d 711, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017) (concluding that “a prescription drug package insert . . . it cannot be
used as ‘stand-alone proof’ of the standard of care” (citations omitted)); Clarke
v. Mikhail, 779 S.E.2d 150, 160 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that a
“manufacturer’s recommended titration schedule is a recommendation only,
from which medical providers can and do deviate”); Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 15AP-479, 2015 WL 8773795, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2015) (agreeing
“that a physician prescribed a medication which arguably was contraindicated
. . . does not in and of itself make the treating physician guilty of professional
negligence”); McCorkle v. Gravois, 152 So. 3d 944, 956 (La. Ct. App. 2014)
(specifying that “plaintiffs could not satisfy their burden of establishing the
applicable standard of care . . . by relying upon the package insert and PDR
alone”); Chandler v. Simpson, No. 17974-5-III, 2000 WL 426441, at *8 (Wash.
Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2000) (stating that warning in drug package insert did not
establish materiality for purposes of informed consent); Grayson v. State, 838
P.2d 546, 549 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (“declin[ing] to hold that departure from
the drug manufacturer’s recommendations found on the package insert is prima
facie evidence of negligence”); Rodriguez v. Jackson, 574 P.2d 481, 486 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding a “package insert . . . does not establish conclusive evidence
of the standard or accepted practice in the use of the drug by physicians and
surgeons, nor that a departure from such directions is negligence” (citation
omitted)); Schultz v. AstraZeneca Pharma., L.P., No. C 06-6681 CW, 2006 WL
3797932, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) (adjudging that “a mere allegation of
‘off-label’ use with nothing more would not be sufficient to state a claim for
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Indeed, some courts have excluded FDA labeling altogether in
medical liability cases.466 Package inserts, offered as proof of what
they state, have also been held inadmissible hearsay.467
Most jurisdictions are only willing to admit FDA-approved
labeling in suits against healthcare providers if such labeling is
presented in conjunction with expert testimony on the standard of
care, so that off-label use is not conclusive evidence of a violation of
the standard of care. “[T]he majority view [is] that while the
information about the drug in the package insert and the PDR is
relevant and useful information regarding the prescribing
physician’s standard of care, it is not the sole determinant of the
standard of care.”468 Drug labeling can be “admissible along with
expert testimony on the issue of the standard of care.”469
[P]roof of a departure from the recommendations in a drug’s labeling
or PDR reference is not alone sufficient to prove a breach of the
standard of care. However, . . . a prescription drug’s labeling or its
PDR reference, when introduced along with other expert evidence on
the standard of care, is admissible to assist the trier-of-fact470

Some older decisions, without benefit of the above-cited
precedent, did allow package inserts, without more, to stand as
“prima facie” evidence of the medical standard of care for the use of
professional negligence”).
466. Dunn v. Yager, 58 So. 3d 1171, 1203 (Miss. 2011); In re RichardsonMerrell, Inc. Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1232 (S.D. Ohio
1985); see Arnold v. Lee, No. 05-0651, 2006 WL 1410161, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 24, 2006) (refusing to admit package insert as evidence of malpractice “[i]n
an age where drugs are frequently used for purposes not approved by the FDA”)
(in table at 720 N.W.2d 194).
467. Saccone v. Gross, 923 N.Y.S.2d 878, 878-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); In re
Bendectin, 624 F. Supp. at 1232.
468. Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 114 (Ky.
2008) (citations omitted).
469. Morlino, 706 A.2d at 730.
470. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 17; see Horn v. St. Peter’s Hosp., 406 P.3d
932, 936 (Mont. 2017) (“A manufacturer’s recommendation or package insert
can be relevant evidence to be considered by the jury, but it is not a substitute
for the required expert evidence that describes the standard of care.” (citations
omitted)); Ngo v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 358 P.3d 26, 41 (Haw. 2015) (“[I]nformation
contained in a manufacturer’s insert. . . can constitute evidence that the jury or
fact finder may consider along with the requisite expert testimony.”); Spensieri,
723 N.E.2d at 548-49 (Plaintiff’s expert could offer a “professional evaluation of
defendants’ conduct based, in part, on reliance on the PDR.”); Bowman v.
Songer, 820 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Colo. 1991) (“A manufacturer’s instructions . . .
may be admissible evidence on the standard of care, when supported by expert
testimony.”); Ramon, 770 P.2d at 135 (Drug labeling is “some evidence that the
finder of fact may consider along with expert testimony on the standard of
care.”); Garvey v. O’Donoghue, 530 A.2d 1141, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“When the
package insert or the PDR is offered in conjunction with expert testimony, . . .
that combination may be sufficient to establish the standard of care.” (citation
omitted)); Grayson, 838 P.2d at 548-49 (quoting and following Ramon); Salgo,
317 P.2d at 180 (“[W]hile admissible, [the PDR] cannot establish as a matter of
law the standard of care required of a physician in the use of the drug.”).
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such products.471
Physicians, moreover, cannot be held strictly liable under
product liability theories for engaging in off-label use.472
d. Independent Physician Investigation of Off-Label Uses
Some authority suggests that physicians should “inform”
themselves about contemplated off-label uses, but the sort of
investigation at issue has been limited to medical professionals
becoming familiar with existing medical literature concerning those
uses:
[P]hysicians prescribing a drug or device off-label have a
responsibility to be well-informed about the drug or device. In the
absence of the information found in the FDA-approved labeling,
physicians must obtain reliable, up-to-date information from other
sources. These sources may include: (1) discussion with professional
colleagues, (2) continuing medical education programs, (3) case
studies in professional journals, and (4) reports of the clinical results
of the use of the drug in other countries.473

Since this caselaw does nothing more than parrot non-binding
FDA statements concerning practice of medicine,474 it is not readily
apparent how, or even if, the recommended inquiry would be
greater than a physician’s expected familiarity with the risks and
benefits on on-label prescription.475
The FDA has approved implantation of the device in other locations
of the body. . . . [Plaintiff] argued that a different standard of care is
required when a procedure is not FDA-approved. The district court
correctly rejected this argument. It found that the lack of FDA
approval did not change the standard of negligence.476

Whatever a physician’s contemplated investigation into offlabel uses may be, any such duty does not extend to conducting
471. Mueller v. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d 39, 42-43 (S.D. 1974); Ohligschlager v.
Proctor Cmty. Hosp., 303 N.E.2d 392, 396 (Ill. 1973); Nolan, 276 A.2d at 49;
Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Minn. 1970); Julien v.
Barker, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (Idaho 1954); Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291, 303
n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Texas law).
472. “To allow a product liability claim against a surgeon to proceed past
summary judgment based on off-label usage would allow litigants to hold
physicians strictly liable for harm resulting from any off-label use of a device,
which would be in contravention of established . . . law.” Mendez II, 2016 WL
830801, at *5 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957,
at *19).
473. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 15 (citations omitted); accord Staudt, 580
N.W.2d at 363. These cases track FDA’s Off-Label Information Sheet, discussed
supra note 138 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
475. See Gaston, 588 P.2d at 350 (rejecting plaintiff’s contention “that the
law [of informed consent] should be different for novel procedures”).
476. Hansen v. Universal Health Servs. of Nev., Inc., 974 P.2d 1158, 115960 (Nev. 1999).
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actual tests or other research. “No one would expect [a physician] to
stop his practice and conduct tests and experiments so that he could
prescribe the drug solely from his own independent findings on its
usefulness and possible side effects.”477
e.

Off-Label Informed Consent Claims Against
Manufacturers or Their Sales Representatives

The general rule in informed consent cases is that “[t]he legal
duty to obtain [a patient’s] informed consent is imposed on the
doctor” who proposes the treatment in question.478 An exception has
been recognized in a few jurisdictions for patients actually enrolled
in FDA-regulated clinical trials, but only to the extent that FDA
regulations impose informed consent regulations on additional
parties.479 Cases recognizing this exception posit that other parties,
when they agree to participate in FDA-regulated clinical trials, may
be liable for failure to obtain informed consent to the extent that
they have voluntarily assumed the duty of complying with
applicable FDA regulations.480
Only hospitals have been subjected to additional informed
consent obligations under this theory, since the applicable FDA
regulation481 does not apply to manufacturers.482 Even as to
hospitals, this voluntary assumption theory has failed where
nothing beyond off-label use occurred, outside the auspices of any
477. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d at 43.
478. BECK & VALE, supra note 225, §8.05[3], at 805-13 (footnote omitted).
479. FDA regulations require hospitals, when acting as “institutions”
supervising clinical trials, to establish institutional review boards (“IRBs”) that
are responsible, inter alia, for preparation of informed consent materials. See
generally 21 C.F.R. §§50.3(h-i), 50.25, 50.27 (2021). Manufacturer “sponsors” of
such trials must obtain the agreement of physician “investigators” to obtain
proper informed consent. See 21 C.F.R. §812.43(c)(4) (2021).
480. E.g., Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 693 A.2d 904, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997), aff’d & rev’d on other grounds, 713 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1998); Kus v.
Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Friter v. Iolab Corp.,
607 A.2d 1111, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§323, 324A (1965) (permitting negligence liability for voluntary
“undertakings” where no legal duty otherwise exists); cf. Mink v. Univ. of Chi.,
460 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (imposing after-the-fact “duty to notify”
on hospital where, prior to any FDA regulations (1950-52), plaintiff was the
subject of a completely undisclosed controlled medical study). Contra Kershaw
v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16, 20 (N.D. 1989) (holding federal informed consent
regulations neither controlling nor admissible). All of this precedent precedes
the Supreme Court’s preclusion of private FDCA enforcement in Buckman, 531
U.S. at 353.
481. 21 C.F.R. §§812.2(b)(iii), 100, 812.43(c)(4)(iii) (2021).
482. Perez, 711 F.3d at 1116-17 (The manufacturer was held not liable for
alleged failure to obtain informed consent to off-label use. An allegation that
device was “investigational” “does not convert [plaintiff’s] own surgery − which
falls outside [an FDA-regulated investigation] − into part of a clinical trial.”);
see Cantwell, 2019 WL 2166541, at *3 (dismissing informed consent allegations
against manufacturer).
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actual clinical trials.483 Courts have “declin[ed] to subject those
physicians who do not voluntarily participate in FDA clinical
investigations to the purview of the FDA’s requirements for such
investigations.”484
Nor are manufacturers’ representatives present during
medical treatment saddled with informed consent obligations in offlabel use situations. Liability for informed consent “is limited to
medical practitioners. Defendant . . . is a sales representative, not a
medical doctor.”485 Causation fails where a representative is simply
present, but did not participate in the disputed treatment.486 Thus,
off-label use claims asserting either hospital informed consent or
mere presence of sales representatives are unlikely.487
Generally, courts have not been inclined to “permit[] some kind
of new ‘failure to warn of regulatory history’ claim.”488 However,
where drug manufacturers allegedly engaged in false off-label
marketing, prescriber reliance on the claimed false statements
about off-label use has been enough for a number of courts to allow
liability.
483. E.g., Smith, 2020 WL 6066273, at *7 (rejecting “assumed duty” theory
of hospital informed consent based on defendant hospital’s addition of the drug
used off-label to its formulary).
484. Southard, 781 A.2d at 108; see Bryant v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 15
S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tenn. 2000) (finding that an assumed duty exists only in cases
“subject to the federal study or mandatory monitoring,” not off-label use); Sita
II, 803 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (holding FDA regulations concerning investigational
studies inapplicable to off-label use); Staudt, 580 N.W.2d at 363 (deciding that
“the hospital need not give this information to patients who are not part of such
an investigation, even though their physicians are treating them with the device
in an identical ‘unapproved’ way” (citation omitted)); Femrite, 568 N.W.2d at
543 (reaching same result as Staudt); Huntman, 1998 WL 663362, at *7
(determining “that [the prescriber] choose to use defendant’s product in an ‘offlabel’ manner outside of an IDE clinical trial does not subject defendant to
liability simply because other doctors were conducting [identical] experiments
pursuant to the IDE exemption”).
485. Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. A claim of lack of consent to
the presence of a manufacturer’s representative also failed because privacy
regulations precluded the representative from learning of the claimed objection.
Id.
486. Id.
487. Kentucky, an outlier in imposing informed consent obligations on
hospitals generally, might be an exception. A Kentucky court, under the
extremely liberal “not even arguably a reasonable basis” standard for
determining fraudulent joinder, refused to preclude off-label use-based claims
implicating both informed consent and the presence of manufacturer’s
representatives. See, e.g., Burton v. Medtronic, Inc., C.A. No. 3:12CV-00317JHM, 2012 WL 5362497, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 31, 2012) (one of seven identical
decisions). Conversely, however, Kentucky law does not recognize state-law
negligence per se liability for alleged infractions of federal enactments. See St.
Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Straub, 354 S.W.3d 529, 534 & n.14 (Ky. 2011); T & M
Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks, 189 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Ky. 2006) (both construing KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §446.070 (West 2021)).
488. Placencia v. I-Flow Corp., No. CV10-2520 PHX DGC, 2012 WL 5877624,
at *8 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2012).
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A drug company cannot absolve itself from the duty to warn by
pointing to the unauthorized use of its drug by physicians with whom
it has not shared its knowledge of dangerous side effects and injury.
Violation of its duty to warn is even more egregious . . . [where
defendant] encouraged and participated in disseminating misleading
information concerning the use of its drug.489

“Although it is assumed that physicians will keep abreast of current
medical literature, here, part of the flawed literature was generated
by [defendant].”490
Conversely, lack of prescriber reliance on a defendant for offlabel information defeats liability.491 “It is well established that a
medical device manufacturer is not responsible for the practice of
medicine.”492 That doctors preferentially rely upon their own
judgment, rather than information from prescription medical
product manufacturers, has also been recognized.
After a drug has been on the market for a sufficient period of time . . .
physicians may rely more on their own experience and the
professional publications of others than on a drug manufacturer’s
advertisements, inserts, or PDR entries.493

Where the product’s prescriber is a “experienced” physician, “[e]ven
accepting the contention that [the physician] was initially led to [offlabel] use” by a manufacturer’s promotion, that “tenuous
connection” is interrupted by the physician’s continued clinical
use.494

VII. OFF-LABEL USE AND PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
As is evident from the prior discussion of preemption, off-label
use is a factor in many product liability lawsuits. Most product
liability litigation involving prescription medical products presents
warning-related allegations involving the adequacy of these

489. Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
490. Id. at 1215; see Barton v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., Nos. 694 EDA 2010, 695
EDA 2010, 2012 WL 112613, at *12 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2012) (finding that
a prescriber’s “belief . . . that the potential benefits outweighed the risks was
rooted, at least indirectly, in [defendant’s] active promotion of its product”)
(applying Illinois law).
491. Bertini, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (holding that absent physician reliance,
alleged off-label promotion is “irrelevant”); Celexa/Lexapro, 2014 WL 3908126,
at *8 (concluding that causation was defeated where a prescriber testified to
continuing to prescribe off-label notwithstanding information plaintiff claimed
was concealed); Bryant v. Wyeth, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1227 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(dismissing where “no evidence that [plaintiff’s] physicians decided to use” the
product in reliance on claimed off-label warranty).
492. Sons v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 776, 783 (W.D. La. 2013)
(citations omitted).
493. Morlino, 706 A.2d at 729 (citation omitted).
494. Sita, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
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products’ FDA-regulated risk information,495 and this informational
emphasis is only heightened where off-label use is concerned, since
the FDA constrains what a manufacturer’s labeling can state about
off-label uses.496
a. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine497 and Off-Label Use
Overwhelmingly, courts have treated off-label use as falling
within the ambit of the learned intermediary doctrine and have
applied the learned intermediary doctrine in the usual fashion to
off-label situations:
Pursuant to the learned intermediary doctrine, drug manufacturers
owe no duty to directly warn a patient of the risks associated with a
particular drug, so long as the manufacturer has provided adequate
warning to the prescribing physician. The physician is thus a “learned
intermediary” between the manufacturer and the patient, because
the physician is better positioned to determine the appropriate course
of treatment for the patient. The manufacturer is similarly under no
obligation to warn the patient of risks associated with an off-label or
non-indicated use of a drug.498

“[E]specially for investigational drugs, . . . the manufacturer’s duty
to warn is ordinarily satisfied if a proper warning is given to the
prescribing physician.”499
Courts have consistently applied the learned intermediary
doctrine in inadequate warning cases involving FDA-regulated
products that were used off-label, both with respect to prescription

495. In one recent case, potential off-label use of a different product was
allowed to act as an alternative design in an action challenging the design of a
prescription medical device. Moultrie v. Coloplast Corp., No. 18-231, 2020 WL
1249354, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020).
496. See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
497. Followed by courts in all fifty states, the learned intermediary doctrine
provides that, where a medical product is only available by prescription, that
product’s manufacturer need only warn the prescribing (and sometimes
treating) physician and has no duty to provide warnings directly to the patient
for whom the product is ultimately prescribed. The learned intermediary
doctrine applies equally to prescription drugs and devices. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §6(d) (1998); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §7, cm i (2010); BECK & VALE,
supra note 225, §2.03.
498. Morris v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. BPG-13-1107, 2015 WL
1757465, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2015) (citations omitted).
499. Gaston, 588 P.2d at 340 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see
Bean v. Upsher-Smith Pharms., Inc., 765 F. App’x 934, 937 (4th Cir. 2019)
(Plaintiff “cannot revive it [off-label promotion] now, repackaged as a response
to . . . the learned intermediary doctrine.”) (applying South Carolina law);
Arinder v. Danek Med., Inc., No. 1:95-CV-326-B-D, 1999 WL 1129647, at *4
(N.D. Miss. June 21, 1999) (“[A]rguments against application of the learned
intermediary doctrine [to off-label use] [are] unpersuasive.”).
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drugs500 and medical devices.501 As these cases indicate, the primary
500. Bean, 765 F. App’x at 937; Tutwiler v. Sandoz, Inc., 726 F. App’x 753,
755-57 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying Alabama law); Ebel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 321 F.
App’x 350, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Texas law); A.Y., 224 A.3d at 19;
T.M. v. Janssen Pharms. Inc., 214 A.3d 709, 727-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)
(applying Texas law); Simon v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 989 A.2d 356, 368-75 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2009); Long v. Rite Aid Headquarters Corp., 2019 WL 1370442, at *2
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2019) (in table at 8 Wash. App. 2d 1013); Evans, 2020
WL 616575, at *4; Lempa, 2019 WL 1426011, at *4-5; Trisvan v. Heyman, 305
F. Supp. 3d 381, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:15-MD-2657-FDS, 2018 WL 2291316, at *7 (D. Mass. May 18, 2018)
(law not stated); Harper v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-603-WKW-DAB,
2018 WL 2691492, at *9-11 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2018); Caughron v. Upsher-Smith
Labs., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-21-DPM, 2017 WL 3015606, at *1 (E.D. Ark. July 5,
2017); Monk v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. SA-16-CV-1273-XR, 2017 WL 2063008,
at *7 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2017); McLeod II, 2018 WL 1456739, at *3; McLeod I,
2017 WL 1196801, at *9-11; Elliott, 2016 WL 4398407, at *6-7; Morris, 2015 WL
1757465, at *3-4; Allain v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-00280-KOB, 2015
WL 178038, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 14, 2015); Stephens, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 125354; Bee v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 290-91, 295 (E.D.N.Y.
2014); Connolly, 2014 WL 12480025, at *5; Rojas, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 781-82;
Wells v. Allergan, Inc., No. CIV-12-973-C, 2013 WL 389147, at *4-5 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 31, 2013); Patteson v. AstraZeneca, L.P., 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33-35 (D.D.C.
2012); Hosler v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 12-60025-CIV, 2012 WL 4792983, at *4,
9 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2012); Costa v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 8:04-CV-2599-T-27MAP,
2012 WL 13103309, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2012); Scharff v. Wyeth, No. 2:10CV-220-WKW, 2011 WL 4361634, at *20 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 2011); Zafarana
v. Pfizer, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 545, 557-58 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Smith v. Pfizer, Inc.,
688 F. Supp. 2d 735, 745-46 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales
Practices & Prods. Litig. (Neurontin II), No. 05-cv-10639-PBS, 2010 WL
3169485, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2010); Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson
(Wendell II), No. 09-CV-04124 CW, 2010 WL 271423, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20,
2010); Zyprexa, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 432-33; Smith v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
C.A. No. 306-CV-6053 FLW, 2009 WL 5216982, at *5-6, 8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D.
179, 186 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1218
(N.D. Ala. 2006); MacMorris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:04CV596FTM-29DNF, 2005
WL 1528626, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2005); Miller v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F.
Supp. 2d 1095, 1120-22 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d, 356 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 13 Pa. D. & C. 5th 187,
202-04 (Pa. C.P. 2010), aff’d, 52 A.3d 498 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012); Tardy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. CV-03-538, 2004 WL 1925536, at *2-3 (Me. Super. Ct. Aug. 3,
2004). But see Proctor, 682 N.E.2d at 1215 (“Doctors who have not been
sufficiently warned of the harmful effects of a drug cannot be considered
‘learned intermediaries[.]’”).
501. Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 162-64 (4th Cir. 1999)
(applying Virginia law); Horrillo v. Cook Inc., No. 10-15327, 2012 WL 6553611,
at *2-3 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2012) (applying Florida law); Norabuena, 86 N.E.3d
at 1207; King v. Danek, 37 S.W.3d at 452-53; Avendt v. Covidien, Inc., 262 F.
Supp. 3d 493, 521 (E.D. Mich. 2017); Hricik v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, 89 F. Supp.
3d 694, 703-04 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *10-12; Block v.
Woo Young Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1035 & n. 5 (D. Minn. 2013)
(applying North Carolina law); Musgrave v. Breg, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-01029, 2011
WL 4620767, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2011); Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at
1286; Herzog v. Arthrocare Corp., No. CIV. 02-76-P-C, 2003 WL 1785795, at *8
(D. Me. Mar. 21, 2003); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 90 F. Supp. 2d
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function of the learned intermediary doctrine in off-label use
situations is to defeat claims that inadequate warnings caused the
prescribing physician to undertake treatment that was injurious to
the plaintiff.
Both of the plaintiffs’ implanting physicians were well experienced in
the use of [this product]. Both testified that they relied upon their
own knowledge and judgment in deciding to implant the devices into
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have not shown that these decisions were
influenced by any representation which the defendants made or failed
to make. Thus, the plaintiffs . . . have failed to establish that, had
additional warnings been given, the plaintiffs would not have
sustained their injuries.502

Conversely, where off-label use has occurred, as is true of
prescription medical product liability litigation generally, evidence
that a properly warned prescribing physician would not have
engaged in the off-label use in question establishes a question of
fact on causation under the learned intermediary doctrine.503
1225, 1234-35 (N.D. Okla. 2000); Minisan v. Danek Med., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
970, 978-79 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Samarah v. Danek Med., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1196,
1204 (D. Kan. 1999); McCarthy, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 413; Menges, 61 F. Supp. 2d
at 830; Coleman v. Danek Med. Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 637, 647-48 (S.D. Miss.
1999); Sita I, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 259; Alexander v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 F. Supp.
2d 1346, 1350 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Savage v. Danek Med., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 980,
984-85 (M.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d mem., 202 F.3d 288 (11th Cir. 1999); Baker v.
Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc. (Baker v. SNR II), C.A. Nos. 1:97-CV1233RWS,
et al., 1999 WL 1129650, at *6-7 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1999); Uribe, 1999 WL
1129703, at *13-14; Lawrence, 1999 WL 592689, at *4; Arinder, 1999 WL
1129647, at *4; Parks v. Danek Med., Inc., No. 2:95 CV 206, 1999 WL 1129706,
at *6-7 (N.D. Ind. June 17, 1999); Carter v. Danek Med., Inc., 1999 WL
33537317, at *9-10 (W.D. Tenn. June 3, 1999); Bell v. Danek Med., Inc., C.A.
No. 96-1393, 1999 WL 335612, at *3-4 (E.D. La. May 24, 1999); Clark v. Danek
Med., Inc., C.A. No. 3:94CV-634-H, 1999 WL 613316, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 29,
1999); Baker v. Danek Med. (Baker v. Danek II), 35 F. Supp. 2d 875, 881-82
(N.D. Fla. 1998); Baker v. SNR I, 1999 WL 811334, at *24-25.
502. King, 37 S.W.3d at 453 (citations omitted); see Tutwiler, 726 F. App’x
at 757; Ebel, 321 F. App’x at 358; Evans, 2020 WL 616575, at *4; Harper, 2018
WL 2691492, at *11; McLeod II, 2018 WL 1456739, at *3; Allain, 2015 WL
178038, at *6; Stephens, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1254; Connolly, 2014 WL 12480025,
at *5; Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *11-12; Patteson, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 37;
Neurontin II, 2010 WL 3169485, at *4; Herzog, 2003 WL 1785795, at *8; Miller,
196 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Alexander, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1235; Minisan, 79 F. Supp.
2d at 978-79; Samarah, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1205; McCarthy, 65 F. Supp. 2d at
413; Menges, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 830; Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 647; Alexander,
37 F. Supp. 2d at 1350; Baker v. SNR II, 1999 WL 1129650, at *7; Uribe, 1999
WL 1129703, at *14; Arinder, 1999 WL 1129647, at *4; Carter, 1999 WL
33537317, at *9-10; Bell, 1999 WL 335612, at *4; Clark, 1999 WL 613316, at *6;
Baker v. Danek II, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 882; Baker v. SNR I, 1999 WL 811334, at
*25 (all holding under learned intermediary doctrine that the allegedly
inadequate warning could not have changed the treatment outcome, given the
prescribing physician’s knowledge and conduct).
503. Horrillo, 2012 WL 6553611, at *5; A.Y., 224 A.3d at 18-19; T.M., 214
A.3d at 728; Simon, 989 A.2d at 374-75; Proctor, 682 N.E.2d at 1215; Bee, 18 F.
Supp. 3d at 296; Block, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; Hosler, 2012 WL 4792983, at
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Only a few courts have suggested that off-label use impairs the
operation of the learned intermediary doctrine. “[T]he illegal and
fraudulent promotion of [an off-label use] . . . appear[ed] to preclude
Defendants’ reliance on the learned intermediary doctrine” under
the terms of one state’s product liability statute.504 Similar
allegations raised unspecified “fact issue[s]” as to the doctrine’s
applicability in a different state where the status of the doctrine
was, at the time, disputed.505 In still another state, “a claim for
negligent and fraudulent off-label promotion” was found “not [to be]
asserting a failure to warn claim” to which the doctrine applied −
largely because the plaintiff had no other viable, un-preempted
theory.506 None of these decisions articulates a generally applicable
rationale why off-label use should affect the learned intermediary
doctrine.

B. Product Manufacturers and Their Representatives
Have No Duty to Intervene to Prevent Physician OffLabel Use
Under the learned intermediary doctrine generally, product
manufacturers are not legally required to intervene in medical
decision-making:
One in a serious medical condition . . . as a general matter faces
unwanted, unsettling and potentially harmful risks if advice, almost
inevitably involved and longwinded, from non-physicians, contrary to
what the doctor of his choice has decided should be done, must be
supplied to him during the already stressful period shortly before his
trip to the operating room.507

*4; Smith, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 746-47.
504. Dellinger v. Pfizer, Inc., C.A. No. 5:03CV95, 2006 WL 2057654, at *6
(W.D.N.C. July 19, 2006) (construing N.C. Gen. Stat. §99B-5).
505. Garross v. Medtronic, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 809, 817 (E.D. Wis. 2015).
Subsequently, Wisconsin’s adherence to the learned intermediary doctrine was
affirmed in In re Zimmer, NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 884 F.3d
746, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying Wisconsin law).
506. Wydermyer, 2017 WL 3836143, at *3-4. This result is extremely
questionable, given the Texas Supreme Court’s broad application of the doctrine
to all information-based product liability theories. See Centocor, Inc. v.
Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 169 (Tex. 2012) (approving of decisions that “applied
the learned intermediary doctrine to a variety of causes of action predicated on
the alleged inadequacy of a prescription drug manufacturer’s product
warning”).
507. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying
South Carolina law). E.g., Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 358 (2d Cir.
1987) (“[T]here is no duty under California law to specify precautions in the
prescription drug context.”); Centocor, 372 S.W.3d at 159 (“Prescription drugs
are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As
a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient.” (quoting
Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974)) (applying Texas law);
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“[W]e hesitate to encourage, much less require, a drug
manufacturer
to
intervene
in
[the
“physician-patient
relationship].”508
Thus, device and drug manufacturers are not held responsible
in off-label use cases for matters of medical judgment and practice.
“[P]hysicians are not unsophisticated lay persons and it is
reasonable to assume that they are familiar with relevant medical
literature.”509 “One must also bear in mind that the warnings are
intended to be read by learned intermediaries who are presumed to
have considerable medical training as well as the ability to access
the medical literature if they require additional information.”510
“Once the doctor’s clinical judgment is introduced as the
determinative factor in the decision making process, it must be
apparent that [non-contraindicated] data [in the label] serves as a
recommendation, not a limitation or prohibition.”511 Regardless of
off-label promotion, it is an −“equally reasonable inference that [the
prescriber] may have come to such an understanding based on his
own correct or incorrect reading of the available medical literature,
based on information contained in the Compendia or even based on
discussions with other medical professionals.” 512

Glennen, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83-84 (The “manufacturer of a prescription
medical device has no to train a physician” because “a medical device
manufacturer is not responsible for the practice of medicine.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Small v. Amgen, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d
1358, 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (A manufacturer has “no duty to provide guidance”
to prescribers.); Chao v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 13-CV-0114-H BLM, 2013
WL 6157587, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013) (There is no “duty, beyond providing
a warning, to dissuade a physician from using a device on a particular patient.”).
See generally BECK & VALE, supra note 225, §2.03[1].
508. Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1987)
(applying Mississippi law); see Chao, 2013 WL 6157587, at *4 (finding no duty
“to second guess a practicing physician when that physician has already
received the FDA mandated warnings”); Greenwood v. Tehrani, No.
805111/2017, 2017 WL 4083099, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2017) (holding
that “the manufacturer is not responsible for how the physician uses the device
and renders the medical care” (citation omitted)). See generally BECK & VALE,
supra note 225, §2.04[2].
509. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., No. 1:09cv-1086 (AJT), 2011 WL 3911095, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2011) (citation
omitted) (Reliance on off-label promotion must be pleaded.), aff’d 707 F.3d 451
(4th Cir. 2013).
510. Ames v. Apothecon, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 566, 573 (D. Md. 2006)
(footnote omitted); see Willett v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094, 1099 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1991) (noting that “[t]he learned intermediary is the one to whom the
warning is directed”) (applying Louisiana law). See generally BECK & VALE,
supra note 225, §2.03[3][c][ii] (collecting precedent for proposition that “patients
have no way to evaluate the kind of technical information that doctors typically
use to make prescription decisions” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
511. Polansky II, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 264-65.
512. In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action
(Intron/Temodar IV), No. 2:06-cv-5774 (SRC), 2010 WL 2464746, at *7 (D.N.J.
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Courts have therefore held that “failures [of physicians] to
perform their duties . . . do[es] not operate to create, or to extend, a
manufacturer’s duty to warn.”513 “[P]roviding an adequate warning
to the prescribing physician relieves the manufacturer of its duty to
warn the patient regardless of how or if the physician warns the
patient.”514 Manufacturers are not required to warn about
“matter[s] of general and elemental medical knowledge.”515
[Plaintiff’s argument] overlooks the fact that such judgments are
often better left to the doctors’ discretion. Doctors are in a unique
position to determine how best to treat their patients − a much better
position than that of a far-away official in a pharmaceutical company,
whose job is merely to write warnings. The law does not mandate that
pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers provide such specific
instructions that they leave little room for doctors’ reasonable
medical judgment.516

June 9, 2010), aff’d, 678 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2012).
513. Ellis v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 311 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying
Georgia law). See generally BECK & VALE, supra note 225, §2.03[3][c][i]
(collecting precedent for proposition that “the manufacturer may rely upon the
physician to perform his or her duties to exercise medical judgment in
prescribing products and determining what information to tell the patient.”
(footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
514. Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 765 (Ky. 2004) (citations
omitted); see Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 949 (Ariz. 2016)
(holding that “if the manufacturer provides complete, accurate, and appropriate
warnings about the product to the learned intermediary, it fulfills its duty to
warn the consumer” (citations omitted)). See generally BECK & VALE, supra note
225, §2.03[3][c][i] (collecting precedent for proposition that prescription medical
product manufacturers “have no duty to ensure that the adequate warning
reaches the patients to whom the physician prescribes the drug” (footnote
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
515. Plenger v. Alza Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
see Pfizer, Inc. v. Jones, 272 S.E.2d 43, 45 (Va. 1980) (“We do not think that the
duty of the defendant extended to explaining exactly how the danger against
which he had been warned might operate” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Nichols v. Clare Cmty. Hosp., 476 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991) (“A manufacturer fulfills its duty to the medical community when it
warns of the risk inherent in use of the drug. There is no requirement that the
warning apprise the doctor of how to properly diagnose the condition that
renders use dangerous.” (citations omitted)).
516. In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 813-14 (N.D. Ohio
2004), aff’d, 447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006); see Bergstresser v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., C.A. No. No. 3:12-1464, 2013 WL 6230489, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 2,
2013) (holding that “[t]he law does not require that the drug manufacturer
provide such detailed information or instructions so as to remove the medical
judgment of the physicians, who are in the best position to monitor and treat
their patients and make medical judgments with respect to their care” (citation
omitted)); In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1333,
1340 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (declaring that “the decision as to use a medication as a
first-line treatment is uniquely up to the prescribing medical professional”);
Kapps v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1153 (D. Minn. 2011)
(explaining that “[a] manufacturer does not have a duty to communicate any
and all information that might affect a customer’s decision to use one of its
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“Neither the Restatement nor [prior precedent] support the
proposition that a label must go beyond the warnings given to
include diagnostic tips, or otherwise instruct a physician on how to
practice medicine.”517
The same rationale has been extended to manufacturer’s
representatives. Precedent “provides no authority for the
proposition that it was inappropriate for a[] . . . sales representative
to educate an orthopedic surgeon who chose to use the [device] in
this off-label manner.”518 A manufacturer’s representative is not
subject to liability merely for knowing that intended treatment
would involve off-label use:
“[O]ff label use,” within the context of medical treatment is not
prohibited, as the FDCA does not regulate the practice of
medicine. . . . [The prescribing surgeon’s] exercise of medical
judgment was within [his] discretion, and [he] was free to do what
[he] did. . . . [E]ven if such a claim [for off-label promotion] were
present in this case, there is no private right of action for violations
of the FDCA. There is a complete absence of evidence as to any claim
for negligence based on “off label” marketing and promotion by [the
sales representative].519

A representative’s claimed “calculated silence” during off-label
treatment is not actionable:

products”) (finding it unnecessary to warn that device reprocessing may not
have been FDA approved); Hunt v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 547,
550 (D. Md. 1992) (deciding that manufacturer “does not have the authority to
dictate to physicians how they should practice medicine” (footnote omitted)).
517. Falsberg v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, No. 68264-4-I, 2013 WL 4822205,
at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2013) (in table at 176 Wash. App. 1019); see E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Farnes, 697 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1997) (allowing
manufacturers to “rely . . . on the education and training of the ‘learned
intermediary’ to explore questions raised by reviewing the insert” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tortorelli v. Mercy Health Ctr.,
Inc., 242 P.3d 549, 560 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (deciding that the manufacturer’s
duty is “not to provide an in-depth education to trained physicians . . . but to
identify and warn of risks”); Kline v. Zimmer Holdings, C.A. No. 13-513, 2015
WL 4077495, *26 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2015) (holding that the “law does not require
such specificity in a warning, particularly where, as here, the question is one of
patient selection for a particular medical device” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 662
F. App’x 121 (3d Cir. 2016); Chao, 2013 WL 6157587, at *5 (declining “to impose
an additional duty on a device manufacturer to second guess a practicing
physician when that physician has already received the FDA mandated
warnings”).
518. Haley v. I-Flow, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 868, 881 (D. Minn. 2012).
519. Wolicki-Gables, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. The explanted device
disappeared after plaintiff’s surgery, but plaintiff had “no evidence of improper
disposal by” the sales representative. Id. at 1295. See Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957,
at *9 (holding that a sales representative “has no affirmative duty to intervene
in order to prevent off-label use of [a] product by a surgeon”); Rohlik v. I Flow
Corp., No. 7:10-CV-173-FL, 2011 WL 2669302, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 7, 2011)
(finding no fraud where sales representative “watched” off-label surgery being
performed).
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Plaintiff’s claim that [defendant’s] representative allowed “the
misuse of the product through calculated silence” is insufficient to
create an issue of material fact for trial as to failure to warn. Plaintiff
. . . has cited no law indicating that “calculated silence” that fails to
prevent a doctor from using a device off-label, is the equivalent of offlabel marketing.520

A physician’s choice to use a prescription medical product offlabel does not expand a manufacturer’s liability or create any
obligation to prevent off-label use from occurring. Lack of FDA
“clearance for that use did not bar Defendants from selling the
device to . . . other physicians who could then decide how and when
to use [it].”521 “[K]nowledge that the prescribing doctor intends an
off-label use” is ordinarily an insufficient basis for imposing liability
on a manufacturer.522 No legal duty is imposed on FDA-regulated
manufacturers to take affirmative preventive measures against
physicians’ off-label use of their products.523 Similar claims
asserting “agency” have likewise been rejected as “implausible.”524
Some courts have dismissed allegations of physician reliance
on
off-label
information
received
from
non-physician
representatives as implausible as a matter of law. FDA-regulated
manufacturers and their representatives have not been required to
520. Seavey, 2014 WL 1876957, at *9.
521. Healey, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 880; see Id. at 881 (finding “no authority . . .
that it was inappropriate for [defendant’s] sales representative to educate an
orthopedic surgeon who chose to use the [device] in this off-label manner”).
522. Carson, 365 F. App’x at 815; accord Modglin II, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 999,
1012 (quoting and following Carson). See Davenport, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40
(determining the manufacturer not negligent in “allowing a physician to use a
medical device in an ‘off-label’ manner” (citation omitted)); Little v. Depuy
Motech, Inc., No. 96CV0393-L JAH, 2000 WL 1519962, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 13,
2000) (holding that a doctor’s “decision to use [a manufacturer’s] device in an
‘off-label’ manner does not subject the manufacturer to liability, even if it knows
of the off-label use”) (reasoning that manufacturer “cannot be held liable for [a
physician’s] decision to implant the [manufacturer’s] device in an off-label
manner”); Cox, 2000 WL 1160486, at *8 (declaring that “[a] seller is not liable
even if it knows of the off-label use”).
523. Davenport, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40 (no manufacturer duty to
interfere with physician’s “practice of medicine” in using its product in an offlabel manner); see Tavilla v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 120843, 2014 WL 4473638, at *5 & n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2014) (finding no
obligation for insurer to prevent its insureds from receiving off-label therapy or
“otherwise interfering with their medical care”) (explaining that “such a duty
would put [insurers] squarely between the insured and the insured’s own
physician”); cf. Kennedy v. Medtronic, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006) (“It would be unreasonable, and potentially harmful, to require a
[manufacturer’s representative] to delay or prevent a medical procedure” on the
theory that its non-physician sales representative should have refused to allow
outpatient surgery.).
524. Smith v. St. Jude Med. Cardiac Rhythm Mgmt. Div., No. CCB-12-1746,
2013 WL 1104427, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2013) (finding it “implausible to
suggest that a product manufacturer would ask a doctor to serve as its agent in
communicating with that doctor’s own patients”).
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explain the concept of off-label use to experienced physicians,525
since physicians rely on their own learning and experience.
[The prescriber] is an experienced [physician]. Given his academic
qualifications and teaching positions, it is not feasible for the court to
find that [he] was ignorant of developments in his field, and that he
not only learned what he knew . . . because of defendants’ alleged
marketing efforts. . . . Simply put, the court does not logically deduct
that [the prescriber] was echoing the outcome of defendants’
indoctrination campaign of his orthopedic associates, rather than
trusting his own personal training and experience.526

It is a physician’s duty to “evaluate [a patient’s] needs, assess the
risks and benefits of the product, weigh the risks against the
advantages available and then prescribe the product,” thus the
defendant was not “responsible for how a learned intermediary
conducts his business.”527
Indeed, a surgeon was not allowed to shift liability for injuries
allegedly caused by off-label use to advice supposedly received from
a manufacturer’s sales representative – such claimed reliance by a
medical professional was “patently unreasonable”:
Even if [the sales representative] told [the doctor] that he could use
the [product] . . ., the Court finds that any reliance by [the doctor] on
that statement to be unreasonable as a matter of law. These
representations . . . addressed what type of [operation the doctor]
should perform on [plaintiff]. As a seasoned neurosurgeon, it is
patently unreasonable for [the doctor] to rely on a sales
representative’s opinion about the type of procedure that should be
employed in operating on a patient . . . .528

Finally, sales representatives acting only as “conduits” for a
manufacturer’s allegedly incorrect information about off-label use
525. “There is no duty to warn physicians of a product’s regulatory history.”
Phillippi v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:08-CV-02445-JAM, 2010 WL 2650596, a *2
(E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010), aff’d, 471 F. App’x 663 (9th Cir. 2012).
526. Lawrence v. Sofamor, S.N.C., No. 95-CV-1507, 1999 WL 592689, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1999).
527. Id. (citations omitted); accord Prohaska v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 422, 444 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Lawrence); see Arthur v. Medtronic,
Inc. (Arthur III), 123 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1150 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (asserting that
“[w]hether a particular medical device or procedure is appropriate for a specific
patient is . . . not within the purview of a sales representative’s expertise” and
concluding that plaintiff “cannot establish that her surgeon reasonably relied
on statements made by sales representatives[.]”); Chao, 2013 WL 6157587, at
*4 (holding that “it is the surgeon, not the device manufacturer, who makes the
final determination regarding patient selection” (citation omitted)).
528. Hall v. Horn Med., L.L.C., C.A. No. 11-1032, 2012 WL 1752546, at *3
(E.D. La. May 16, 2012) (citation omitted); accord Glennen, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
84 (quoting Horn); Arthur III, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (quoting Horn); Sons,
915 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (quoting Horn); cf. Ramos v. Weber, 987 N.Y.S.2d 51, 5152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (finding that surgeons have no informed consent duty
to “disclose[] the opinion of a non-physician representative for the implant
manufacturer that [the patient] ‘may not be the ideal candidate’ for” surgery).
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are not personally liable because they transmitted information that
they received from a manufacturer principal during the course of
their employment.529 Conversely, allegations that sales
representatives actively promoted off-label use through “false and
misleading statements” about the product’s “safety and
effectiveness” can be sufficient to state a claim, at least under
indulgent fraudulent joinder standards.530

C. Duty To Warn Of Risks Of Off-Label Use
“There are differences with respect to whether warnings are
required for the off-label use of a drug.”531 Common-law courts have
taken four different approaches to the duty to warn in cases
involving off-label use. Two of these approaches – that off-label use
imposes an expanded duty to warn, and, conversely, that it
essentially eliminates the duty to warn – are comparative outliers.
The majority of courts have concluded that off-label use has a
minimal impact on the scope of common-law duties to warn.
1. Decisions Predicated On A Greater Duty To Warn
Plaintiffs have sometimes contended that off-label use creates
more extensive duties to warn than would otherwise exist under the
common law as applied to prescription medical products. Such
arguments most commonly target state statutory FDA compliance
defenses, particularly New Jersey’s.532 Some courts (none actually
in New Jersey) have held that, because off-label uses “have not been
subjected to the baseline FDA scrutiny,” that the statute presumes,
products used off-label are not entitled to assert this defense.533

529. Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215-17 (N.D. Ala. 2006)
(clarifying that “a sales representative is not a ‘seller’”); Burns v. Wyeth, Inc.,
352 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776-77 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (no sales representative personal
liability absent evidence of misrepresentation of risks of off-label use).
530. “[T]here is a colorable basis for a claim that sales representatives have
a duty to refrain from affirmatively misrepresenting the safety and efficacy of
devices for uses for which they have not been approved.” Hricik, 89 F. Supp. 3d
at 702 (footnote omitted); see Elmore v. Gorsky, C.A. No. 2:12-CV-00347, 2012
WL 6569760, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2012) (allowing joinder of sales
representative based on such a claim); Stibor v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 04 C 1255,
2005 WL 1793589, at *3-4 (E.D. Wis. July 27, 2005) (allowing joinder of sales
representative based on such a claim); see also infra at notes 552-554, and
accompanying text.
531. Blain, 240 F.R.D. at 194.
532. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:58C-4 (West 2020) (“If the warning or instruction
given in connection with a drug or device . . . has been approved or prescribed
by the [FDA] . . ., a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or
instruction is adequate.”).
533. Knipe, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (applying New Jersey law); accord In re Testosterone
Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, No.
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Conversely, New Jersey courts require plaintiffs to “overcome” the
state’s statutory compliance presumption in off-label use cases,534
since such use is not lack of FDCA compliance under the statute:
The decision of [plaintiff’s] physicians to prescribe [the drug] off-label,
and the fact that the FDA had not yet approved [it] for the particular
indication for which it was prescribed to [plaintiff], does not rebut the
statutory presumption of adequacy to which the [drug’s] labeling is
entitled. . . . The FDA’s decision not to include a risk . . . warning on
the [drug’s] label was deliberate and informed. Plaintiffs cannot use
the fact that [the drug] was prescribed off-label to rebut the statutory
presumption of adequacy.535

Michigan has the oldest, and arguably strictest, statutory
presumption of adequacy based on FDCA compliance536 − albeit
limited to drugs.537 Arguments that off-label promotion vitiates the
Michigan presumption have been rejected.
The Michigan Legislature provided immunity for drug
manufacturers for products approved by the FDA, so long as the
product and its labeling meet the FDA standards. . . . The statute
does not limit the protection to situations when the drug is used for
its approved purposes. Should the Legislature wish to limit the
protection available to “off-label” uses of the drug, it may do so. Until
such an amendment is enacted, this Court must interpret the statute
as it is written.538

14 C 1748, 2018 WL 4030586, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018) (quoting Knipe)
(applying New Jersey law). In Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d
1189, 1198-99 (D.N.D. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 367 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir.
2004), the court reached a similar conclusion as to a similar North Dakota
statute.
534. Cornett II, 48 A.3d at 1056.
535. Bailey, 37 A.3d at 576, see id. at 558 (footnote omitted) (“[f]ollowing the
accepted medical standard of care, physicians frequently prescribe drugs for offlabel or unapproved uses”) (construing §2A:58C-4); see Seavey, 2014 WL
1876957, at *7-8 (New Jersey statutory presumption applies to off-label use of
§510(k) medical device.); Dotegowski v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. CGC-10-506794,
2014 WL 5600609, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2014) (applying New Jersey
law).
536. MICH. COMP. LAWS §600.2946(5) (2021) (“[A] drug is not defective or
unreasonably dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the drug
was approved for safety and efficacy by [FDA], and the drug and its labeling
were in compliance with [FDA] approval[.]”).
537. The Michigan presumption does not extend to medical devices. MICH.
COMP. LAWS §600.2945(b) (2021) (providing that a “drug does not include a
medical appliance or device”); see Miller v. Mylan, Inc., 741 F.3d 674, 677-78
(6th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing between drugs and medical devices) (applying
Michigan law).
538. White v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030 (W.D.
Mich. 2008); accord In re Risperdal Litig., 175 A.3d 1023, 1031 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017) (applying Michigan law); In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17MD-2804, 2020 WL 2090355, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2020) (applying
Michigan law); In re Depakote, No. 12-CV-52-NJR-SCW, 2017 WL 4348052, at
*5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2017) (applying Michigan law); Short v. Janssen Pharms.,
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The Texas compliance statute includes an express exception in
drug cases removing cases involving causal off-label promotion from
its presumption of adequacy.539 Under this statute, a Texas plaintiff
must plead and prove that the defendant’s actually promoted offlabel use to that plaintiff’s prescriber, and that the off-label use
caused injury.540
Generalized claims of greater warning duties in off-label use
cases have rarely been asserted, and only more rarely recognized.
“[T]wo-fold” reasoning led to rejection of an enhanced off-label
warning duty requiring disclosure of then-unknown risks.
In cases such as this one that involve an off-label use of a prescription
drug that is not endorsed or promoted by the manufacturer, the
requisite knowledge of the risk is two-fold: the manufacturer must
know (or be charged with knowledge of) both that the off-label use is
occurring and that the off-label use carries with it the risk of the harm
at issue.541

A duty to warn of “unknown” risks from off-label use would be
onerous and convey little useful information:
Requiring . . . warnings regarding an off-label use in the absence of a
known risk would be highly inefficient: it would drain the resources
of drug companies; it would cause physicians to be inundated with
such pseudo-warnings and risk distracting them from heeding
warnings of actual risk; and it would add very little to the fact that
physicians already know that if a use is omitted from a prescription

Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1025, 2015 WL 2201713, at *6 (W.D. Mich. May 11, 2015) (all
applying Michigan presumption in off-label use cases).
539. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §82.007(a-b) (West 2021) (providing
presumption of “adequate warnings” if “pharmaceutical” warnings are
“approved by” the FDA) (exception if a defendant “recommended, promoted, or
advertised the pharmaceutical product for an indication not approved by” the
FDA, the product was so used, and that off-label use caused injury); see Jackson
v. Wyeth, LLC, C.A. No. 2:12-CV-196, 2015 WL 363513, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
27, 2015) (finding no causation where plaintiff’s use was on-label). Medical
devices are within a more general compliance presumption that has no off-label
promotion exception but can be rebutted by evidence that the relevant
standards “were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of
injury or damage.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §82.008 (West 2021).
540. Ebel, 321 F. App’x at 355 n.2, affirming, Ebel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 536 F.
Supp. 2d 767, 776-77 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (exception not proven); In re Farxiga
(Dapagliflozin) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 17 MC 2776 (LGS), 2018 WL 1274929,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2018) (exception adequately pleaded) (applying Texas
law); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14 C
1748, 2014 WL 7365872, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2014) (exception adequately
pleaded) (applying Texas law); McKay v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 934 F. Supp.
2d 898, 905-06 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (exception not proven), aff’d, 751 F.3d 694 (5th
Cir. 2014); Lucas v. Abbott Labs., C.A. No. 3:12-CV-3654-B, 2013 WL 2905488,
at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. June 13, 2013) (exception adequately pleaded); Anderson v.
Abbott Labs., 2012 WL 4512484, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2012) (exception not
adequately pleaded).
541. Meharg v. I-Flow Corp., No. 1:08-cv-184-WTL-TAB, 2010 WL 711317,
at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 1, 2010)
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drug’s label that use has not been tested sufficiently to demonstrate
that it is safe and effective.542

Only one case appears to hold that off-label use necessitates
greater warnings than the common law would otherwise require
and it did so on unusual facts. The plaintiff’s prescriber had made
an “unsolicited” inquiry of the manufacturer concerning the risks of
the off-label use at issue:
[The prescriber] directly sought information on maximum safe dosing
. . . and post-marketing reports of [adverse events]. . . . [R]easonable
persons could differ on whether [defendant] adequately warned [the
prescriber] about the risk . . ., given [defendant’s] evasive response to
[the prescriber’s] direct inquiry. . . . Because this case involves an offlabel use, [defendant] should have been particularly forthcoming
when asked about information relating to a specific question by an
individual doctor.543

However, an expanded duty on these facts would appear to conflict
with FDA limitations on manufacturer responses to unsolicited
inquiries about off-label uses.544
Where the FDA had actually revoked approval for the labeling
of a particular intended use of a product, a duty was imposed on the
affected manufacturer to take steps to promote awareness in the
medical community that this indication had been removed from the
label.545
2. Decisions Predicated On A Standard Duty To Warn
Given the ubiquity of off-label use, most courts have declined
to treat such use as form of unforeseeable misuse that cuts off the
duty to warn. “[A] patient prescribed an off-label use of a drug may
be a reasonably foreseeable user of the product, such that a
manufacturer has a duty to warn of all known adverse effects
associated with such use.”546 Thus, the largest group of decisions
imposes essentially a duty to warn of the risks of off-label use to the
same extent as with on-label use.547
542. Id. at *4 n.9
543. Wells v. Allergan, Inc., No. CIV-12-973-C, 2013 WL 389147, at *5 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 31, 2013).
544. Such answers “should be tailored to answer only the specific question(s)
asked.” FDA Guidance for Responding to Unsolicited Requests, at 7. See supra
note 138.
545. Richards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1980); Hardy v. Royce Labs., Inc., C.A. No. 3:97-CV-740H, 2000 WL
33960115, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 3, 2000) (holding that physician unawareness
that the “FDA had banned marketing” of the product for the use at issue
precludes summary judgment).
546. Knipe, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 628-29; accord Shahbaz v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. CV 13-07382-AB (SSX), 2020 WL 5894590, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July
31, 2020); Bee, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 287.
547. To the extent that a state product liability statute “contains an
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Adequate allegations that a manufacturer “withheld or
omitted information regarding adverse events and risks associated
with [an] off-label use” are thus sufficient to support a warningbased claim under the majority rule.548 The duty to warn “extends
to off-label use of prescription medication.”549 The state-of-the-art
defense, that “a drug manufacturer must warn of risks that are
actually known or reasonably scientifically knowable applies” to offlabel use cases, and “[a] drug manufacturer may be required to
provide a specific warning for an off-label use.”550 Conversely,
“warnings must be given for off-label use only where there is
empirical evidence of harm that is known by the manufacturer.551
Most courts also hold that an off-label use is “foreseeable” to
defendants claimed to have promoted it. This foreseeability
rationale originated in cases involving prescription drugs. “[A]
warning [may be] required” where the defendant “fostered and
encouraged” an off-label use.552 “[A] manufacturer of a
pharmaceutical has a duty to disclose to physicians and patients
material facts about the risks of the drug, particularly when it is
engaged in off-label marketing.”553 The same foreseeability
exclusive remedy,” separate claims concerning off-label use are not available.
Reddick, 2021 WL 798294, at *11 (applying Louisiana statute). Off-label use
and promotion are not considered relevant in cases involving on-label use.
Trisvan, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (“Plaintiff cannot complain of the risks
associated with off-label use of [a drug] when he was prescribed the medication
for on-label use.” (citation omitted)); Z.H. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 1:14CV176,
2017 WL 104168, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2017) (Evidence of off-label
promotion was excluded as irrelevant in on-label use case.); In re Risperdal®
Litig., No. 738, 2017 WL 3496520, at *5 (Pa. C.P. July 26, 2017) (Evidence of
off-label promotion is “factually irrelevant” absent off-label use in the case.).
548. Norabuena, 86 N.E.3d at 1209.
549. Trisvan, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 402. However, off-label uses that plaintiff
did not undergo were outside the scope of any duty. Id. at. 403; see Hernandez
v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 15 C 11176, 2017 WL 3263456, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1,
2017) (applying “the elements necessary to establish a[ warning] negligence
claim” to off-label use facts).
550. Wendell v. SmithKline Beecham (Wendell III), No. 09-CV-04124-CW,
2018 WL 6267855, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2018) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see T.M., 214 A.3d at 728 (imposing liability for
“known risk” of off-label use); Proctor, 682 N.E.2d at 1212 (same).
551. Stiens, 2020 WL 7266398, at *8 (citation omitted).
552. Proctor, 682 N.E.2d at 1212.
553. In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. (Neurontin
III), 618 F. Supp. 2d 96, 110 (D. Mass. 2009); see Drake v. Allergan, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 3d 382, 392 (D. Vt. 2014) (holding that evidence that defendant “marketed
[the drug] to young physicians so that they would incorporate the drug into their
clinical practices” supported negligent warning claim); Arters, 921 F. Supp. 2d
at 819-20 (assuming state-law duty not to promote off-label use “in a fraudulent
or unreasonably dangerous way”); Hosler, 2012 WL 4792983, at *3-4
(“[e]ngaging in off-label promotion” to plaintiff’s prescriber stated warningrelated claim); Smith v. Pfizer Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)
(determining that off-label promotion established that the off-label use was
“foreseeable”); Smith, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (same); Wendell II, 2010 WL
271423, at *3 (finding that allegation of off-label promotion creates duty to give
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arguments have also been accepted in off-label use decisions
involving medical devices, where plaintiffs must likewise establish
“that [defendant] was aware or should have been aware of the
dangers inherent in those off-label uses and yet failed to warn of
those dangers.”554 Additionally, one court engrafted onto state law
the FDA’s regulatory rationale that promotion creates new intended
uses,555 to rule that allegedly inadequate off-label warnings were a
failure to provide “adequate directions for use” under FDA
regulations.556
Also employing a foreseeability rationale, albeit not dependent
upon claims of off-label promotion, some courts have held that
large-scale off-label use of a manufacturer’s product, without more,
creates a duty to warn. “[I]t is precisely th[e] fact − that off-label use
allegedly provided a majority of [defendant’s] sales − that would
create [its] duty to physicians not to be misleading about the
risk.”557
A number of decisions simply impose the usual prescription
medical product warning duties without any allowance for the offlabel nature of the use at issue. Courts have even used a defendant’s
FDA-required statement that the safety of off-label use had “not
been established” against it:
[A] reasonable juror could disagree with the assertion that the
[product] was just as safe as any other. For example, the [product’s]
own label provided that “[t]he safety and effectiveness of this device
for [the off-label use] have not been established.”558

adequate warning); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. (Neurontin
IV), C.A. No. 04-cv-10739-PBS, 2011 WL 3852254, at *47 (D. Mass. Aug. 31,
2011) (concluding that a duty “arose because [defendant] was marketing the
drug for unapproved uses by disclosing positive information about the drug
while suppressing negative information in its possession”), aff’d, 712 F.3d 21
(1st Cir. 2013); Dellinger, 2006 WL 2057654, at *6 (ruling that off-label
promotion failed to warn doctors “reasonably” concerning “dangerous
propensities”); Pietrowski-Valdez v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. BC684293, 2020
WL 5900886, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 28, 2020) (deciding that off-label use
“does not relieve [defendant] from negligence or strict products liability with
respect to [the product’s] use in a particular case”).
554. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 784; see Cornett I, 998 A.2d at 565 (Off-label
use presented “foreseeable dangers” given alleged promotion.).
555. See supra notes 207-213 and accompanying text.
556. Alton, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (“[T]he off-label application that resulted
in [plaintiff’s] injury was an intended use. As such, [plaintiff’s] allegations
describe conduct in contravention of [defendant’s] duties under the FDCA,
namely its duty to provide ‘adequate directions’ as to that intended use in its
product labeling.” (citations omitted)).
557. McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying Texas
law); see Medics Pharm. Corp. v. Newman, 378 S.E.2d 487, 488-89 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that “regular” off-label use supported imposition of negligence
duty to warn); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-MD-1789 (JFK), 2010
WL 4273310, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2010) (applying “foreseeability” in off-label
use case without reference to promotion) (applying Florida law).
558. Horrillo, 2012 WL 6553611, at *4; see Knowlton v. Deseret Med., Inc.,

110

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

“[T]hat [defendant’s product] might be used in on-or-off label
capacity . . . does not weaken the [plaintiff’s] medical evidence”
where the “correlation” with risk was not “dependent on . . . the
[product’s] use in an intended or off-label context.”559 Finally, on
unusual facts, one court held an off-label use “foreseeable” when it
had previously been in the label but then removed at FDA’s
direction.560
Allegations that a defendant misrepresented an off-label use
as having FDA labeling approval when the use did not have been
found to state a claim. “[A] false statement of FDA approval is
actionable.”561 Less frequently, courts have allowed claims of
promotion of an off-label use that was “rejected” for labeling and
marketing by FDA.562
Off-label
promotion
may
also
be
actionable
as
overpromotion,563 “if the defendants by their actions nullified the
warning, it could be plausible that the warning would have been

930 F.2d 116, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1991) (engaging in warning liability discussion
without acknowledging that off-label use involved) (applying Massachusetts
law); Drake, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 390-91 (applying general heeding presumption in
off-label case); Woodbury v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 93 C 7118, 1997
WL 201571, at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1997) (applying general “knew or should
have known” standard to off-label use); Zitney v. Wyeth LLC, 243 A.3d 241, 243
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (mentioning off-label use, but not referencing is in warning
discussion).
559. Bee, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 288.
560. Richards, 625 P.2d at 1197 (Defendant should have used “more
effective means” to communicate removal of the indication beyond mere
deletion.).
561. Putney, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 07-108-P-H, 2007 WL 3047159, at *6 (D.
Me. Oct. 17, 2007) (quoting Braintree Labs., Inc. v. NephroTech, Inc., No. 962459-JWL, 1997 WL 94237, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997)). Allegedly false
“representations of FDA approval” are most frequently litigated between
business competitors under the Lanham Act. See Alpharma, Inc. v. Pennfield
Oil Co., 411 F.3d 934, 940-41 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing claim); Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Pharms., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 516 (8th Cir.
1996) (affirming judgment on claim); Genus Lifesciences, Inc. v. Lannett Co.,
378 F. Supp. 3d 823, 833-34 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (allowing claim), reconsideration
denied, No. 18-CV-07603-WHO, 2019 WL 4168958 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019);
Arbor Pharms., LLC v. ANI Pharms., Inc., No. CV 17-4910 (DWF/LIB), 2018
WL 3677923, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2018) (allowing claim); Belcher Pharms.,
LLC v. Hospira, Inc., No. 8:17-CV-2353-T-30JSS, 2018 WL 4643292, at *5-6
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2018) (finding claim not adequately pleaded); Innovative
Health Sols., Inc. v. DyAnsys, Inc., No. 14-CV-05207-SI, 2015 WL 2398931, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (allowing claim); Par Sterile Prods., LLC v.
Fresenius Kabi USA LLC, No. 14 C 3349, 2015 WL 1263041, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 17, 2015) (allowing claim); JHP Pharms., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp.
3d 992, 1000-01 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (allowing claim).
562. James v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:10-CV-2082, 2011 WL 292240, at *3-4
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (“Plaintiff alleges that Defendant marketed a product
to be used in a manner that the FDA expressly rejected.”).
563. See BECK & VALE, supra note 225, §2.06 (discussing “overpromotion”
theory of liability in prescription medical product litigation).
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inadequate as if it had been physically removed.”564
Finally, off-label promotion allegations have not created any
greater duty to non-users of the defendant’s product that would
support “innovator liability”565 theories asserting duties that extend
to users of competing generic products, under either
misrepresentation or Restatement §324A566 “undertaking” theories
of liability.567 Nothing about off-label use or promotion favors
requiring “brand-name manufacturers [to] bear all of the potential
liability, particularly where it is unclear what the impact of such a
potentially enormous shift in liability may have on the development
of new drugs.”568
3. Decisions Predicated On A Lesser Duty To Warn
Some courts − mostly in cases involving §510(k) medical
devices − have asserted an intermediate position that the duty to
warn, in an off-label use context, is limited to informing physicians
that the use in question is, in fact, off-label. A warning that only
certain uses were included on FDA-approved labeling has sufficed:
[W]hile the package insert did not expressly state that the [device]
had not been approved for [the use in question], or that any such use
was experimental, the insert did contain the following warning:
“. . .[A]ll of the components of the [device] are intended for [use in] the
[specified sites] only.” This warning, to an experienced doctor . . .
could only mean that the [device] had not been approved for use
[elsewhere]. Thus, despite plaintiff’s claims to the contrary, there can

564. Mendez I, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 300; see Ebel, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 775
(“Overpromotion can include promotion of illegal off-label use.” (footnote
omitted)). But see Hawkins II, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 1164 (“The fact Defendants may
have engaged in false off-label promotion is only a predicate step in an
overpromotion claim.” (citation omitted)).
565. Innovator liability is a controversial theory whereby a company
originally marketing a branded prescription drug becomes liable for injuries
caused by competing generic products, because generic products used the same
allegedly inadequate warning originally created for branded drug. See BECK &
VALE, supra note 225, §8.09.
566. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §324A (1965).
567. See In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 62,
74-82 (D. Mass. 2017) (applying Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
New York, and Oklahoma law).
568. Id. at 80; see Frei, 2020 WL 1165975, at *6 (finding no claim for
defendant’s “benefit[ing] from” unrelated manufacturer’s alleged off-label
promotion and having a duty to “counteract” that promotion); Wells v. Wyeth
Pharms., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 3d 534, 539-40 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding that
innovator liability was “unwarranted” by allegations of off-label use); Mitchell
v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. A-16-CV-574-LY-ML, 2016 WL 11479893, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2016) (concluding that innovator liability was
“unwarranted” by allegations of off-label use), adopted, 2017 WL 10185486
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017); Amiodarone Cases, 2019 WL 9048827, at *5 (applying
general remote causation standards to innovator liability, off-label promotion
claims).
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be no dispute that the package insert contained language that
adequately warned against the precise usage and injuries in
question.569

Other courts have disagreed with this approach. Analogously
to majority rule in informed consent cases,570 these courts deny any
duty to specify that particular uses are off-label since off-label use
is not itself a medical “risk.”
Plaintiff argues that the package insert failed to mention the FDA’s
disapproval of the [particular off-label use]. . . . [S]uffice it to say that
the regulatory status of a product does not constitute a risk of surgery
and need not be disclosed to a patient prior to obtaining consent.571

Another group of decisions holds, in cases where on- and offlabel uses have similar risks, that substantive warnings accurately
describing those risks are adequate even if they do not reference the
product’s off-label uses.
Much of the argument before us is directed to the proposition that
because the physicians were warned that the use of the drug for
contraception had not been approved, [defendant] cannot be held
liable. However, . . . the more crucial question is whether the
warnings were adequate to warn a physician of the possibility that
[the drug] might be causing the condition experienced by [plaintiff].
In this respect, it must be noted that the insert explicitly states that
[the conditions the plaintiff suffered] are adverse reactions which
have been observed. . . .
* * **
The fact remains that the insert warned of the possibility of [the
relevant risks]. . . . The evidence was insufficient to present a jury
question on the inadequacy of the package insert to warn of the

569. Sita, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 259-60 (citation omitted); accord Kincer v. Danek
Med., Inc., No. 96-3240, 1999 WL 1866402, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 1999) (
“[A] physician would have been aware that if he used the . . . device for [that
use], he would be using the device in an off-label manner.”); Clark, 1999 WL
613316, at *5 (Manufacturer should have warned “about the FDA status of [the
device] or about the FDA non-approval for this use.”). Kincer is representative
of a dozen similar decisions issued by the same court in 1999. See James Beck
& John Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCA-Based Causes of Action in
the Tort Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
389, 433 n.2 (2000) (providing a complete list).
570. See Part VI(A) supra.
571. Bogle, 1999 WL 1132313, at *5 (citation omitted); see Jones v.
Medtronic, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2015) (holding that “medical
device companies, pursuant to the FDCA and the MDA, do not have an
affirmative duty to inform patients of unapproved procedures”), aff’d in part &
rev’d in part on other grounds, 745 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2018) (preemption);
Jones v. Sofamor S.N.C., Nos. 1:96-CV-3167-RWS, 1:96-CV-3170-RWS, 1999
WL 1062103, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 1999) (concluding that failure to mention
that use was off-label “is not evidence of the failure to warn of risks associated
with the product”).
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potential consequences of the use of the drug.572

Conversely, where the same risk inhering in both on- and off-label
use of a product is the subject of an inadequate warning, the risk
may be considered “foreseeable,” and liability imposed, without
regard to off-label promotion.573
Beyond existing precedent, some commentators’ suggestions
for FDA regulation of off-label promotion might, in turn, limit
manufacturers’ duty to warn of off-label risks to some degree.574
4. Decisions Finding No Duty To Warn Of An Off-label Use
A few courts have found no duty to warn of the risks of an offlabel use. The leading decision in this category held:
[W]hen a physician, as a learned intermediary, has been provided
with the indications for which a drug is effective, but prescribes it for
a non-indicated use, the manufacturer should not be exposed to tort
liability for any defect in labeling. . . . [T]he manufacturer had no
duty to warn of any deleterious effects that might be associated with
misuse of the product, i.e., its use for treatment of a non-indicated
condition.575

572. Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So. 2d 680, 682-83 (Fla. 1990) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted); see Johnson v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 1-17-1288,
2018 WL 1628414, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 30, 2018) (determining that,
regardless of off-label use, risk warnings were “adequate as a matter of law”);
Trisvan, 2018 WL 6573434, at *6 (declaring that a plaintiff must allege failure
to warn of risks “unique risks associated with his off-label use” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 64748 (rejecting contention that off-label use must be specified despite risks
plaintiff suffered being expressly warned against); Ponthieux v. Danek Med.,
Inc., Nos. 96-3141, 95-2542, 1999 WL 33486689, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. May 28,
1999) (finding no duty to warn of off-label status where warning included the
risks that plaintiff suffered); Broderick, 1999 WL 1062135, at *5 (explaining
that, even though the package insert did not mention off-label use, “the warning
on the package insert clearly and unambiguously identified the types of possible
adverse affects [sic] a patient could suffer”); Hanohano v. Uppal, Nos. 257344,
278750, 1997 WL 33426414, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 3, 1997) (holding that a
warning claim failed as a matter of law where the labeling listed “all known or
knowable risks” that plaintiff encountered from an off-label use). But cf. Boutte
v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 732, 738 (M.D. La. 2014) (asserting
that, although defendant “expressly warned of the side effect [plaintiff]
complains of,” a warning could be inadequate because off-label promotion
created “separate product”).
573. Bee, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 287. But see Green v. BDI Pharms., 803 So. 2d
68, 75-76 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that a patient’s off-label use of an OTC
product, which “he never took . . . for its intended purpose” and “vastly
exceed[ed] the recommended dosage,” was not a “reasonably anticipated use” as
a matter of law).
574. See Horvath, supra note 5, at 132 (contending that a “stratified” “Not
Supported by Strong Evidence” warning “might be construed as an adequate
warning against the off-label use”).
575. Robak v. Abbott Labs., 797 F. Supp. 475, 476 (D. Md. 1992) (citations
omitted); see Morris v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. BPG-13-1107, 2015 WL
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“[D]rug manufacturers are being held accountable in courts of law
for injuries caused by these drugs only when the[ir] [labeling]
recommendations are followed.”576
However, all the decisions in the prior sections finding a
greater or lesser duty to warn about risks of off-label use stand in
at least implicit opposition577 to these few decisions that treat offlabel use as per se product misuse. As such, they are also in tension
with the general recognition of off-label use as legal, widespread,
and within the prevailing standard of care.578
There is also authority for the proposition that a strict liability
claim – as opposed to negligence − cannot be based solely on offlabel use, as opposed to some allegedly “defective” condition of the
product itself:
The complaint also fails to state a claim insofar as it attempts to
premise a products liability claim on off-label use: products liability
law concerns products, not the uses of products.579

5. Causation Issues in Warning-Based Off-Label Use Cases
Insofar as state common law recognizes liability for various
aspects of off-label promotion, such claims are also subject to the
same causation-related requirements of any other warning-based
claim.
After the approval process, and after the device has reached the
market, the causation element is that but for defendant’s off label
marketing, the [product] would not have been used in the manner
contrary to the FDA approved labeling.580

Causation in off-label promotion cases can be defeated in a
number of ways. Remoteness is one ground. Alleged off-label
promotion, occurring long before the plaintiff’s eventual use of a
generic product made by someone else, have been found non-causal:

1757465, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2015) (“The manufacturer is similarly under no
obligation to warn the patient of risks associated with an off-label or nonindicated use of a drug and, therefore, cannot be held liable in the event the
physician prescribes a drug for such use.”) (following Robak).
576. Mueller, 221 N.W.2d at 42-43; cf. Pluto v. Searle Labs., 690 N.E.2d 619,
621 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that there is no duty to warn of “increased risk”
from product use where product neither caused nor was indicated to prevent
that risk).
577. Not infrequently, this no-duty position has been expressly rejected.
E.g., Wendell III, 2018 WL 6267855, at *7; Meharg, 2010 WL 711317, at *2 n.6;
Knipe, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 628-29; Murray v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., No.
130401990, 2016 WL 11441684, at *4 (Pa. C.P. Mar. 10, 2016), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part on other grounds, 180 A.3d 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (choice of
law).
578. See Parts II-III supra.
579. McCormick, 101 A.3d at 490.
580. Mendez I, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 304.
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Plaintiff points to evidence of alleged labeling and promoting
misconduct conducted by Defendant . . . between 1985 and 2004. . . .
However, Plaintiff fails to draw a connection between this alleged
misconduct and the decision of Plaintiff’s physicians . . . to prescribe
[the drug] to [him] in 2011. . . . Thus, even assuming that the
Defendants engaged in misconduct prior to 2004, Plaintiff fails to
allege facts showing that [he] suffered any harm as a result of those
actions.581

Similarly, claimed defects concerning a product’s labeled
indications do not permit a claim by a plaintiff who was prescribed
the product for a different, off-label use.582
Lack of reliance also severs the causal chain. If the prescribing
physician was not exposed to the alleged off-label promotion, or did
not pay attention to it, causation cannot be established.583 Reliance
is not presumed, even in the face of allegations of widespread offlabel promotion, since “fraud-on-the-market” type theories of
causation are not permitted in product liability litigation. “[A]
‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory” based on off-label promotion “has no
application in a products liability case.”584 Such allegations would
gut the learned intermediary doctrine by eliminating the
requirement that a plaintiff’s physician be influenced by the offlabel promotion:
[I]n order to establish reliance and/or causation, [plaintiffs] would
581. Allain, 2015 WL 178038, at *4; accord Allain v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc.,
No. 2:14-CV-00280-KOB, 2018 WL 1071290, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2018)
(finding no causation as a matter of law where last alleged off-label promotion
was “three years before [the prescriber] was licensed to practice medicine, and
13 years before he prescribed” the drug at issue); see Stephens, 70 F. Supp. 3d
at 1251 (determining that causation was not adequately alleged where off-label
promotion occurred “more than five years” before plaintiff was prescribed drug).
582. Lyman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-262, 2012 WL 2970627, at *17 (D. Vt.
July 20, 2012).
583. Martin I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1040 (dismissing complaint that “has not
alleged which misrepresentations were relied on by her and her surgeon”);
Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1038 (holding that plaintiffs must allege that
their “physicians relied on these [off-label promotion] misrepresentations”
(citation omitted)); Smith, 2014 WL 2547813, at *6 (dismissing complaint that
was “wholly void of a description of the actions [defendant] took to promote or
market the [product] in an off-label manner . . . as well as information linking
those actions to her injuries”); Hawkins I, 2014 WL 346622, at *13 (finding
fraud not pleaded where “Plaintiff fail[ed] to allege . . . the content of the offlabel promotion directed at his spine surgeon and on which the surgeon relied”);
Buccelli, 2015 WL 398594, at *4 (decreeing that a plaintiff must allege “specific
omissions and misrepresentations made” either directly or to the prescriber);
Lawrence, 2013 WL 4008821, at *7 (requiring plaintiff to “identify what
representations were made to them or their physicians and allegedly relied on
by them in deciding to go ahead with the surgical procedure at issue”).
584. White I, 2019 WL 1339613, at *8; see Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (Martin
II), 63 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1060 (D. Ariz. 2014) (holding that “[p]laintiffs [alleging
off-label promotion] cannot pursue a ‘fraud of the market’ theory”); Cales, 2014
WL 6600018, at *12 (ruling that actionable off-label promotion cannot be proven
by “fraud on the market”).
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have to demonstrate doctor-by-doctor that defendants’ fraudulent
misrepresentations or omissions during the off-label promotion
caused the doctor to prescribe the medicine. . . . [S]tatistical analysis
cannot fulfill these requirements because it does not take into account
any other factors that may have led doctors to prescribe [the drug] for
off-label indications. . . . In sum, statistical probability does not
substitute for actual inquiry, as a general showing of percentages
does not tend to prove that the class members’ specific doctors relied
upon Defendants’ statements or that Defendants’ statements were
the proximate cause of an injury.585

Failure to “identif[y] the representatives, what was said, when
it was said, to whom it was said − whether it was communicated to
Plaintiff’s physicians − and how these statements relate to
Plaintiff’s [off-label] prescription” has been fatal to an off-label
promotion-based claim.586 “Plaintiff must not only provide some
evidence of a marketing plan to promote the off-label use . . ., she
must also provide proof that the marketing plan actually reached
the prescribing physician.”587
585. Clark v. Pfizer, Inc., 990 A.2d 17, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharms., Inc., 52 A.3d 498, 510 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (following Clark).
586. Solomon v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 07-1102 (FLW), 2009
WL 5206120, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Texas law). The same
MDL judge issued several other opinions on the same day that reached the same
conclusion under other states’ laws. See Street v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A.
Nos. 3:07-cv-1182 (FLW), et al., 2009 WL 5216989, at *10-12 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
2009) (applying Ohio law); Money v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 3:07cv-1100 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216987, at *8-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying
Oklahoma law); Adkins v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 3:07-cv-00901
(FLW), 2009 WL 5216986, at *6-8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Tennessee
law); Smith v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 3:06-cv-6053 (FLW), 2009 WL
5216982, at *7-9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Pennsylvania law); Bunting
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 3:06-cv-6052 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216981,
at *6-8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Colorado law); Mayberry v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., C.A. Nos. 07-942 (FLW), 07-1099 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216968,
at *8-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Mississippi law); Begley v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., C.A. Nos. 06-6051 (FLW), 06-6269 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216967,
at *9-11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Illinois law); Mattson v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., C.A. No. 07-908 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216966, at *9-11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
2009) (applying California law); Moscinski v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No.
06-6055 (FLW), 2009 WL 5216962, at *8-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying
Wisconsin law); Hall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. Nos. 06-5203 (FLW), 066050 (FLW), 2009 WL 5206144, at *8-11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying
Florida law); Cooper v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 07-885 (FLW), 2009
WL 5206130, at *8-11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Alabama law); Barge v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.A. No. 3:07-cv-00783 (FLW), 2009 WL 5206127, at
*9-11 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009) (applying Georgia law); Robinson v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., C.A. No. 3:07-cv-267 (FLW), 2009 WL 5206126, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec.
30, 2009) (applying Maryland law). But see Carr-Davis v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., C.A. No. 07-1098 (FLW), 2009 WL 5206122, at *7-10 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2009)
(reaching different result because Missouri consumer fraud claim, at the time,
did not require reliance) (applying Missouri law).
587. Ebel, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 777 (citations omitted); see Priest, 2016 WL
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Some non-product liability decisions have been more liberal
with physician reliance issues in addressing off-label promotion
issues. Not all off-label promotion liability theories without
physician-specific proof of reliance have been rejected as “fraud on
the market.” A trio of First Circuit RICO decisions are the most
notable contrary precedent.588 They permitted what was essentially
fraud-on-the-market causation to suffice, even to the point of
disregarding affirmative prescriber non-reliance testimony:589
[Defendant] now argues that because doctors exercise independent
medical judgment in making decisions about prescriptions, the
actions of these doctors are independent intervening causes. But
[defendant’s] scheme relied on the expectation that physicians would
base their prescribing decisions in part on [its] fraudulent marketing.
The fact that some physicians may have considered factors other than
[defendant’s] detailing materials in making their prescribing
decisions does not add such attenuation to the causal chain as to
eliminate proximate cause.590

Instead, statistical proof that discounted physician behavior
furnished sufficient proof of causation in these RICO cases.591
Prescribing physician testimony supporting the efficacy of the offlabel use could be ignored, even criticized, by the plaintiffs’ nonphysician expert witnesses.592 In product liability cases, however,
only a couple of decisions have relaxed causation/reliance
requirements in actions alleging off-label promotion.593
11162903, at *13 (dismissing off-label promotion claim for “fail[ure] to
adequately allege that [defendant’s] marketing efforts influenced [plaintiff’s]
doctor to prescribe”); Sita, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 263 (holding that “plaintiff must
establish that [the prescriber] was influenced by the illegal marketing efforts”);
cf. Khasin v. Hershey Co., No. 5:12-CV-01862-EJD, 2014 WL 1779805, at *3
(N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014) (dismissing all claims involving “off-label advertising”
of food where plaintiff “did not view” the advertising at issue).
588. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. (Harden), 712 F.3d 60
(1st Cir. 2013); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. (Aetna), 712 F.3d
51 (1st Cir. 2013); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig. (Kaiser), 712
F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013).
589. Reliance is not a required element in RICO. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653 (2008).
590. Kaiser, 712 F.3d at 39.
591. Id. at 30 (Expert testimony that “established causation by performing
a regression analysis on sales information against promotional spending” was
sufficient.).
592. Id. (Economist expert testified “that self-reporting from physicians
about patterns of practice that may be controversial shows both conscious
reluctance and unconscious bias, which lead them to deny being influenced. As
a result, it is preferable to examine objectively the causal association between
promotion and sales using econometric models.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see Aetna, 712 F.3d at 57-58 & n.3 (following Kaiser);
Harden, 712 F.3d at 67-68 (following Kaiser). Harden also involved state-law
claims, but the record as to such claims was “substantially incomplete” and not
separately discussed. 712 F.3d at 70.
593. See Dellinger, 2006 WL 2057654, at *7 (suggesting in dictum that offlabel promotion to a prescriber’s “colleagues” might be sufficient); In re Yasmin
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Some jurisdictions view off-label use as a form of misuse that
breaks the chain of causation. “[T]o the extent [plaintiffs] take issue
with the off-label use of the [product] as opposed to the promotion
of that use, their recourse is in a malpractice claim against the
physician that prescribed the off-label use, not in a products liability
claim.”594 “[I]f a physician violates the manufacturer’s warnings by
using a drug on a type of patient who should not receive that drug,
the manufacturer will not be considered the legal or proximate
cause of the patient’s injuries, and recovery against the
manufacturer will be barred.”595 However, this precedent is mostly
dated, and is in tension with the general recognition of off-label use
as common, legal, and often the medical standard of care.596 Given
the ubiquity of off-label use, most courts have declined to treat it as
unforeseeable misuse.597
A physician’s failure to consult the product’s labeling, and thus
the consequent failure to realize that a particular prescription was
off-label, has been found “foreseeable” and therefore not a
superseding cause.598 Nor is off-label use “per se” evidence that a
prescriber would have ignored the drug label in toto.599 However,
that same physician’s conscious decision whether or not to pass
along off-label risk information to the patient is a matter of
independent medical judgment.
The patient is expected to and, it can be presumed, does place primary
reliance upon [the doctor’s independent] judgment. The physician
decides what facts should be told to the patient.600

& YAZ (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL
6812683, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2011) (holding that “more than 200” detailing
visits raised “an inference . . . that said doctor was exposed to the media at
issue”) (law not stated).
594. Shuker, 885 F.3d at 775 n.15 (citations omitted).
595. Gaston, 588 P.2d at 338 n.9 see Peterson v. Parke Davis & Co., 705 P.2d
1001, 1003 (Colo. App. 1985) (prescribing drug at dose levels greater than called
for in the labeling constituted superseding “misuse”); Baron, 840 N.Y.S.2d at
448-49 (finding that physician’s decision to use product off-label defeated
causation in consumer fraud claim); Robak, 797 F. Supp. At 476 (determining
that “when a physician decides to dispense an ethical drug for a condition for
which it is not indicated, the manufacturer should not be held responsible for
the consequences on any product liability theory”).
596. See Part I supra.
597. See Fertik, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 106. (“[T]here is no controlling authority
that immunizes [defendant] from a product defect claim based on a foreseeable
‘off-label’ use.”).
598. Richards, 625 P.2d at 1196-97. Richards is an off-label rejection of the
broader argument that a physician’s failure to read product labeling is generally
a superseding cause. However, most precedent precludes causation from being
established where an allegedly inadequate warning goes unread. See BECK &
VALE, supra note 225, §2.05[1].
599. Bee, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 294 n.23 (reasoning “that [the prescriber] used
the drugs here in an off-label context does not per se mean that he did not look
at or consider language on the drugs’ labels”).
600. Parks, 1999 WL 1129706, at *6 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
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Under this rationale, a physician’s affirmative decision not to
discuss off-label use with a patient should insulate a manufacturer
from any warning related claim.601
While not often litigated, a fully informed patient may also
assume the risks of off-label use.602 There is “no reason why a
patient should not be allowed to make an informed decision to go
outside currently approved medical methods.”603

D. Off-Label Use and Express Warranty Claims
Express warranty, as a theory, is an uncomfortable fit with offlabel use, since by definition the product’s labeling will not
ordinarily such uses.604 Nevertheless, assuming that the
manufacturer did in fact make some kind of such affirmative offlabel statements that otherwise qualified as an express warranty,605
marks omitted).
601. A “treating physician’s decision not to inform a patient of the risk of
injury is an intervening cause, which severs any causal connection between the
patient’s injury and the manufacturer.” Prohaska, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 445
(quoting Krasnopolsky v. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp. 1342, 1347
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)); accord Coleman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 648 n.17 (holding that a
manufacturer “could not be held liable for any misrepresentations by [the
prescriber], so long as [he] was himself adequately apprised of all relevant
information”); Uribe, 1999 WL 1129703, at *14 (concluding that a prescriber
who engaged in off-label use with “independent knowledge” of risks “constituted
an intervening actor between the defendants and [plaintiff] for purposes of the
defendants’ duty to warn”).
602. Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (Patient “expressly
assumed a risk in opting for the unconventional cancer treatment.” (footnote
omitted)) (applying New York law); see Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155, 1163 n.7
(Pa. 2015) (ruling that “an assumption-of-the-risk defense may be available . . .
[if] there is evidence that the plaintiff expressly consented to . . . the
unconventional or experimental treatment” (citation omitted)); Spar v. Cha, 907
N.E.2d 974, 982 n.2 (Ind. 2009) (finding that assumption of the risk “may exist
when a patient elects to forego conventional care and instead requests
experimental treatment”); Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 371 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2012) (acknowledging exception); Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898
A.2d 874, 884 n.41 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that a patient may “consent
to undergo an experimental medical procedure where the standards of care have
not yet been fully developed”) (all citing Boyle).
603. Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying New
York law); cf. 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a (2021) (allowing certain patients with no
other options to elect treatment with “eligible investigational drug[s]”).
604. As discussed in supra notes 228-234 and accompanying text, the FDA
may order inclusion of off-label information in certain circumstances, and
limited exceptions exist.
605. Off-label use is no different than other express warranty allegations,
requiring an “express” statement of the claimed warranty. E.g., Byrnes, 142 F.
Supp. 3d at 1274; Scovil, 2015 WL 880614, at *12; Mendez I, 28 F. Supp. 3d at
295; Schouest, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 707; Arthur, 2014 WL 3894365, at *8; Brady,
2014 WL 1377830, at *8; Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 788; Davenport, 302 F. Supp.
2d at 440-41 (all dismissing off-label express warranty claims for lack of any
affirmative statement).
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and those statements became part of the “basis of the bargain,”606
express warranty claims alleging those statements are false have
been allowed.
[T]o the extent the breach of express warranty claim is based on
voluntary statements, i.e., statements not approved by the FDA or
mandated by the FDA about the use or effectiveness of the product
for . . . off-label uses, a breach of express warranty claim may proceed
because federal law requires any warranty statement to be truthful
and accurate.607

Other cases have precluded express warranty claims involving
off-label use because a product’s FDA-regulated labeling “never
explicitly warranted that [the product] was safe for [an off-label]
use.608 FDA-regulated manufacturers are “not at liberty to provide
altered warnings or warranties.”609

E. Duty-To-Test Claims Involving Off-Label Uses
Courts evaluating whether a manufacturer has a duty to test
off-label uses have reached disparate results. Some cases reject any
heightened duty to test off-label uses:
If the court were to accept plaintiffs’ theory that [defendant] failed to
test before filing its NDA, then in any failure to warn case, the
presumption of adequacy accorded an FDA-approved drug labeling
could be nullified by a plaintiff contending that the FDA would have
approved a different warning had the defendant manufacturer done
additional tests. . . . Inherent in the drug approval process is the
expectation that warnings will be revised and often strengthened

606. Ramirez, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (stating that “any affirmation that
forms the basis of an express warranty must be between the seller and the
buyer,” not directed to the treating physician); accord Martin II, 63 F. Supp. 3d
at 1061; Arvizu, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 794; Zaccarello, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 1070;
Martin I, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1046; Beavers-Gabriel, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1043;
Dunbar, 2014 WL 3056026, at *8.
607. Cornett, 48 A.3d at 1058 (citation omitted); accord Angeles, 863 N.W.2d
at 422; McCormick, 101 A.3d at 492; see Brady, 2015 WL 11181971, at *8
(rejecting disclaimer defense); Beavers-Gabriel v. Medtronic, Inc., C.A. No. 1300686 JMS, 2015 WL 143944, at *10 (D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2015) (holding that
properly pleaded off-label express warranty allegations state claim); Alton, 970
F. Supp. 2d at 1104-05 (agreeing that an off-label warranty would not be within
“the disclaimer contained in the FDA-mandated labeling”); Houston I, 957 F.
Supp. 2d at 1180-81 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining that a claim “for
voluntarily making misleading warranties outside the label” with respect to offlabel use is theoretically valid) (ruling that plaintiff failed to allege how it was
the “basis of the bargain”); Knipe, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26 (allowing off-label
use-based express warranty claim); Cabana v. Stryker Biotech, LLC, No.
BC465313, 2012 WL 3876245 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (same).
608. Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 395 (6th Cir. 2013)
(applying Tennessee law).
609. Moore v. Zydus Pharms. (USA), Inc., 277 F. Supp. 3d 873, 887 (E.D. Ky.
2017).
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over time.610

“Manufacturers are neither required nor expected to submit
labeling reflecting all of a drug’s possible uses.”611 Courts have
reached similar conclusions in medical device litigation:
Imposing liability for breach of a purported “independent duty to
conduct long-term testing” would be beyond the pale of any known
[state] tort doctrine, because, inter alia, the causal link between
Plaintiff’s known harm, and the unknown outcome of the hypothetical
testing is entirely speculative.612

However, where the manufacturer allegedly “actively
marketed its products for off-label . . . use,” other courts have
allowed claims predicated on a duty to test medical devices for risks
associated with the promoted off-label uses, particularly given the
FDA’s claimed “repeated refusal” to allow labeling and marketing
of that use:
Had [defendant] elected to promote and market its [device] only for
those uses cleared by the FDA, perhaps [it] would have no duty to
conduct such testing. But there is evidence in the record from which
a jury could conclude that [defendant] actively marketed its products
for off-label . . . use without conducting any relevant safety studies.613

Similarly, some courts have decided that concerted off-label
promotion could, in the context of design or warning claims, require
the defendant to test the use being promoted:
[T]he defendants’ marketing efforts, which encouraged doctors to
prescribe [the drug] for off-label uses, is [sic] relevant to the plaintiff’s
negligence claim. . . . If a drug maker engages in an extended,
coordinated campaign to increase a drug’s off-label usage, a jury may
find that the company breached its duty of care by failing to
adequately ensure that the drug is safe for such usage. . . . [A]
marketing campaign is relevant to whether the defendants’ efforts to
test [the drug’s] safety for off-label uses were reasonable.614

610. Bailey, 37 A.3d at 573.
611. Richardson, 44 S.W.3d at 10 (citation omitted).
612. Phillippi v. Stryker Corp., No. 2:08-CV-02445-JAM-KJN, 2010 WL
2650596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (citations omitted); accord Seavey, 2014
WL 1876957, at *10 n.9 (noting that “the Court must decline Plaintiff’s
invitation to question the adequacy of the testing process, as it is not this
Court’s place to challenge the adequacy of the FDA’s regulatory process in a
warning context”).
613. Krumpelbeck v. Breg, Inc., 491 F. App’x 713, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2012)
(applying Ohio law). This failure to conduct off-label testing theory has, to date,
been adopted only in the context of one risk of this particular type of medical
device. See Huggins v. Stryker Corp., 932 F. Supp. 2d 972, 989-90 (D. Minn.
2013); Placencia, 2012 WL 5877624, at *4-5; Staub v. Breg, Inc., No. CV 1002038-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 1078335, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012); Monroe v.
Zimmer U.S. Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1036-37 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Hamilton v.
Breg, Inc., C.A. No. 2:09-CV-146, 2011 WL 780541, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20,
2011) (all reaching same result as Krumpelbeck).
614. Smith, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (denying motion to exclude evidence of
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On the other hand, manufacturers that do undertake to test
off-label uses may nonetheless find themselves sued for “promoting”
those off-label uses by virtue of having tested them.615

VIII. CONCLUSION
Off-label use has had a long and significant history in
American medical practice. Such widespread and accepted medical
therapies as the use of aspirin to reduce risk of heart attack and the
prescription of Viagra (originally approved to treat chest pain)
against impotency, began as off-label uses.616 Off-label use was also
the origin of the cosmetic uses for Retin-A and Botox.617 Indeed, oral
contraception − perhaps the most socially consequential new drug
use of the modern era – began as an off-label use, since the FDA
originally approved “the Pill” solely for “infertility and menstrual
irregularities” in 1957,618 and not for contraception as an intended
use for almost another three years.619 In the interim:
[The manufacturer] did not have to market the pill as birth control
because men and women were learning for themselves what it could
do. It didn’t hurt, either, that the FDA had required . . . a warning on
each bottle that said [the drug] prevented ovulation. In other words,
the real purpose of this drug was listed as if it were a side effect. . . .
It was like a free ad.620

Since this author’s original off-label use article was written,
almost a quarter century ago, many of the myths and
misconceptions surrounding off-label use have been dispelled.
Others remain, such as the fate of the FDA’s increasingly tattered
ban on truthful off-label promotion, but at least appear to be on
their way to reasonable resolution. But the long process of
integrating off-label use and marketing into the legal mainstream
hardly means an end to these topics being litigated. The law, like
medical practice, is never static.

off-label marketing); see Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-144,
2015 WL 5258858, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2015) (finding that “denials of
approval from the FDA to receive an indication . . . [are] relevant to the issues
of [defendant’s] notice of the need to do further safety tests”).
615. See Neurontin III, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant’s “increased clinical testing and development for new off-label
usages” was part of an improper promotion scheme.).
616. Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion
of Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 47 (2005).
617. Pyott, 74 A.3d at 614-15; Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32
F.3d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1994).
618. JONATHAN EIG, THE BIRTH OF THE PILL 258 (2014).
619. Id. at 299.
620. Id. at 265 (quotation marks omitted); see id. at 260 (“Federal law
regulated the behavior of drug companies, but not that of doctors. Once a drug
was approved for any purpose, physicians were free to prescribe it liberally [for]
. . . ‘off-label uses.’” (alteration in original)).

